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GENERAL SUMMAR Y
The decade of the 1970s was characterised by fluctuations in the world
economy of a kind whicb had not been experienced in peacetime since the
1930s. Even with the wisest and most prudent fiscal and monetary policies
it would have been impossible to protect the Irish economy fully from the
world-wide recession. Our objective in this paper is to investigate what effect
fiscal policies had on tile evolution of the Irish economy over the period
1967 to 1980 and, with the benefit of hindsight, to attempt to formulate a
judgement as to the manner in which fiscal policy was planned and executed.
The "hindsight" from which we benefit has two major components: first
our access to data which are at once more detailed and accurate than those
available to successive Ministers of Finance at the time when they planned
their budget strategies and second our use of a formal model of how the
various sectors and agents in the economy interact with each other and evolve
over time. While the first component (more accurate data) is an unqualified
benefit, the second component (the model) is much more controversial since
there is no absolute consensus in the economics profession on broad areas
of macroeconomic theory and modelling practice. We are fully conscious of
this problem and hope that the reader will not interpret our formal and
detailed quantitative analysis as implying either ignorance or arrogance on our
part in respect of the current very active international research into the
foundations of macroeconomic theory and practice. It remains, of course,
for the reader to decide whether our judgement, in relation to the gross
simplifications needed in order to construct an operation’,d model of the
economy, has been good or bad.
In Chapter 2 of our paper we describe in detail the structure of our
macromodel of the Irish economy. Details of the exact formulation of all
the individual equations and statistical results are contained in Appendix 2,
with a full dictionary of the variables used given in Appendix 1. A view of
how an economy functions does not emerge after one constructs a formal
model. Rather, one must have a fairly clear idea on how the economy works
before expressing this view through the medium of mathematical/statistical
equations. The objective of Chapter 2 is to convey to the reader our con-
ception of the structure of the Irish economy. We divide our description into
three main "blocks": supply, absorption and income distribution. To talk
in any meaningful way about the supply side of the Irish economy requires
separate consideration, at t’he very least, of industry, agriculture and services.
The core of the industry sector involves the determination of industrial
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capacity output, the related long-run demands for labour and capital, the
short-run (or actual) labour and capital inputs, and the rate of capacity
utilisation. The concept of "export-led" growth motivates the determination
of capacity, and the determination of factor inputs is along fairly standard
neo-classical lines (meaning that, for example, employment and investment
are sensitive to relative factor prices as well as to output). The behaviour
of the agricultural sector is considerably more simple and is heavily influenced
by institutional, governmental and demographic forces. The service sector
has three subcomponents; a marketed services component (responsive to
demand and prices), a non-marketed component (consisting of non-public
authorities elements such as teachers, hospitals,etc.), which is almost entirely
state funded, and a public authorities component (public administration
and defence), which is considered as largely instrumental in nature. Two
further parts of the supply block deal with the determination of imports
and labour supply.
The second main block deals with the determination of domestic and
foreign absorption (i.e., consumption, investment, stock changes and exports)
and is of fairly standard form. The third and final block of the model trans-
lates the factor-based modelling of supply into the pattern of income dis-
tribution which results from the interaction of production and demand
activities, and yields the prices and incomes accruing to the sectoral and
expenditure categories used in the model. The basic inspiration for the
determination of prices and wages comes from the "Scandinavian" model.
We identify our industry sector with the "tradables" sector and the services
sector with the "non-tradables" sector. In the main variant of the model,
the price of tradables is determined on world markets. Wage inflation in both
tradable and non-tradable sectors adjusts to the "room" for wage increases
in the tradables sector, i.e., an increase which is consistent with a "normal"
profit share. Price inflation of non-tradables is determined by cost-push
forces and overall price inflation is a weighted average of both the tradable
and non-tradable elements. In addition, wage determination can be in fluenced
by deviations of the unemployment rate from its trend value (i.e., a Phillips
curve). The second component of the income distribution block deals with
state expenditure and revenue and with the financing of the resulting deficit.
The monetary environment is modelled using a conventional small-open-
economy (SOE) fixed exchange rate approach.
In Chapter 3 we describe tests we have carried out to examine the per-
formance of the model as a system representing the actual economy. Such
tests consist of various types of simulations and involve the calculation of
model "multipliers", where policy or exogenous variables are altered a-.d
the impact on the model relative to some control solution is examined.
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Such testing complements a study of the individual equations of the model
(Chapter 2), but does not constitute a "validation" of the model in any
formal or rigorous sense.
Chapter 4 deals with the methodology we have used to investigate the
detailed impact and delayed effects of fiscal policy actions. Basically we
wish to compare the effects of actual fiscal policy actions (which, of course,
yielded the historical outturn) with some idealised, or benchmark, fiscal
policy (which would yield a hypothetical outturn when simulated with the
model). The benchmark policy we choose attempts to pin down the concept
of "fiscal neutrality" or "fiscal indexation", concepts which, in one form or
another, are used in official publications dealing with fiscal policy. By look-
ing at the difference between the hypothetical outturn and the actual out-
turn we can attempt to quantify the extent to which actual fiscal actions
differed from "fiscal neutrality", defined in a specific way. This allows us
quantify the "discretionary" element of policy. These ideas are illustrated
in Chapter 4 using the year 1967 (the first year in our sample), and show
the impact (or immediate) effects of discretionary policy and the manner in
which these effects change over time as the economy evolves in response to
discretionary policy changes.
Chapters 5 and 6 represent the empirical core of our study. In them we
examine how the exercise of fiscal "discretion" (by our definition) has
influenced major economic indicators such as gross domestic product, real
personal disposable income, the balance of payments and the borrowing
requirement, unemployment, employment in the market sector of the
economy, consumption prices and wages. The period being examined (1967
to 1980) includes the run-up to the world economic crisis associated with
the first OPEC oil price rises. It also includes the full duration of the Fianna
F;iil administration of 1969173, the Fine GaeI-Labour Coalition of 1973/77
and all but six months of the succeeding Fianna Ffiil administration which
remained in office until June 1981. Two of Whitaker’s "financial turning
points" also fall in our period, namely the introduction of current budget
deficits as explicit policy measures from 1972 and the very "expansionary"
budgets of 1978[79 (Whitaker, 1983).
Our analysis of fiscal policy is presented under two headings: "incremental"
analysis, which attempts to isolate effects of discretionary policy changes
specific to each individual year of our sample, and "integral" analysis, which
attempts to quantify the effects of pursuing a policy of continual strict fiscal
indexation from an initial year (1967) to a terminal year (1980).
in the case of "incremental" analysis, we present our results in a tabular
form which permits the identification of the impact effects of each year’s
specific discretionary fiscal changes and the delayed effects of these changes.
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Some broad conclusions can be drawn from such tables:
(i) Discretionary fiscal policy since 1967 can be classified in five periods.
From 1967 to 1971, discretionary policy was not very active and
the current budget was preserved in balance. The period 1972 to
1975 was characterised by much greater fiscal activism, and during
1974 and 1975 a very explicit counter-cyclical policy was pursued,
leading to large overall deficits and, in particular, increasingly large
planned current deficits. Discretionary fiscal policy in 1976 was
contractlonary and, glvcn that world economic growth had resumed,
was of a counter-cyclical stance. The change of administration in
1977 initiated two-and-a-half years of unbridled discretionary fiscal
expansion which was strongly pro-cyclical. Finally, policy imple-
mented in 1980 ceased to be expansionary but did not attempt to
correct the accumulated fiscal imbalance.
(ii)Within such a broad classification, two budgets stand out as being of
particular interest. In both 1971 and 1976 the c~onsequences of fiscal
discretion were particularly inflationary, leading to increments to
wage inflation of 3.9 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively. In the
case of 1971, the underlying increase in world inflation appears to
have been underestimated by the authorities and fiscal drag (par-
tlcnlarly through the system of direct taxation) was very inflationary
in its consequences. In 1976 an explicit policy of tax increases led to
in flationary pressures, again through wage bargaining, as they affected
prices and direct tax rates.
(iii) In almost all years, any impact effect on the growth rate of GDP is
quickly eroded over time.
(iv) The effects of discretionary fiscal policy on unemployment and
market sector employment are complex. Broadly speaking, the
effects of fiscal discretion over the whole period was to lower unem-
ployment in the first year (the major exception being 1976 where
unemployment increased in the first year by 6,600). However, for
all years other than 1971 and 1976, any change was eroded over time.
In 1971, the initial slight fall in unemployment resulted, by 1980, in
a rise of 20,000. In 1976, the initial rise of 6,600 resulted in a rise
of 21,500 by 1980. In both cases the loss of competitiveness in the
industrial sector due to domestic cost-push influences through the
tax systems was largely responsible.
In the case of our "integral" analysis, we present our results for four
variants of the model. First, the standard version, used also in the "incre-
mental" analysis. Second, a variant where the Phillips curve is dropped from
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the wage equation, i.e., unemployment does not directly influence wage
bargaining. Third, a variant of the standard model where a crucial parameter
(the elasticity of the "target" wage with respect to the income retentions
ratio) is changed from unity to 0.5. Finally, a variant where the above
parameter is set to zero, i.e., direct tax rates do not affect wage bargaining
directly. Of interest in our analysis are both the results for the standard
mode] variant and the extent to which such results are sensitive to each of
the other three model variants. Some broad results for the standard model
are as follows:
(i) The cumulative effect of fiscal discretion on the growth rate of GDP
was positive for all years except 1968, 1974 and 1976-1978. For
example, by 1980 the growth rate was 1.7 percentage points higher
than would have been the case under policies of strict indexation
from a 1967 base. The largest negative effect was in the year 1977,
when actual policies reduced growth by 3.7 points relative to indexed
policies, largely as a result of the negative delayed effect from the
1976 budget.
(ii) The cumulative effect of fiscal discretion on the level of real personal
disposable income was positive for all years except 1971 and 1977.
In both of these years the negative effect was very minor.
(iii) Fiscal discretion led to a massive deterioration in both the balance
of payments and the borrowing requirement. Under strict indexation
of policy since 1967, there would have been a balance of payments
surplus of 10 per cent of GDP by 1980. The mechanisms which
caused such extraordinary behaviour related mainly to the export-
led orientation of the industrial sector, the accumulation of foreign
assets as the borrowing requirement would have been reduced (the
domestic financing component being exogenous in the model) and
the massive gains in competitiveness. Needless to say it does not
need the "Lucas" critique of policy analysis to warn us that such an
extraordinary economic configuration would have caused shifts in
many of the parameters of the model (even if we grant that it would
have been politically feasible) and the assumption of a fixed exchange
rate would appear implausible in such a context.
(iv) The cumulative effects on unemployment numbers were rather small.
Only for the years 1977 and 1978 is the effect positive, largely as a
result of the deflationary budget of 1976, followed by relatively
neutral fiscal policy over the whole of 1977.
(v) A basic trade-off in the model is between market sector and non-
market sector employment. In all years since 1969 the cumulative
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effect of fiscal discretion on market sector employment was negative.
By 1980, this loss amounted to 90,800 jobs. Between 1967 and
1980, on the other hand, about 94,400 jobs were "created" in the
non-market sector.
Turning to the second aspect, i.e., the sensitivity of our results to certain
key model properties, the GDP growth rate and the level of real personal
disposable income are relatively insensitive to changes in the model variants.
In the case of the balance of payments deficit and the borrowing require-
ment, our use of an elasticity of unity on the income retentions ratio in the
standard model wage equation has exaggerated the discretionary effects,
relative to the lower values of 0.5 and zero. This aspect of the model also
proves to be important in determining the unemployment and employment
effects of policy. Our inclusion of ten possible variants of the wage equation
in the model is a measure of our uncertainty regarding this vital aspect of
the economy and the central role played by wage determination in solving
the model.
In Chapter 7, we provide an overview of the effects of fiscal policy over
the 1967 to 1980 period. Based on the results of Chapters 5 and 6, we suggest
that the effectiveness of fiscal policy in attaining long-term growth goals (as
distinct from changing short-term standards of living) has fallen well below
that which was expected of it by policy makers. Two types of budgets are
distinguished which appear to characterise the fiscal stance of the ’seventies
--namely, those aimed at the immediate expansion of activity and those
aimed at the correction o f high inflation rates or balance of payments deficits.
We conclude that neither type of policy has stimulated sustainable long-
term growth. Our analysis suggests that this results from an apparent failure
by policy makers to comprehend the mechanisms of inflation and/or the
level of leakages from the economy via imports and savings. Specifically, the
potential relationship between wage inflation and rates of taxation, where
gross wages may adjust after tax changes to maintain net wages, was poorly
understood in many of the budget speeches. This mechanism, plus that of
the Phillips curve, has resulted in fiscal policy during the ’seventies hamper-
ing the industrial sector through disimproved competitiveness vLv-&-~s our
trading partners rather than stimulating its growth via a buoyant domestic
economy. A consequence of this is that fiscal policy has induced a shift of
resources from the private marketed sectors (notably the industrial sector)
to the public non-marketed sectors, leaving the domestic economy in a
weaker position to take advantage of an upturning world economy than it
otherwise might have been with indexed fiscal policy.
Areas of further research are also identified in Chapter 7. We distinguish
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betwceJl areas where our model could be improved and areas where our method
of policy evaluation might be inadequate. We discuss the crudeness of the
industrial sector, where thc level of domestic demand does not influence
long-rtm output ;uld where the Public CapitM Progrmllmc may not have
been adequately treated. Doubts ;ire also raised as to our failure to link
agricultural output to material inputs in a consistent framework. The poor
quality of data used in the market services sector is ,also seen as a barrier
preventing a more adequate representation of the economy. Finally, we
admit the short-comings of a fixed-exchange ratc SOE monetary sector and
the mcthod of debt financing uscd in the model. ’l’he paper is concluded by
dcscrihing somc problcms with our method of policy evMuation, notably the
assumptions of temporal policy independence and perfect foresight, and
potcntial problcms caused by thc Lucas critique, i.e., policy-induced changes
in the model paramcters due to rational expectations formation by agents.
A full dictionary of definitions of all the exogenous and endogenous
variables used in thc modcl is given in Appcndix 1 and Appcndix 2 presents
a eompletc listing of all thc cquations of thc model, togethcr with statistical
cstimation results. A notc on thc relationship between "discretionary" and
"intcgral" fiscal analysis is contained in Appcndix 3.
Chapter 1
INTR 01) UCTION
Our objective in this paper is to present a quantitative analysis of fiscal
policy in Ireland over the period 1967 to 1980. In order to place this analysis
on a firm basis we have constructed an operational macroeconometric model
of the economy which has a medium-term orientation and we test this model
in terms of its ability to ~sist in explaining and interpreting economic
behaviour during the 1967-1980 period.
To carry out quantitative economic analysis requires a formal economic
model. However, to present analysis and draw conclusions on the basis of
computations carried out using a model presents conceptual and practical
difficulties. To the recipients of the proffered economic advice, the "model"
may be the subject of controversy. Such an audience will wish to know how
sensitive is the advice to the particular form chosen for the model. Alter-
natively the model may appear as a mysterious "black box" and be liable to
be misunderstood or abused by becoming, for example, a tool in a debate
where sides are chosen according to the extent that the structure of the
model has certain theoretical properties and the "results" from the model
agree with predetermined views.
It was in the hope ofisolatingsuch potential problems that we have carried
out, in a previous paper, a fairly formal and exhaustive investigation into
some of the economic underpinnings of quantitative analysis of the economy
(Bradley and Fanning, 1984). The fact that some of the empirical results in
that study were of limited use in choosing between competing economic
hypotheses and paradigms, and of mixed quality, should serve as a caution
against a hasty or inflexible selection of results for incorporation into any
interpretation or quantification of the Irish economy. Faced with poor
empirical results, reactions by aspiring model builders tend to fall into one
of the following three categories. Formal mathematical-quantitative models
may be left aside in favour of a verbal or informal approach. In this way
many economic subleties of behaviour can be encompassed. However, there
is the danger that crucial assumptions may not always be made explicit and
indeed may be made in an inconsistent fashion. Furthermore, it is difficult
to draw quantitative conclusions using an informal approach. A second
possible reaction could be to select the best available empirical equations
from the statistical analysis and to use them in a model, even if these are
not based on, or derived from, theoretically firm foundations. The tracking
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performance of such models is often quite impressive, at least for the his-
torical, or within sample, period. However, it may be less easy to evaluate the
usefulness of the model’s policy advice. In addition, "empirical" equations,
with their many parameters and variables, often become subject to structural
instability when data revisions are made or when new data observations are
added. A final approach could be to use a judicious mixture of an imposed
theoretical structure and of empirical investigation to produce equations that
have both reasonable (or at the least, understandable) theoretical under-
pinnings and acceptably accurate tracking performance. Such an approach
attempts to use the best elements of both previous attitudes. Ideally the
entire model should be derivable from an integrated set of chosen theoretical
postulates but in practice this is often unattainable-and an operational
model represents an uneasy compromise betwecn theoretical rigour and
empirical findings. The model used in this study is an example of just such a
compromise.
There has been extensive previous empirical analysis of the macroeconomy
in Ireland. Some of this has been at a sectoral level, while many previous
attempts have been made to construct and use operational macroeconometrie
models of the economy.1 One previous model is being used extensively for
policy analysis and forecasting and has been updated and maintained on a
regular basis (FitzGerald and Keegan, 1982). This model, MODEL-80, has
been used by the Department of Finance, the Central Bank of Ireland,
the ESRI and the National Planning Board. However, there are features of
MODEL-80 which make it unsuitable for use in medium-term policy analysis.
In its orientation MODEL-80 is a short-run demand management model with
detailed modelling of the expenditure and income side of the national
accounts but with less attention given to the problem of modelling the
supply of output and factor inputs on a sectoral basis. Its basic assumption,
common to all models of its type, is that the supply side will accommodate
any increases in demand with little complication. The major portion of
MODEL-80 is given over to a very detailed modelling of the fiscal instru-
ments available for use by the government and the manner in which these
instruments can be brought to bear to influence demand. In deciding to
construct a new model for use in the analysis of medium-term economic
policy issues we have been influenced by the necessity to incorporate supply
side features in a fundamental way. As Lawrence Klein has suggested in a
recent book, it is only by constructing a model which brings together the
total forces of supply and demand that we can understand, and then derive
policies to affect, the economic issues of modern society (Klein, 1983).
1. Examination of this work is contained in Bradley and Fanning, 1984 and a detailed examination
and comparison of prcvlous macromodcls is contained in Bradley and Fanning, 1983.
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The conventional use of simultaneous equation econometric models for
policy analysis has been the subject of much criticism by the economics pro-
fession. A succinct summary of major areas of contention was provided by
Geary (1982) ill his reply to the FitzGerald and Keegan (1982) paper on
MODE L-80. Although raised in the context of a critical evaluation of MODEL-
80, these points have more universal application to all macromodels. We
summarise Geary’s views below.
First, it was claimed tbat macroeconometric models performed badly in
dealing with the economic upheavals of the 1970s and that the "Keynesian
orthodoxy", widely regarded as providing the theoretical underpinnings of
empirical models, had broken down. As a statement of fact, one could hardly
dispute this point.2 However, the macromodels of the late 1970s and early
1980s arc very different entities from those of the earlier period. As put by
Hclliwell and McRac (1981), "any model structure that was chosen.., a
decade ago is sm’e to be the wrong structure now that energy price changes
and other events have posed new and largely unforeseen problems of adjust-
mcnt". The inference to draw from Geary’s point is that Irish applied econo-
mists must face up to these new challenges in a constructive way, be it
through rico-Keynesian or new classical frameworks (Klamer, 1984).
Geary’s second point concerned issues of econometrics and their relation-
ship to empirical models; that models are cavalier on the issue of stochastic
specification and require identification restrictions which, in the terminology
of Sims (1980), are simply incredible. On the issue of stochastic specification
it is, indeed, the case that the imperatives of making a model operational
result in gross simplifications both in the error structures used and in the
estimation techniques applied. Also, the identifying restrictions are mainly
simplifications, chosen empirically so that they do not conflict with the
data.
The third point was essentially the "Lucas critique" of the use of macro-
models for policy analysis, which holds that the parameters of the model
may not remain fixed but may vary with each alternative policy. This critique,
by using examples generated with the rational expectations assumption,s
shows what serious errors can be made in econometric policy analysis if the
response of expectation formation mechanisms to policy is ignored. In the
words of Sims (1982), "As in most revolutions, the old regime toppled by
the rational expectations revolution was corrupt and in some sense deserved
2. Although Alan Blinder (1979) held that the neo-Keynesian approach provided a quite adequate
interpretation of the stagflation of 1979-1976.
3. The rational expectations assumption is that the public behaves optimally, given its own objectives
and the information avallab[e to it, and that the public understands precisely what contingency plans
have been chosen for Future policy.
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its fate. However, as is often the case, the revolution itself has had its excesses,
destroying 0/" discarding much that was valuable in the name of utopian
ideology". Sims argues that the explicit identification of expectation-
fomlation mechanisms is not necessary for policy analysis and that the
rational expectations critique is only a special case of the more general
cautionary note-statistical models are likely to become unreliable when
extrapolated to make predictions for conditions far outside the range experi-
enced in the data sample used for estimation (Sims, 1982, p. 122).
In a final point, Geary argued that if the specification of a model is ad
hoc, there can be no presumption of the internal consistency often claimed
for models. He suggested that a more aggressively experimental approach
with smaller models might be useful either in the direction of extensive
paramctrisation using information from tightly specified sectoral models or
a less structured time-series approach using quarterly data. Our approach
leans towards the first suggestion (in particular our industrial and service
sectors are tightly specified with an imposed technology) while recent
applications of the new quarterly national accounts derived by O’Reilly
(I 982) has developed the second line of research. O’Reilly’s analysis, using a
pure muhivariale lime-scries technique, indicated that issues of lag structures
and stochastic error specification may usefully be explored but that the
imposition of strong theoretical priors is needed to resolve problems such as
muhicollinearity.
Thcsc and other related issues have been recently explored in a stimulating
and novel way by Smith and Pesaran (1984): They hold. that the usual
applied econometric procedure is by and large an efficient goal-oriented
activity and that many of the criticisms made of it reflect a misunderstanding
both of the context in which applied econometricians operate and of the
multiple criteria their work must satisfy. Three such criteria are identified:
models must be relevant to the purpose for which they are desiglled;they
should be internJly consistent (ill the sense that they do not generate self-
contradlctoW answers to the questions posed and should also be consistent
with more general theories); and models need to be adequate representations
of the phenomena of interest. The final criterion of adequacy covers the
statistical criteria to which most of econometric theory is devoted. Smith
and Pesaran interpret the wave of criticism of econometric models in terms
of the above three criteria: clients see models as being insufficiently relevant
to their problems of forecasting and policy; economic theorists see models
as being inconsistent with their knowledge of the economy; theoretical
econometricians see models as being inadequately estimated and tested. A
b~danced approach is desirable but a completely formal structure within
which to trade-off the three criteria does not seem feasible since model
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construction and use are organic social processes and not mechanical activities.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we
describe the structure of our model and highlight some of the key numerical
magnitudes that serve to characterise it. Detailed technical equations and
statistical estimation results are presented in Appendix 2. Extensive back-
ground material has been given in a previous paper, Bradley and Fanning
(1984), so our presentation is fairly concise.
In Chapter 3, we describe the tests we have carried out to examine the
performance of the model as a mathematical-statistical system representing
the real economy. Such tests consist of various types of model simulations
and involve the calculation of model "multipllers", where policy or exo-
genous variables are altered and the impact on the model relative to some
control solution is examined. Such testing complements a study of the
individual equations of the model in the sense that while individually the
equations of the model make good sense as an integrated system they
might have undesirable properties.
In Chapter 4 we descp.’be briefly the methodology of policy analysis.
Techniques available for use can range from fairly simple simulation experi-
ments to sophisticated use of optimal control techniques. We restrict ourselves
to the simpler simulation techniques, at)d make use of an approach developed
by Blinder and Goldfeld (1976) which permits investigation of the detailed
impact and delayed effects of policy actions. This approach is model based
and, hence, the results are only as credible as the underlying model We hope
that our results will encourage others to attempt to encapsulate their views
on the workings of the macroeconomy within their own quantitative frame-
works and thus provide alternative policy analysis for comparison and public
discussion.
In Chapter 5 we undertake a retrospective analysis of fiscal policy over
the period 1967 to 1980. This period covers approximately the terms of
four different political administrations, the last two being characterised by
vigorous fiscal policies designed to insulate the economy from the ravages
of the post-OPEC world recession. Our methodology does not permit us to
enquire into the reasons why various policy decisions were taken, but merely
permits us to attempt to quantify the effects of what was done, be it inten-
tionally or otherwise. However, a recent article by Whitaker (1983) on
"Financial Turning Points" provides interesting interpretations of the
motives of, and political constraints facing, the governments of the period
being studied.
In Chapter 6 we examine the individual budgets that implemented fiscal
policy over the 1970-1980 period. This presentation is designed to illustrate
some of the practical and political issues that underlie the more formal
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analysis contained in Chapter 5 and to compare, where possible, the con-
temporaneous "ex-ante" projected budget effects with our "ex-post" analysis.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we conclude our study with a review of our main
resuhs and an account of areas of further research prompted by the weak-
nesses and flaws that emerged in our applications of this first version of the
model.
Chapter 2
THE MODELLING FRAME WORK
INTRODUCTION
To construct a model of an economy is essentially to have a view of how
that economy works and to incorporate that view into a set of mathematical
equations. Some of these equations will have a "behavioural" content in the
sense that they describe directly the behaviour of agents in the economy
(e.g., the consumption function for households or the demand for labour by
industry). Other equations will have no behavioural content but will simply
link variables together (i.e., the ex~post identities of the model). In addition,
the behavioural equations invariably contain parameters or coefficients whose
specific numerical values are assigned using statistical estimation techniques
with time-series data.
As a result of its technical and mathematical nature, any thorough descrip-
tion of a macroeeonometric model must, of necessity, be a complex affair.
In order to make this task more digestible we have split it into three separate,
but obviously interrelated, parts. In this chapter we give a mainly verbal des-
cription of the behavioural structure of the model and highlight some of the
most important empirical findings from the statistical estimation. In Appendix
2 we present a purely technical summary of the model equations and the
complete statistical results of the estimation. In Chapter 3 we describe some
of the ways in which the model performs as an in tegrated system, how it stands
up to the standard tests of within-sample tracking performance and how it re-
acts to perturbations or shocks to its exogenous variables and to its coefficients.
In this chapter our description is organised around a three-block framework
comprising a supply block, an absorl3tion block and an income distribution
block. The main components of each block are shown in Figure 2.1. The
reasons for choosing this method of organising the model structure have
been discussed at length in a previous publication (Bradley and Fanning,
1984) and while the actual nomenclature should not be taken too seriously,
this approach does serve to highlight the main behavioural components of
the model and is useful for expositional purposes. Figure 2.1 also provides
the linear sequence which we follow in our exposition of the model.
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Figure 2.1: Block structure of the model
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Supply Block I ¯ Industry
¯ Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
¯ Services
¯ Imports
¯ Labour Supply
¯ National Aggregates: Supply and Income
IAbsorption Block ¯ Consumption
¯ Investment
¯ Exports and the Balance of Payments
¯ Inventory Changes
¯ National Aggregates: Demand
Income Distribution
Block
¯ Producer Prices
¯ Expenditure Prices
¯ Wages
¯ Fiscal Activities
¯ National Debt Interest Payments
¯ Monetary Activities
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THE SUPPL Y BLOCK
Introductory Remarks
In the treatment of domestic supply of goods and services in the model
we use a major division into three production branches - industry, agricul-
ture and services. The agriculture branch includes forestry and fishing while
the services branch includes marketed sen, ices, non-marketed services and
public administration. Completing the supply block are two sections con-
cerned with imports and the balance of payments and with the issue of
labour supply.
In the case of industry we attempt to implement a theoretically coherent
behavioural model. The core of the industry sub-model involves the deter-
mlnation of industrial capacity output and the related long-run factor demands
for labour and capital. Our approach to the determination of capacity out-
output is in the spirit of the model of export-led growth (Caves, 1970; Dixon
and Thirlwall, 1975; Thirlwall, 1980;Kennedy and Dowling, 1975). Because
the simulation results of the model can be very sensitive to particular assump-
tions made by the modellers, we have set up multiple options in the case of
various key equations. Three versions of the capacity output relationship
are available in the model. In the first the determinants are simply expected
world demand (proxied by a trade-weighted world GDP variable) and a
measure of the relative competitiveness of production in Ireland and else-
where. An autonomous growth in capacity was also found, which could not
be explained by other than a time trend. In the second we have included a
disequilibrium term in expected domestic absorption which modifies the
previous formulation. In the third version we have included both world
activity and domestic absorption together with relative competitiveness. This
last version cannot be interpreted within the export-led growth framework
since it requires both expected world demand and domestic absorption to be
autonomous.
Our interpretation of the technology of the industry sector is along
standard neo-classical lines. Capacity output together with measures of
expected relative factor prices are used to determine the cost minimising
long-run demands for labour and capital. An important aspect of our approach
is the imposition of a specific technology on the relationship between
capacity output and long-run factor inputs. As a consequence, labour and
capital requirements cannot become inconsistent with the underlying tech-
nology of the model, a very desirable property for medium-term analysis.
The translation of the long-run to the actual factor inputs is by means of
adjustment mechanisms which attempt to capture the processes which prevent
instant adjustment. Hence, in the short run the national industrial "firm"
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need not be on its long-run production function. Finally, actual output in
industry is determined primarily by the capacity output measure, but is
affected by abnormal changes in final sales of industrial goods and by the
profitability of production (Helliwell, Boothe and McRae, 1982, p. 265).
In the case of agriculture, forestry and fishing (AFF), it was recognised
that employment and investment decisions were unlikely to derive from
neo-classical optimising paradigms which are more appropriate to an industrial
sector exposed to international competitive forces and relatively capital
intensive. In Irish agriculture, institutional, government and demographic
forces become dominant and any realistic model must recognise this. Given the
importance of the agricultural component of AFF, and the ready availability
of data on gross output and material inputs, we attempt to model gross
agricultural output by means of a simple supply function making output
sensitive to capacity, relative prices of output and inputs, and weather con-
ditions. A separate equation explains the demand for material inputs and
permits the derivation of added-value in agriculture. Added-value in forestry
and fishing, a very small element of total AFF, is left exogenous. Employ-
ment in AFF is modelled as a labour-release or migration-out process in that
agents who do not leave are employed. The long-term factors permitting and
encouraging the release of labour from AFF are the growth of labour pro-
ductivity, the relative earnings differential vis-a-vis the non-agricultural
sector and the availability of work elsewhere in the economy. The total
investment process in AFF is particularly difficult to specify behaviourally
due both to the importance of investment in cattle stocks (which may be
subject to substantial variation over a fairly short period) and to the complex"
system of grants, subsidies and other incentives available to farmers. Con-
sequently, we consider only a subset of the investment process - machinery
and buildings - and use a simple flexible accelerator model which links the
capital stock to output and the real cost of capital. Agricultural stock
changes are left exogenous in the model.
The complex heterogeneity of the service sector makes it difficult to justify
implementation of a comprehensive decision-based factor demand system.
For example, the inclusion of large non-commercial and self-employment
components is likely to affect the sensitivity of employment and investment
to a relative factor price measure. Also, the distinction between capacity
output and actual output is less clear since there are shorter production
proccsses involved, a more simplified technology and a less structured labour
force. In this version of the model we have attempted to "purge" the total
services sector of the non-marketed element. Public administration and
defence arc isolated clearly in the national accounts and thus provide little
difficulty (ignoring, of course, the underlying difficult measurement pro-
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blcms and the somewhat suspect national accounting conventions involved).
The isolation of other non-marketed services is a more difficult problem and
our attempts rcprescnt a very crude first effort.
Output in the marketed services sector (MS) is determined by a weighted
mcasurc of final demand and by profitability. The factor demand system for
capital and labour is derived by cost minimisation subject to a flexible
functional form technology. This imposes a certain consistency of behaviour
(perhaps unwarranted) on the MS sector and while such assumptions are
perhaps unrealistic, they seem preferable to an approach based on unrelated
cml)loymcnt and investment equations. They also permit us to make stylised
comparisons between industry and marketed services.
Output of the non-marketed scrviees sector (NMS), which excludes public
administration, is determined by the level of NMS employment. The wage
hill in NMS is determined by nominal government expenditure on goods
and services (excluding public administration wages), and NMS employment
is ohtaincd by dividing the wagc bill by average annual carnings in NMS
(dctermincd in the income distribution block of the model). An alternative
approach trcats NMS employment as a policy instrument and derives the
wage bill cndogcnously in an idcntity. In tbe case of public administration
otttput is actually measured in the national accounts by labour inputs with
essentially no productivity or capital stock corrections. Public administration
employment and investment decisions are regarded as discretionary policy
instruments.
In modelling imports we distinguish five broad economic categories:
imports of investment goods (related to total invcstment)i consumption
goods (related to totzd priwtte consumption); materials for further production
in agriculturc (related to agricultural output); and imports of services (related
to a broad measure of total activity in the economy). Imports of inter-
mediate industrial goods, which constitute some 65 per cent of total imports,
arc derived residually in an expenditure-output identity.
Finally, in the labour supply sector we distinguish, in an integrated (albe-
it simple) schema, population growth, education participation, labour force
participation and migration abroad. Unemployment is determined as the
difference betwccn labour supply and labour demand (determined in the
industry, agriculture and services sectors of the supply block).
Industry
The outline schcma for the industry sector is shown in Figure 2.2. Tbe
key empiricM concept, capacity output, is of course unobserx, able and we
use a linkcd-pcaks mcasure as a proxy. In fact the empirical results proved
quite robust to a wide range of ~dternative measures (Bradley and Fanning,
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1984, Chapter 3). We provide three choices of model for the determination
of capacity output. In the first (illustrated in Figure 2.2), capacity output
is determined by expected world demand (elasticity 1.3) and competitive-
ness as measured by Irish total unit factor costs relative to world unit labour
costs (elasticity - 1.2). The generation of a trade-weighted competitor cost
of capital index will certainly be considered for future work to improve our
measure of competitiveness. In addition, a secular growth in capacity was
detected which could not be explained by other than a time trend (3.9 per
cent per annum). In the second variant we have made the world demand
elasticity parametric in the rate of change of expected domestic absorption,
thus introducing a feedback between domestic real activity and capacity
outpnt. The "equilibrium" world activity elasticity falls to 1.1 while ever3,
1 per cent rise in expected domestic absorption raises this by 0.04. In the
third variant we have included a geometric average of expected world and
domestic activities. Such a model requires the ver3, strong assumption that
variations in expected domestic activity are regarded as autonomous in the
same way as for world activity. Estimation results indicated a total activity
elasticity of 2.0, with a weight of 0.6 on world activity and 0.4 on domestic
activity.
Even though we have included three variants of the capacity output
equation, there remain many reasons for using any or all of them with
caution. For example, the concentration of all industrial incentive effects
into the Irish total unit factor cost measure may be quite inadequate and
ignores any beneficial effects due to public funding of improved infra-
structure. The trade weighting used to derive the world activity measure is
by no means comprehensive or unambiguous. The fact that almost four
percentage points of growth on average are not accotmted for by economic
variables should serve as a warning that the equation may require further
development. Some aspects of this rich agenda of research have been explored
by FitzGerald (1984a) in his study of multinational investment location. In
addition, the choice of capacity model is central to the overall properties of
the model. In the first variant (the "pure" export-led growth model), indus-
trialists perceive domestic market growth as being transient or insignificant
and do not modify their capacity as a consequence. They do, however,
modify their rate of capacity utilisation (see below) in response to domestic
sales and profitability conditions. In the other two variants industrialists
assign non-zero weights to the growth of domestic absorption. Consequently,
fiscally stimulated real growth will have a positive effect on capacity and on
exporting potential which may partially offset any loss in competitiveness
due to Phillips curve effects.
Given capacity output and a relative factor price ratio which is exogenous
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Figure 2,2: Schema for industry sector
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to tile industr3, sector, the assumption of cost minimisation subject to a
specific technology yields the demand for labour and capital at full capacity.
In other words, the chahl of causation runs from capacity output to long-run
factor inputs. An implicit assumption being made is that there can be no
"shortage" of fixed capital in Ireland, i.e., that it simply accommodates to
the required level of capacity output for given relative factor prices. Given
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the high international mobility of industrial capital, this seems a relatively
plausible assumption (McAleese, 1983). The complete system of equations
derived using the well-known CES production function is given in Appendix
2. Briefly, the technology of the industry sector is characterised by its
approximately Leontief nature (with an elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital of 0.29) and by technical progress which is capital using
and labour saving. Both constant and increasing returns to scale versions
were estimated. However, the well-known difficulties in separating technical
progress and returns to scale prevented satisfactory free estimates (Berndt
and Khaled, 1979; Bradley and Fanning, 1984, Chapter 4). In the model
constant returns to scale (CRS) and increasing returns of 1.3 are included as
options. The statistical fits are quite good given the "parsimonious" nature
of the model. The large errors which arise about the time of the first OPEC
price shocks may be partially explained by the fixed exponential decay rate
assumed in generating the rather artificial capital stock measures and by the
putty-putty model of capital being used. However, as a first approximation
the long-run factor demand mode[ may provide a useful framework on which
future refinements can be made.
In the model the long-run factor demands are converted to actual factor
inputs by means of a two-tier adjustment mechanism. The passage from
the desired level of factor inputs to the inputs needed at long-run capacity
output is assumed to be influenced by the rate of capacity utilisation in
industry. Furthermore, the passage of the actual inputs to the desired
level depends on the extent to which agents can, and will, adjust their acttial
behaviour towards desired levels. Combining both mechanisms leads to
employment and capital demand equations which are dynamic functions of
the long-run demands and the rate of capacity utilisation. The empirical
results indicate that the process of adjustment of the actual capital stock to
its long-run optimal value is slightly faster than the corresponding adjustment
of employment and that this adjustment is quite insensitive to variations in
capacity utilisation. Labour inputs, on the other hand, proved to be very
sensitive to variations in capacity utilisation.
Having determined the actual capital input, K, the gross investment
flow, 1, is obtained by means of the identity which was originally used to
generate the capital stock measure, i.e.,
It = Kt - (l - d)Kt.1
where d, the depreciation rate, is set at 5 per cent (Bradley and Fanning,
1984, pp. 64-65).
The final, and crucial, behavioural equation in the industry sector con-
cerns the manner in which the capacity utilisation rate is determined. The
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production decision is represented in the model as a choice of the operating
rate of capacity and is determined by the deviations of final sales from
planned capacity and by the profitability of production. Since the capacity
utilisation decision is essentially a short-run phenomenon, profitability is
measured by the ratio of short-run costs (taken as unit labour costs) to the
added value price (i.e., labour’s share of added-value), no consideration being
given to the user cost of capital. The empirical results show that if sales
rdative to capacity rise by I per cent then the rate of capacity utilisation
rises by about 0.6 per cent. The remaining 0.4 per cent will be imported.
On the other hand, a 1 per cent rise in labour’s share of added-value leads to
a 0.3 per cent fall in utilisation. With capacity fixed in the short run, this
will translate into a 0.3 per cent fall in actual output.
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
The schema for the AFF sector is shown in Figure 2.3. Our approach is
I. consider agricuhure separately from forestry and fishing since the annual
Census of Agricultural Production gives comprehensive details of gross
~nttput and limited information on material inputs in agriculture, the major
c.mponcnt of the sector. A measure of capacity output in agriculture is
defined as a five-year moving average, and actual output is made a linear
fimction of capacity output, the real price of material inputs and a variable
which captures weather effects. The signs of all coefficients are in accordance
with a priori expectations; a fall in the real price of inputs or an improve-
ment in the "weather" both lead to increased output (the real price elasticity
is - 0.36 evaluated in 1975).
Attempts to specify and estimate an interrelated output and material
input system failed to yield plausible empirical magnitudes. In this version
of the model we explain the ratio of material inputs to gross output by a
time trend and the data indicate that this ratio has been growing steadily at
about 2.7 per cent per annum. The equation residuals for the 1973-75
period are rather large, indicating the inadequacy of this simple approach.
Total employment in AFF is determined by a time-trend (as a proxy for
long-run labour productivity), a measure of the expected AFF/non-AFF
relative earnings and the overall rate of unemployment. The empirical
rcsuhs indicate employment falling at a rate of 2.9 per cent per annum, a
relative earnings ratio elasticity of 0.07 per cent and a small positive sen-
sitivity to the general level of unemployment. The stock of machinery and
buildings is determined by output and by the real cost of capital in a simple
flexible accelerator model. Changes in the capital stock proved rather sluggish.
with respect to changes in output and the cost of capital, only about 10 per
cent of the desired change occurring in the first year.
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Figure 2.3 : Schema for agriculture, forestry and fLshing sector
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The final behavioural element in the AFF sector concerns the allocation
of gross agricultural output between its three final uses: domestic absorption,
inventory changes and exports. The separate determination of any two
elements means that the third can be derived from an identity. In this version
of the model we have chosen to leave inventor3’ changes exogenous mainly
due to the intractability of modelling their behaviour. The domestic absorp-
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tion element is a rather stable fraction of gross output, a fact noted in a
slightly different context by Kennedy and Dowling (1975, pp. 115-118).
Agrlcuhural exports are derived by an identity as gross output less domestic
absorption and inventory changes.
The AFF specification as discussed above is rather unsatisfactory. Given
that a theoretically consistent neo-classicM framework could not be estimated
empiricMly, one is reduced to explaining key variables by simple time trends.
While such equations often track extremely well, they impart autonomous
properties to tile sectorwhich nlay be misleading when the model is shocked.
Services
Having considered industrial and agrictdtural supply, the rest of the eco-
nomy is dividcd into three broad categories of scrvices-producing subsectors.
The first subscctor consists of marketcd sets, ices, an outlhae schema of which
is providcd in Figure 9.4. Output in the marketed services sector is deter-
mined by a weighted measure of final demand (where the weights are taken
from thc 1969 1/O table and measure the service sector output content of
final dcmand) and a mcasure of profitability. Tile elasticity with respect
to finM dcmand is 0.9 and with respect to profitability is 0.3. Factor inputs
arc determined by assuming cost minin~isation in the production of output
whcrc the technology is assumed to be of generalised Leontief form with
constant returns to scale. Estimation indicated that the "technology" of the
markctcd serx, iccs sector was charaetcriscd by an Allen elasticity of sub-
stitution of about 0.6 and technical progress was found to be neutral with
rcspcet to labour and capital saving (at a rate of some 5 per cent per annum).
A simpler modcl of the non-rnarketed services sector (NMS) "~vas specified.
Output is essentially detcrmined by labour inputs, corrected for a trend in
productivity. Thc wagc bill in NMS is determined by govcrnment purchases
of services frorn this sector. We proxy this by the value of total government
consumption expenditures net of the public administration wage bill. Hence
in one wu’iant we view government as imposing a cash limit on the NMS wage
bill, with actual numbers employed in NMS being detennincd as the ratio of
the wage bill to avcragc annual earnings in NMS (determined in the income
distribution block). A second variant takes NMS employment as a policy
instrunlent.
Finally, public administration output is determined by labour inputs,
the numbers employed being a discretionary policy instrument. In both
non-marketed sen, ices and in public administration gross fixed capital for-
mation is a discretionary policy instrument.
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Figure 2.4: Schema for the marketed services subsector of the model
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hnports
Our determination of imports uses a breakdown of imports by five eco-
nomic categories. Even thongh there arc vet3, serious reservations about
these data, nevertheless, we feel that this classification is more satisfactory
from an analytic point of view than thc alternative more accurate SITC
breakdown. Four categories of imports are determined in separate behavioural
cquations. Imports of producers’ capital goods are determined by total fixed
investment expenditures (elasticity 1.2) and industrial capacity utilisation
(elasticity 0.7). For imports of consumption goods an elasticity of unity
with respect to total household consumption is imposed. The average propen-
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sity to import grew at a fixed rate of 4 per cent per annum and the relative
domestic-import price elasticity was -0.6. Imports of agricultural raw
materials were similarly treated with an imposed elasticity of unity with
respect to gross agricultural output, a trend growth of 3.6 per cent and a
relative price elasticity of -0.5. Finally, imports of services are determined
by a broad measure of GNP with an impact elasticity of 0.4 and a long-run
elasticity of 1.3.
The important category of imports of industrial goods for further produc-
tion is determined residually in the expenditure-output identity. Consequently,
this category of imports, constituting some 65 per cent of total imports, acts
as a buffer which resolves any imbalances between domestic supply and
domestic demand. An alternative approach would, of course, be to model
this category of imports behaviourally and regard any resulting imbalance
between supply and demand as indicating errors in the model.
Lab our Supply
It is well established that migration abroad has played a very important
role in Irish population adjustments in the past. To the extent that migration
is caused by domestic economic conditions relative to economic conditions
in destination countries, it is necessary to model population growth rather
than include population as an exogenous variable uninfluenced by economic
conditions. The schema for modelling demographic and labour supply issues
is given in Figure 2.5. We consider the demographic structure in terms of
three major age groupings: under 15 years; between 15 and 64 years; and
over 64 years. The first and last groupings constitute the "dependent"
population while the middle group constitutes the working age population.
Changes in the total population are related to total migration and a "natural"
population growth rate (which is assumed constant for the entire 1961-80
period). Statistical estimation yielded a "natural" growth rate of 1.1 per
cent. Two similar equations are used to determine the changes in population
aged under 15 and between 15 and 64. In the latter two cases the fraction
of migrants in these age groups was empirically detcrmined (21 per cent and
67 per cent, respcctively). The final population grouping- those aged over
64 -- is determined as a residual to ensure "addlng-up". Clearly the model
is highly simplistic and ignores the important question of inter-cohort move-
ments over time. Improvements to this model would be possible but we
feel they would require a complexity out of keeping with any conceivable
additional accuracy obtainable.
Net migration abroad is determined using an approach developed in
Bradley and Fanning (1984) which is related to the standard approaches in
the literature. Net migration is a linear function of the population group
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Figure 2.5 : Schema for tabour supply sector
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exposed to migration (i.e., those aged between 15 and 64). The coefficient
in the equation is sensitive to the relative attractiveness of working in Ireland
vis-a-vis working abroad, measured by the product of the relative employ-
ment probability between Ireland and the United Kingdom, and an Irish-UK
relative earnings measure. Such an approach derives from the well-known
Harris-Todaxo models of urban-rural migration (Harris and Todaro, 1970).
Recent work by Kirwan and Nairn (1983) indicates that the position of Irish
labour in Britain has been more adversely affected by the present recession
than other classes of labour. For this reason, and also the exclusion of factors
such as unemployment benefits and tax rates, the migration equation should
be used with caution.
It is assumed that the dependent population groups do not participate in
the labour force. Furthermore, since education beyond the statutory limit
of 1.5 years has become progressively more common (particularly since the
extension of state funding in secondary education in 1968), an education
participation rate is determined as a function of a policy dummy variable
and a time trend to capture slowly changing attitudes to education. Attempts
to find real wage, unemployment and other economic influences failed. In
the actual model simulations this participation rate is exogenised and the
equation is retained merely to facilitate future extensions. Using the education
participation rate, two identities determine the population of working age
which is in full-time education and an adjusted measure of working age
population, i.e., the total less those in education. Labour force participation
is explained in terms of a discouraged-worker model. Estimation showed
that a rise of 1 per cent in the unemployment rate results in a fall of 0.015
per cent in the participation rate. Extensive investigation failed to yield
any sensible wage, price or social welfare influences. Unemployment is deter-
mined residually by subtracting the labour supply (determined above) from
the total demand for labour (determined in the industry, agriculture and
services sectors). The manner in which labour demand, supply and unemploy-
ment interact with each other and with the process of wage determination is
of central and crucial importance to the overall properties of the model. We
take up these issues in the income distribution block below’and in the ne:~t
chapter, where we examine the performance of the model as a system.
National Aggregates: Supply and Income
This section of the model brings together, in aggregate summary accounts,
the supply implications of the previous sectors. The starting point for the
summary macroeconomic pattern of income distribution is the organisation
of sectoral supply information so as to obtain a def’mition of overall incomes
earned from .production activity. The basic accounting identity adds up
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the value of OUtl)Ut produced by the three domestic sectors, adjusted for
financial services. This is the total domestically earned income at factor costs.
Net indirect taxes have to be added in order to value it at market prices.
Gross national product is obtained by adding to GDP an estimate of net
factor income from abroad.
Taking the value of GDP at factor cost as a starting point, we can follow
througb the distribution of aggregate income as it is affected by fiscal redis-
tribution and its distribution between labour and capital. Identities are used
to determine net domestic product at factor cost, net national income, the
adjustment for stock appreciation, private income, personal income, personal
disposable income and real personal disposable income. Company profits
are determined residually from the output-income identity in rather the
same way as irnports of industrial raw materials were determined residually
from the output-expenditure identity. The complex issue of what determines
profit retention within the company sector is not addressed directly. Instead
a sirnple linear relationship is assumed linking undistributed profits to total
profits.
THE ABSORPTION BLOCK
Introductory Remarks
Our treatment of the second main block of tile model involves the deter-
ruination of domestic and foreign absorption. Domestic absorption is defined
as the sum of consumption expenditures (by households and government),
fixed investment expenditures (by industry,agriculture and services), housing
investment (by households and government), and expenditures on inventor3,
investment. Foreign absorption consists of exports of goods and services.
Our consumption function is an aggregate one and is of the conventional
permanent income type. Experiments with other consumption functions
surveyed elsewhere (Bradley and Fanning, 1984, pp. 175-184) indicated tbat
our simple approach was not dominated by any other and, in addition, bas
tile desirable virtue of stability. Government consumption is treated as a
policy instrument, the components of which are the wage bill in public
administration and other purcbases, mainly from the non-marketed service
sector. Our approach to modelling private housing investment attempts to
cut through the complex details of the functioning of tile housing market.
We use an expenditure-type relation driven by real personal disposable
income, but influenced by government housing transfers, interest rates and
inflation. Government housing investment is treated as a discretionary policy
instrument. The remaining investment categories have already been treated
in the supply block, namely fixed investment by industry, agriculture and
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services. Agricultural and intervention inventory changes are left exogenous.
Non-agricultural inventory changes are determined in a simple stock adjust-
ment model. Concerning exports, the component of gross agricultural output
which is exported abroad has already been determined in the supply block.
The determination of non-agricultural exports bas been the subject of much
controversy in Ireland and in the international literature. The choice of
approach lies between supply driven, demand driven or hybrid models, and
has been analysed in Bradley and Fanning (1984, pp. 196-202). In the model
we implement both an export supply equation and a hybrid export function
in order to study the robustness of our analysis to the choice of export
model.
Consumption
Private consumption expenditures are detem~ined by real personal dis-
posable income. The impact marginal propensity to consume was estimated
as 0.42, with a long-run value of 0.62. The long-run average propensity to
consume (measured in 1970) is 0.86. A data dummy variable was included
in the consumption function, essentially eliminating the year ]975. Govern-
mcnt consumption is composed of two elements: a wages and salaries element
for public administration employees and a residu’..d element which covers
other government consumption (mainly the wage bill of the non-marketed
service sector).
In oesl men t
Private housing investment is determined mainly as a function of real
personal disposable income. Additional explanatory variables include real
housing transfers (positive effect) and a real interest rate (negative effect).
The real income elasticity was estimated as 1.8. Government housing invest-
ment is left as a discretionary policy variable. The remaining elements of
total investment arc determined in the supply block. It should be noted
that we do not disaggregate fixed non-housing investment into its building
and non-building components. Such a disaggrcgation could be made (using
unpublished CSO data) and would greatly improve the specification of the
various weighted final demand variables in the model.
Exports and the Balance of Payments
We treat exports in the model at a fairly aggregate level in keeping with
the aggregate structure of the supply block. In the agriculture sector exports
were determined residually by subtracting the fairly stable domestic absorp-
tion from total agricultural output. However, given the theoretical and
empirical controversy that surrounds the determination ofnon-agriculturaJ
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exports in a small and open economy (Honohan, 1982), we have included
stylised supply and demand interpretations. Underlying both models is the
assunrption that export prices are determined on world markets. In the
first variant, exports are a function of world demand (proxied by a trade-
weighted GDP measure) and the profitability of exporting (the export price
relative to the Irish unit labour costs). The demand elasticity is 1.03 and
the profitability elasticity is 1.4. In addition, a secular export growth of
7 per cent per annum could not be accounted for by economic variables
but is probably capturing such phelaomena as the progressive "opening
up" of the economy to world trade and the difference between the gross
mcasurc of exports and the added value measures of world activity. In the
second variant the ratio of exports to industrial capacity output is deter-
mined by cxport profitability (elasticity 1.13) and a secular growth (3.7 per
cent pcr annum). A consequence of this formulation is that world demand
has no contcmporaneons effect on exports (industrial capacity is a very
sluggish function of world activity and domestic al)sorption is only indirectly
affccted by world activity). In a third variant we make the stylised export
supply function par;maetric in disequilibrium growth in world demand.
Within our ovcr;dl model system the controversy over export determina-
tion becomes less important than the key isstle of the determination of
industrial capacity. In the casc whcrc industrial capacity is uninfluenced by
domestic ~lbsorption (i.c., the "purc" export-led growth model), both demand
~md sut)ply export functions yield similar results. However, allowing domestic
absorption to influence industrial capacity (i.e., the "generalised" export-led
growth model), introduces a wedge between the supply and demand export
functions. For example, hiring an extra 1,000 civil servants will boost
domestic absorption and, using the gcner~ised export-led growth model,
will raisc industrial cal)acity. However, the circumstances under which this
would lead to increased export growth would have to be examined very
critically.
National Aggregates: Demand
In the model we must establish a series of identities which determine
various expenditure aggregates: domestic absorption, domestic expenditure,
final demand and the necessary weighted expcnditnre aggregates. The his-
torical "statistical discrepancy" that emerges is the excess of gross domestic
expcnditure over output at constant prices. This discrepancy arises due to
incompatible deflation procedures on the output and expenditure sides of
thc national accounts, a process which is mirrored within the model by
including thc historical value of STATDIS as an exogenous variable. In carry-
ing out sinaulations in the out of sample period we set STATDIS to zero or
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to some average value if the historical discrepancy displays a systematic
component.
THE INCOME DIS TRIB UTION BLOCK
Introductory Remarks
The third and final block of the model translates the factor based modell-
ing of supply into the pattern of income distribution which results from the
interaction of production and demand activities. Our usage of the term
"income distribution" is a rather limited one and is taken to mean the prices
and incomes accruing according to the sectoral and expenditure categories
used in the model. We do not consider the important issue of the distribution
of personal incomes within these sectoral categories, a question which would
require considerably more detail than is available in the present model.
The basic inspiration for the determination of prices and wages comes
from the Scandinavian model (Lindbeck, 1979), the details of which are
briefly summarised below. We identify ourindustry sector with the "tradables"
sector and the services sector with the "non-tradables" sector. In the main
variant of our model, the price of tradables is determined on world markets.
Wage inflation in both the tradables and the non-tradables sectors adjusts to
the "room" for wage increases in the tradables sector, i.e., an increase which
is consistent with a "normal" profit share. Price inflation of non-tradables
is determined by cost-push forces and the overall price inflation is a weighted
average of both tradable and non-tradable inflation.
The number of expenditure categories distinguished in the model is quite
large. Each of these categories (eight in all) requires its separate price. The
basic approach to modelling the expenditure deflators is quite uniform in
that they are "explained" in terms of their component prices. In other words,
any such deflator simply incorporates the prices of all goods and services
which go to make them up, and includes any tax effects. The weights, which
are assumed constant, can be obtained by statistical estimation - the approach
we have used -- or from Input-Output tables.
The bargaining process which underlies the Scandinavian wages model for
the tradables sector can be interpreted in different ways. Our model imple-
mentation reflects this ambiguity in that various choices are offered for the
tradables wage equation, e.g., for the role of direct taxation and its incidence,
for the price index used in evaluating labour’s share of added-va/ue, and for
the role of the Phillips curve in modifying bargaining strengths (Lindbeck,
1979). Wages in the services sectors adjust to those in industry, i.e., the
labour market is assumed to be fairly homogeneous.
The fiscal and monetary aspects of the model are concerned with three
issues:
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(i) Income redistribution via taxes and expenditures
(ii) Derivation of the government’s budget constraint
(iii) Monetary consequences of financing the borrowing requirement.
Consequently, the fiscal sector is concerned with modelling of direct and
indirect tax revenues, subsidies, personal transfers, interest payments on
national debt, etc., and with the isolation of the instruments of fiscal policy.
The monetary environment is modelled using a conventional SOE fixed
exch.’mge approach. This has important long-term consequences which must
be clearly understood if one is to interpret the policy simulations correctly.
We return to this point in Chapter 4 below.
Producer (Added-Value) Prices
The deflator of industrial added-value plays an important role in the
model as a major component of the deflator of overall GDP at factor cost.
Assuming perfect commodity arbitrage ha the long run for a homogeneous
aggregate tradable commodity, we determine industrial producer prices as a
distributed lag over world prices of manufactured exports. In estimation we
force full adjustment within two years, 40 per cent of the adjustment coming
through in the first year. In a second variant of the industrial price equation
we modify the external determination of prices by adding as an additional
explanatory variable, abnormal changes in Irish unit labour costs in industry.
Empirically, a 1 per cent rise in unit labour costs above their expected value
causes a 0.6 per cent rise in price. In a third variant we dctermine industrial
prices by a simple mark-up on unit labour costs, i.e., a model which would
be relevant to a price-making economy.
The nearest proxy to the price of gross industrial output is the price of
gross output of the transportable goods industries. This gross output price
is determined in the model as a function of the added-value price (deter-
mined above), and the price of material inputs (proxied by import prices
and agricultural output prices). In estimation a homogeneity constraint was
not rejected by the data. The elasticities with respect to added-value, imports
and agricultural output prices were, respectively, 0.18, 0.53 and 0.29. The
output of the services sector is largely non-traded and a cost mark-up model
of added-value prices yielded an adequate statistical fit. The price of material
inputs ha agriculture is cxplained in terms of its component prices, i.e.,
agricultural output prices and industrial output prices, the first as a proxy
for farm-type inputs and the second as a proxy for other inputs. The domin ant
explanatory variable proved to be the industrial price. Two identities com-
plete this section: the first determines the deflator of added-value in agricul-
ture; the second determines the overall deflator of GDP at factor cost.
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Expenditure Prices
The deflators of the expenditure categories used in the model (other than
non-agricultural exports) are explained in terms of their components in an
equation of the general form
log PEX = a0 + aI log PGDPFC + a2 log PMGS + aS log (1 + TINC)
where PEX is any cxpenditure deflator, PGDPFC is the deflator of GDP at
factor cost, PMGS is thc deflator of total imports and TINC is an index of
indirect taxes net of subsidies. The tax variable was found to be of statistical
significance only in the case of the private consumption deflator. Hence,
for simplicity, wc rcgard all indirect taxcs and subsidies as bearing on private
consumption and cstimatc the consumption price equation with the coefficient
on the net indirect tax rate constrained to unity. The complete estimation
rcsuhs are given in Appendix 2. Briefly, the split between the GDP price
component and the import price component broadly mirrors the import
content of the expenditure category in question. Finally, the price of non-
agricuhural cxports is determined by world prices of manufactured exports.
The deflator of invcntory changes proved particularly difficult to model.
Thc deflator of inventory stock levels was determined in an equation of
standard foml with a GDP price elasticity of 0.37 and an import price
clasticity of 0.63. The inventory change price dcflator was related to the
avcragc of the contemporaucous and lagged stock level deflator with an
imposcd elasticity of unity. In addition, any price disequilibrium between
import prices and industrial output prices is allowed to influence the inven-
tor5, change price with an elasticity determined by estimation. A 1 per cent
incrcasc in the pricc of imports rclative to the price of industrial output
results in a 0.5 per cent increase in stock change prices.
Three further deflators are needed for the model. The first concerns the
deflation of thc item "adjustment for financial services" in the national
accounts, an item which refers to the excess of interest and dividends received
by financial institutions over payments to depositors. The necessary deflator
is simply linked to the overall GDP deflator. In order to derive GDP at con-
stant market prices it is necessary to value taxes on expenditure and subsidies
at basc year prices. The description of the official process of deflation reads
as follows:
Whcre taxes on expenditure and subsidies relate to particular goods
the rate or subsidy per unit quantity of the item taxed or subsidised,
if available, is used to derive an index to deflate current values. In
the case of "ad valorem" duties both the rate of duty and an
appropriate price index are used to compile constant price data.
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If neither of these methods of deflation can be used the estimation
of a constant price series is made by using volume indicators
appertaining to the relevant industry or by deflating by a suitable
price index.
In the spirit of this rather vague description, the deflator of taxes on expen-
diture and the subsidies deflator are simply linked to the overall GDP dcflator.
Wages
The basic idea of the Scandinavian model, when used as a positive theory
of inflation, is the assertion that the rate of wage inflation tends to adjust to
the "room" for wage increases in the tradable sector, as defined by the sum
of the (exogenous) increase in world market prices for tradables and the rate
of productiviry increase in the tradable sector. A second key assumption is
that the labour market is homogeneous and that the wage increase determined
in the tradable sector is "inherited" lay the non-tradable sector. After exten-
sive empirical experimentation with a wide range of alternative models
(bargaining models, expectations-augmented Phillips curves, etc.), we choose
to implcmcnt a very simple version of the Scandinavian model based on the
observed rcgtdarity in labour’s share of added value in industry over the
period 1960 to 1980. Five different measures of labour’s "share" were
defined as follows:
SHR 1 = I.I*WI*RETRAT/(POI*OI)
SHR2 = LI*WI/(POI*OI)
SI1R3 = I,I*WI*RETRAT/(PCPER*OI)
SHR4 = LI*WI/(PCPER*OI)
SHR5 = LI*WI*(RETRAT)0-5/(PCPER*OI)
where LI denotes employment in industry, WI denotes average annual
earnings, RI-TRAT denotes the average retentions ratio, OI denotes added-
value in constant prices, POI is the added value deflator of industrial output
and PCPER is the deflator of private consumption expenditures. The sample
period averages were as follows (for 1962 to 1980):
Mean Standard Deviation
SI-IR 1 0.61 0.023
SHR2 0.72 0.034
SHR3 0.58 0.025
SHR4 0.69 0.030
SHR5 0.63 0.019
For example, the statistics for SHRI show that labour’s share of added-
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value, net of all direct taxes, averaged 61 per cent. However, if labour
evaluated its share by using the consumption deflator (SHRB), its average
share falls to 58 per cent. The formula for SHR5 uses the elasticity of 0.5 on
the retentions ratio, found by Hughes (1985).
We regard each measure of labour’s share as the basis for a possible target
nominal wage; e.g., using the above mean value of SHRI we obtain
WIT1 = SHR1 * POI * OPRI ] RETRAT
where OPRI denotes labour productivity. Actual wages, WI, adjust to the
target wage by means of an error-correction mechanism:
&log WI = aI * &log WIT1 + a2 * log(WIT1/WI).I
The wage bargaining process can also be influenced by deviations of the
unemployment rate from its trend. This was the only form of the Phillips
curve that proved statistically significant and has obvious interpretations in
terms of the "natural rate" hypothesis. The empirical results showed very
quick adjustments to the target wage. Where a Phillips curve was included,
a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate above its trend causes
a two percentage point fall in the rate of wage inflation. In all we have
available ten variants of the industrial wage equation corresponding to the
five measures of labour’s "normal" share including and excluding the Phillips
curve effect. These variants permit us to examine the macro consequcnces of
the following issues:
(i) Direct tax incidence: who pays the extra direct tm~?
(ii) ls the process of wage bargaining dominated from the supply side ot
the demand side?
(iii) How important a role does the Phillips curve play?
The fact that we have felt obliged to include so many polar choices in the
wage equation should serve as a measure of our relative ignorance of this
whole area and may be preferable to "plumping" for a particular single for-
mulation (Hersong, 1984, provides a theoretical analysis of the links between
points (i) and (ii) above). Indeed, the almost universal absence of direct
taxation effects in wage equations is one of the more curious features
of macroeconometric models (Britton, 1983, on the NIESR. model of the
United Kingdom is a recent example) and serves to introduce a serious
asymmetry between, say, the employment effects of direct and indirect
taxation policy changes.
In conclusion, wage inflation in the marketed, non-marketed and public
administration service sectors is simply linked to the industrial (or tradable)
sector by means of error-correction mechanisms. The speed of adjustment in
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every case is extremely rapid. Such a linkage does not imply that any wage in-
flation spiral must initiate within tile industry sector. It does, however, imply
that in the long-run maintenance of industrial sector competitiveness acts as
a constrain(on intersectoral wage differences.
Fiscal A ctivities: General Remarks
The purpose of the fiscal sector of the model is relatively straightfolavard.
Equations are provided to endogenise the main indirect tax revenues (excise
duties, VAT, motor vehicle duties, customs duties and a residual category).
direct tax revenues (income tax, social insurance contributions and cor-
poration tax), and income transfers (unemployment transfers, social welfare
transfers and nation’,d debt interest paynlents). The main current expenditures
on goods and services and the entire capital budget are treated as discretionary
policy instrunaents. We have no doubt but that this approach to cxpci~dlture
is a gross simplification of tile tree state of affairs and some ahcrnativc
approaches are outlined in Bradley and Fanning (1984, Chapter 8). Wc
return to the question of the exogeneity assumption for government expen-
ditures in Chapter 4 below.
The tax revenue equations in the model arc based on the following under-
lying identity:
n
T = Z tiTBii=l
where T denotes revenue from any of the range of direct and indirect taxes;
ti denotes statutory tax rates, where i indicates a specific income bracket
or expenditure category; TBi denotes the tax base, distributed by tax bracket
or expenditure category and measured net of deductions and exemptions;
n denotes the number of tax brackets or expenditure categories. With a
sufficiently detailed disaggregation of TB, in principle it would he possible
to reproduce the above identity in tile model and no statistical estimation
would be required. However, in ahnost all cases such a level of disaggregation
would be impracticable mad the identity is nsuzdly replaced hy an approxi-
mation of the form
T = tra * TBb
where tr is a representative or average tax rate and TB an aggregate proxy for
the tax base. The rate elasticity, a, gives some indication of how represen-
tative tr is since values below unity would imply that only part of tile
tax base is "covered" by the chosen rate. The base elasticity, b, measures
tile progressivity of the rate schedule as well as the effect of changes in tile
distribution of income or in the composition of aggregate expenditure
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occurring in response to tax base variations. A distinctlbn between real and
nominal changes can be introduced as follows, where P is a price index:
IogT -- ~Iogtr + 31og(TB/P) + 71ogP
where 3 measures the reventle effect of real income or expenditure changes
and I’ gives an indication of inflation-lnduced fiscal drag.
In order to link tax revenue equations with the rest of the model, the
tax bases, TB, need to be defined in terms of income and expenditure con-
cepts which are at once appropriate and available. For example, for excise
duties TB is taken as total household consumption. A highly disaggregated
study of taxation has been carried out by Keegan (1984) where the tax bases
are determined in a consumer demand system. While such a level of detail is
necessary for preparation of individual budgets, we feel that our broad
aggregate approach is quite adequate for a study of medium-term policy
issues.
For administrative reasons fiscal activities are classified as current account
and capital account. The current account activities (both expenditure and
taxation) are the subject of armual review in the Budget, while activities on
the capital account are the subject of the annual Public Capital Programme
(PCP). However, these are by no means self-contained categories and are
subject to frequent cross-classification and re-definitions. On the capital
expenditure side, there are three items which represent direct government
investment in housing and in other fixed assets and that part of fixed invest-
ment by the non-marketed services sector which is part of the PCP. Capital
transfers are made to industry, the rest of the company sector, to the personal
sector for housing and for other purposes and a residual category. All of
the above capital expenditure items together with the small capital revenue
side are treated as discretionary policy instruments.
Fiscal Activities: Details
Four major types of indirect taxation are considered: a large grouping of
excise taxes, the value-added tax, motor vehicle duties and a residual class
of indirect taxes. The equations follow the general schema discussed above.
The rate, base and price elasticities are indicated below:
Rate Base Price
Excise duties 0.77 0.88 0.33
Value-Added Tax 1.08 1.38 1.00
Motor vehicle duties 0.93 1.53 --
Residual category 1.43 1.08 1.02
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The low value of the price elasticity for excise duties is to be expccted given
the specific nature of excise duties. The rate elasticities for excise dutics and
for the residual category give some cause for concern, as do the base elasticities
for VAT and motor vehicle duties.
Three types of direct taxation arc eonsidcrcd: direct income tax, social
insurance contributions (the sum of flat rate contributions, discontinued in
1979, and pay-related contributions, introduced in 1974) and company
taxation. Given the great complexity of the income taxation system, wc use
a very simple approach based on an assumed exogenous average tax ratc
with tax revenue determined by an identity. This approaelL although crude,
seems preferable for our puq~oscs to thc approach of Dowling (1975)
who modelled income tax revenues as a function of a complex measure of
allowances claimable, but did not include explicit tax rates. Our approach
ignores the progressivity of the tax system at any point in time but it could
be generalised to take accSunt of this. A very detailed sub-model of thc
income tax system has been developed by FitzGerald (1984b) and could bc
incoq~orated into later versions of our model. The social insurance system
is modelled in a similar way with the average rate of contribution cxogcnous.
Finally, no attempt was made to grapple with thc complexities of thc cor-
porate tax system. A simple equation is used to link revenue with company
profits, the profit elasticity being 0.84.
Subsidies in the model are of three types: subsidies on personal consump-
tion, EEC subsidies and a residual category. The latter two are left exo-
gcnous while the consumption subsidy is handled by defining an explicit
subsidy "rate" which is regarded as a discretionary policy instrument.
Thrcc categories of pcrsonal income transfers are modcllcd: uncmploy-
ment assistance and benefit, pay-related unemployment benefit, and a
residual (but very large) category of mainly social welfare transfers (i.e.,
pensions, sickness benefit, etc.). Unemployment assistance and benefit
payments are related to a payment rate and total numbers unemployed.
Only a short data sample is available for pay-related unemployment benefit
and’a simple equation links expenditure with a lagged wage rate and numbers
unemployed. Finally, the residu~ category of social welfare transfers covers
a wide and heterogeneous mixture of payments ranging from old age pensions,
health benefits and children’s allowances, to secondary school teachers’
salaries. An explanation along standard lines -- i.e., expenditure related to a
rate of payment and a base - proved impossible at an aggregate level. In the
present version of the model they are left as discretionary policy instruments.
National Debt Interest Payments
National debt is considcred in two parts: debt denominated in Irish pounds
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and debt denominated in foreign currency. Interest payments on the first
component are explained in terms of a rate of interest and changes in National
Loans outstanding. The actual stock of debt outstanding is exogenous. In
this version of the model we determine interest payments on foreign debt as
if all foreign debt was of infinite maturity. We also permit a simple revaluation
option for the stock of foreign debt outstanding when exchange rates
change. The details of this area are probably best handled in satellite sub-
models by analysts with particular concern for the composition of the
foreign debt and the debt maturity structure.
Identities are used to determine total current expenditure by government,
total capital expenditure, total revenue and the resulting borrowing require-
ment. This borrowing requirement can be financed by either monetary or
non-monetary means. Monetary financing consists of money creation by the
Central Bank or of foreign borrowing. Non-monetary financing consists of
borrowing from domestic commercial banks and the non-bank public. Foreign
borrowing is determined in the model as the residual financing element.
Monetary Activities
As explained in the introduction, an SOE, fixed exchange rate monetary
sector is included in the model. The first element consists of a demand for
money equation which determines the broad money aggregate, M3, in con-
stant prices as a function of real GNP, the inflation rate and the ratio of the
deposit rate to the lending rate. Estimation yielded a GNP elasticity of
approxinlately unity, an in flation elasticity of- 0.5 and a small positive, but
statistically insignificant, interest rate differential elasticity. The existence
and stability of the demand for money equation is important for the monetary
authorities irrespective of whether policy is conducted within a closed eco-
nomy or within an open economy with a fixed exchange rate and dominated
by external financial markets. With perfect capital mobility there is no scope
for altering the domestic interest rate since any attempt to do so will be
frustrated by capital flows. A stable demand for money function in this case
implies that if the monetary authority carries out policy actions designed
to change the domestic component of the money stock (i.e., domestic
credit), there will be equal and offsetting changes in the foreign component.
Hence, in an open economy with virtually perfect capital mobility, a stable
demand for money equation enables the Central Bank to adapt domestic
credit policy to attain an external reserves target.
The second element of the monetary sector, the financing of the public
authorities borrowing requirement, has been included in the fiscal sector
where the foreign element is determined residually. The empirical assumption
being made is that the borrowing requirement can be financed domestically
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or abroad by changes in interest rates which are small enough that their
effects on domestic spending can be ignored (Helliwell et al., 1982). In using
such a model over a period of sustained deficits by the public sector, the
implications of this assumption must be closely monitored, particularly
aspects related to debt accumulation and resulting debt service payments
problems and the exogeneity of the exchange rate.
The third element of the monetary sector links the balance of payments
with changes in the official external reserves. This relation is used to endo-
genise the net capital inflow of tbe non-bank private sector and is at the core
of the perfect capital mobility assumption. The final identity concerns the
sources of the money supply and sirnply states the two sources involved
- domestic credit and the external reserves. The entire specification of the
monetary sector is highly recursive. Gross National Product ,and its deflator
are determined in the real sector and are used to determine money demand.
Given a level of domestic credit the level of external reserves are determined.
Given the level of reserves and the balance of payments, the private net
capital inflow is determined.
Chapter 3
EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE MODEL
In Chapter 2 we presented and discussed the structure of the model on
an equation, sectoral and block basis. In this chapter we examine the model
as a complete system. We simulate it through the within sample data period
(1966 to 1980) in order to examine its tracking performance. We also
subject the model to exogenous "shocks" and examine how the model
reacts to them. Here, of course, we have nothing but intuition and common
sense to guide us in our evaluation. Through execution of such tests we are
better able to pass a rough judgement upon the validity and applicability of
the model as a tool for policy analysis.
Our general philosophy of model construction should be clear from
Chapter 2. We feel that it is necessary to impose as rigorous a macro-theoretical
structure as possible on a macroeconometric model since it is only through
such a perspective that policy analysis can be adequately rationalised. Given
this objective, it became clear that one must trade off theoretical rigor
against tracking performance. If one adds enough explanatory variables it is
usually possible to account for the twists and turns of even the most obstinate
dependant variable! Because of this we felt that the analysis of multipliers
should be used as the predominant criterion for model testing with the
requirement of "reasonable" tracking performance being a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for model acceptability. To adopt this attitude
does, however, require the theoretical underpinnings to be subjected to very
close scutiny.
Before turning to the empirical analysis we give a brief outline of the
manner in which the different sectors of the model operate and of some of
the main linkages between sectors when the model is operated as an integrated
system. The model has a strong supply orientation in its concern with the
determination of output in industry, agriculture and services. In industry,
capacity output is determined by long-run demand and by competitiveness.
There is great difficulty in specifying the industry sector given that it is com-
posed of both traded and non-traded components. Our standard model variant
treats the entire industrial sector as potentially tradable and determines
capacity as a function of world demand and competitiveness. Complementary
to this, in the price sector we determine the industrial output price purely in
terms of world prices. Such a stylised approach serves to play down the
influence of any potential domestic effects on industrial capacity and in
42
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different variants we examine the effect of relaxing this restrictive formulation.
Conversely, the marketed services sector has been treated as a non-traded
sector with output determined by clornestic demand and price determined as
a mark-up on unit labour costs. The non-marketed services sector and the
public administration sector are driven by policy instruments, expenditure or
employment. In the agricultural sector, capacity output displays great inertia
and is only influenced by profitability and the weather to a slight degree.
Consequently, it is relative impervious to changes in the other sectors since it
is driven more by exogenous factors and demographic forces than by economic
circumstances.
The manncr in which the model framework is specified conditions the
way in which shocks feed through the economy. For example, the demand
effect of a fiscal expenditure stimulus will initially influence the public
administration or the NMS sectors with the demand expansion effect spilling
over into the marketed services sector and, depending on the choice of
industrial capacity output model, possibly into the industry sector. On the
othcr hand, the effect of an increase in world demand will result in increased
exports and industrial output, which then filters through over time to the
MS scctor through increased disposable income. The NMS and public authority
sectors arc unaffected.
The price and competitiveness cffects of exogenous shocks are also of
great importance. In the industrial sector, competitiveness is measured by
thc ratio of a wcightcd sum of Irish unit capital and labour costs to "world"
unit labour costs. Clearly Irish competitiveness will depend upon the manner
in which wages and productivity are determined in the model. The well-
known Scandinavian model of SOE wage-price determination has been used
hut differs from the "text-book"version in that productivity is endogenously
determined in our model and the wage determination process can be modi-
fied by a short-run Phillips curve. The role played by returns to scale in
industry also generates links between supply and price/competitiveness
aspects of the model particularly since the positive relationship between
output and productivity implicit in increasing returns, ceterisparibus, is not
evident tunder constant returns to scale. The implications of various different
maintained hypotheses are explored below.
The government borrowing requirement is derived residually as the
difference between expenditure and revenue. The component of the borrow-
ing requirement which is financed domcstically is exogenous and net foreign
borrowing is ultimately the residual. If unadapted, this has the implication
that when the model is perturbed by a fiscal expansion not only is the policy
financed by foreign borrowing but all interest payments on the increased
foreign debt arc also financed by further foreign borrowing. As a result,
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foreign debt interest payments do not act as a leakage upon domestic demand
but rather debt is simply accumulated. To rectify this problem it has been
assumed in all fiscal multiplier analysis in this chapter that any increase in
interest payments on foreign debt above its historical value is financed by
increased taxation. In our multiplier calculations we use direct income tax as
the source of this extra finance but any other tax or selection of taxes could
he used. The effect of introducing this mechanism is that, subsequent to the
initial demand stimulus, increased interest payments act as a leakage on
aggregate dernand which serve to negate any expansionary effect of the
fiscal stimulus, a process which is exacerbated if target wage growth is
determined net of direct taxes.
The process whereby fiscal expansion (and contraction) affects the
economy is quite complicated. Such expansion, presumed to be financed
by foreign borrowing, might initially stimulate public administration employ-
ment, with demand spill-over into the market services sector and, possibly,
the industrial sector. The unemployment rate is reduced so that unemploy-
ment transfers fall, at fixed transfer rates. Tax revenue also initially rises
since disposable income and expenditure rises. On the other hand, a fall in
the unemployment rate induces wage inflation via the Phillips curve (if
selected), thus disimproving international competitiveness at fixed output
prices. Furthermore, increased gross wages and/or reduced unemployment
will induce net inward migration via the Harris-Todaro migration model.
These mechanisms will work towards offsetting the initial beneficial effect
on the unemployment rate. Finally, the initial expansionary effects on
demand are further offset by increased imports (since disposable income
has increased) and by increased interest payments on the foreign debt (at
fixed interest rates). The complex combination of these and other factors
determines the eventual outcome of the fiscal stimulus.
Before examining the multiplier properties of the model and its sensitivity
to various possible equation variants, we now turn to the tracking per-
forrnancc of the model.
TRACKING PERFORMANCE OF THE MODEL
Errors enter the model system through the stochastic errors in the be-
havioural equations. If all the behavioural equations fitted perfectly within
sample, the model, when simulated as a system, would reproduce the entire
set of endogenous variables exactly. In practice, of course, this is never the
case. Intuitively one feels that the within-sample tracking errors of the
individual behavioural equations wil[ represent a lower bound of error when
compared with the errors of the model simulated as an integrated system. In
Appendix 2 the behavioural equations are presented, along with a selection
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of summary statistics that describe the "goodness of fit" of the equations
considered in isolution. However, to examine the performance of the model
as a system we must simulate it in various ways and test its tracking ability.
For reasons of space it is clearly impossible to providc analysis of tracking
performance for all variants of the model. Instead, we have defined a "stan-
dard" model as a basis for tracking and muhiplier analysis. With rcfcrcnce to
tbe discussion of Chapter 2, this "standard" version has the following
features:
(i)Increasing returns to scale in the industry sector
(ii) lndustria! capacity dctcrmincd by world dcmand and compctitivc-
Yless
(iii) Industrial exports dctcrmincd by dcmand and profitability
(iv) Industrial prices dctcrmincd by world priccs
(v) Target industrial wage determined in terms of consumption prices
and net of direct taxation
(vi) Industrial wagc dctermination charactcrised by a short-run Phillips
curve.
In Table 3.1 we present summary statistics for a subset of the endogenous
variables in the modcl. Wc examine thrce diffcrcnt types of simulation; a
single-cquation simulation where each equation is considered in isolation; a
static simulation where the model is treated as a complete system but is
"restarted" every ycar; and a full dynamic simulation where the model is
started in a specific year and allowed to run on to a terminal year. Eacb of
these simulations constitutes a progressively more stringent test of the
model’s performance as a system. The stlmfp.ary statistics used 1o con’lpare
the three simulations are the root mean square error (RMSE) and the root
mean square percentage crror (KMSPE) v:hich are defined as
;~lT      *RaMSE = _ 5" (Yit - Yit)221
RMSPE=
~/tTl [(Vit*- Yit)/Vltl2
’ii
where Yit* is the simulated v;due of the ith endogenous variablc at time t,
Yit is its historical value and T is the number of timc periods in the simula-
tion. No statistics are presented under the singlc cquation forecast for
industrial output, and fixed investment in industry, private services or
agriculture as these variables are generated by identities in the model. The
same is also true of total imports, employment, the balance of payments,
various demand aggregates and the government borrowing requirement as
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Table 3.1: Simulation results for 1966 to 1980
Single equation Static simulation Dynamic simulation
Variable: static forecast of the model of the model
RMSE RMSPE RMSE RMSPE RMSE RMSPE
Industry
Capacit 1
Output[
Capital stock 1
Fixed investment |
Employment2
Ag~ffculture
Output1
Capital stock 1
Investment 1
Employment2
Pn~ate services
Output1
Capital stock I
Investment I
Employment2
tM blic services
Output1
Employment2
Public administration
Output1
Trade
Total imports of goods and
servicesl
Materials for further pro-
duction industry 1
Non-agrlcultural exportsI
Balance of payments rateS*
Supply and demand
aggregates
Employment2
GDP at market prices1
Personal consumptionI
Gross domestic expenditure 1
Total fixed investment I
Disposable income 1
Net migration abroad2.
Wages and paces
Industrial wages4
Private service wages4
Public sector wages4
Industrial output deflator5
Service sector output
deflator5
Consumption deflator5
23.8 2.0 23.8 2.0 39.9 3.1
-- - 36.5 3.1 34.3 2.8
8.6 0.3 36.1 1.0 54.9 2.1
- -- 22.3 8.8 24.8 9.4
- -- 5.5 1.7 7.2 2.2
- -- 32.4 7.5 31.3 7.2
8.0 0.7 8.6 0.8 22.6 2.0
- - 8.6 7.0 12.2 9.4
2.6 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.1
28.5 2.7 30.2 3.0 30.4 8.0
69.0 5.0 69.6 5.1 100.4 6.0
-- -- 69,0 38.6 58.6 40.0
11.0 3.5 6.7 2.1 6,6, 2.1
16.1 3,6 25.7 5.9 22.1 5.2
- 5.2 4.4 5.2 4.4
4.3 1.8 4.8 1,8 4.3 1,8
-- 137.5 6.9 81.3 4.2
-- 116.3 9.8 77.1 6.3
36.6 2.9 36.6 2.9 72.7 5.8
-- 3.3 245.5 2.7 97.4
11.4 1.1 12.1 1.1
-- -- 61.5 1.8 68.3 2.0
28.1 1.$ 39.1 1.7 33.3 1.5
-- 61.5 1.8 08.2 2.0
-- 78.7 11.2 68.8 9.8
-- 66.5 2.2 55.0 1.8
6.5 117.4 6.5 118.0 10.9 144.5
0.08 2.7 0.094 3.7 0.085 8.0
0.09 5.2 0.09 4.8 0.08 3.2
0.08 1.7 0.17 4.5 0.16 4.3
0.05 4.8 0.05 4.8 0.05 4.8
0.017 1.7 0.019 2.2 0.026 2.8
0.012 l.S 0.019 1.6 0.016 1.4
Superscripts refer to units of measurements as follows:
1. £m, 1975
2. 000s
S. ratio to GDP at market prices
4. £000s, 1975
5. index, 1975= 1.
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they are identities comprising of the relevant components determined
endogenously elsewhere in the model.
Our prior expectation as we move to the right across Table 3.1 is that the
tracking performance as measured by RMSE and RMSPE will deteriorate.
We find that, for a number of variables examined, the fit does not deteriorate
between tbe static and dynamic simulation. In fact it improves. The results
presented in Table 3.1 seem reasonably satisfactory given the rapidly changing
structure of the Irish economy over the 1966 to 1980 period. The only
serious anomalies which exist are our failure to estimate adequately net
migration abroad or investment in private services. Our failure to capture the
movements in these variables and its implications are returned to in the next
section where similar results arc plotted against their historical equivalents.
Those variables against which an asterisk have been placed consist of
economic factors which have changed sign throughout the 1966 to 1980
period. For example, net migration may be +500 one year and -100 the
next. As a result, the historical level of any of these variables may often be
very close to zero. Therefore any errors which occur at these points will be
magnified if presented in percentage error form as the base (i.e., the historical
level of the variable) is very low. For’ instance, a 1,000 error when the base
is 200 will appear very much larger than when the base is 20,000. As a result
we would suggest that the RMSE be used as the relevant validation criterion
as it gets over this problem.
In Figures 3.l to 3.6 we present plots over time of the actual and dynami-
cally simulated wdues of a number of key economic indicators. These historical
values are given by the continuous line and the simulated values by the
broken line. in Figure 3.1 we present a number of variables characterising
demand in the economy--personal consumption, gross domestic expen-
diture, disposable income, non-agricultural exports and total fixed im,estment.
We see that household consumption tracks well with the only significant
errors occurring in 1968 and 1980. Gross domestic expenditure also tracks
well, any errors being both small and non-systematic (meaning that there is
no long-run deviation above or below the historical solution). Disposable
income is captured quite well with the only serious errors occurring in 1979
and 1980, as a result of the failure of the model to adequately quantify tax
revenue in those years. Non-agricultural exports do not track as well as the
other variables mentioned above after 1972 though this is hardly surprising
given the growing export-orientation of the Irish economy in a period, of
depressed world demand. Finally, total investment is captured quite well
with the exception of a huge under-prcdiction in 1975 and 1976 (7% and
25%, respectively).
In order to find the source of the large error in total investment we plot
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Figure 3.1 : Within-sample tracking: selected demand variables
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Figure 3.2: Within-sample tracking: sectoral investment
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investment at a sectoral level in Figure 3.2. Of the .£200m error in total
investment in 1976, 75 per cent is explained by under-prediction in the
private service sector. Further examination suggests that this problem has
been caused by a failure both to estimate output and to capture relative
capital-labour prices in private services in those years. This problem is returned
to below in a discussion of sectoral employment (see Figure 3.3). Investment
in the other sectors shows an adequate tracking performance. In the case of
government investment, since tile value of investment is a policy instrument
(and hence exogenous), errors can only arise through the price system.
In Figures 3.3 and 3.4 we present a graphical analysis of the model’s per-
formance in tracking sectoral supply. Value-added output in industry is
captured satisfactorily though is over-predicted in 1974-75 and under-
predicted in 1980, the latter case probably explicable by the impressive
export performance during that year given falling world demand (see Figure
3.1). Value-added in the private sera, ice sector is again tracked reasonably
though tbcrc is a large over-prediction of output in 1976 and 1980. This is
possibly explained by the rather long lags which have been imposed upon
the variable explaining output in private services. Value-added in agriculture
is poorly tracked due both to the complex nature of this sector and the fact
that value-added output is derived residually from gn’oss output and material
inputs, both larger than value-added output. Value-added in this sector
moved rather erratically over the 1966 to 1980 period. As with other sectors,
there appears to be a certain inertia in the modelling of the agricultural sector
so that changes which vary both in sign and magnitude are not reflected
over a single year but are rather averaged over a 2-3 year period picking up
an underlying trend.
Output in the non-market selwice sector also tracks well up to 1975 but
performance after that is rather poor. This problem is possibly due to the
determination of OUtl)Ut in dais sector by a single instrument, government
consumption, which was relatively stable in real terms in the 1975-1977
period while historical non-market services output fell. This problem could
possibly be solved by the inclusion of total government investment variable
as a secondary explanatory variable in which case the historical fall in
government investment would most likely result in a sharp down-turn in
predicted non-market services output,
Errors in tracking employment appear to follow the pattern of errors in
output described above for all sectors except private services. In the private
service sector there is a systematic over-estimation of employment after
1970 even though output is reasonably well captured (with the exception
of 1975). This is due to systematic errors in the measurement of relative
capital-labour costs which, coupled with a high Allen elasticity of sub-
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Figure 3.3: Within-sample tracking: selected supply variables (a)
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Figure 3.4: Within-sample tracking: selected supply variables (b)
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stitution between capital ,and labour (0.6), results in over-estimation of
employment at the expense of under-estimated investment (see Figure 3.2).
This problem is difficuh to rectify given the poor quality of data on wages
and capital costs for private sen, ices. The tracking performance of industrial
employment is, again, reasonable if a little sluggish. The major problems
occur from 1971 to 1977 wherc large short-run changcs in productivity are
not well c!aptured in a single year but are rather averaged over a two to three
year period, picking up an underlying trend.
In Figure 3.5 we examine the performance of a number of important
aggregates. Gross Domestic product at market prices is well estimated with
the only noticeable errors occurring in 1966 and 1970. It is worth noting
however that errors would be magnified if they had been graphed in terms of
growth rates. Total employment is reasonably well represented given the
problems of measuring productivity and relative factor prices and their high
variance over the post-1970 period. The estimation of the deterioration of
the public authorities borrowing rcquirement is moderately satisfactory with
significant errors in 1976-1977 and 1980. Further examination of this
problem suggested that this resulted from errors in estimating tax revenue
rather than expenditure.
Net migration abroad is badly predicted with large under-estimates of
emigration from 1972 to 1978, a maximum error of 11,500 occurring in
1978. We feel that while migration has traditionally proved even a difficult
variable to measure, a better representation might be obtained if migration
flows were induced by differences between net wages in Ireland and the UK
rather than by gross wages differentials as in the present model. In terms of
its seriousness for the entire model’s performance, an alternative dynamic
simulation where migration was set at its historical level showed little dif-
ferences from these results presented here so the effect of these errors appears
quite slight.
hi Figure 3.5 we also examine the ability of the model to estimate gross
imports and the balance of payments rate. Imports are relatively well esti-
mated, the only serious problems occurring with over-estimation in 1975 and
under-estimation in 1980, as with industrial output. That gross imports
would mirror industrial output is hardly surprising given that 70 per cent of
gross imports is accounted for by imported materials for the industrial sector.
The balance of payments rate4 is reasonably well measured given that the
balance of payments is derived residually from gross imports and gross
exports. The most serious errors occur in 1976 when non-agricultural exports
were seriously over-estimated and 1979-80 when they were under-estimated.
4. Measured by the balance of payments as a proportion of GDP.
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Figure 3.5 : Within-sample tracking: selected aggregates
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Finally, in Figure 3.6 we examine the performance of our model in
estimating rates of inflation for key wage and price aggn’egates. This section
of the model appears to suffer from the inertia of the other sectors so that
a single year lag is generally required to pick up wage increases, particularly
wage inflation which deviates much from the average. This is particularly
evident for the high wage and price increases of 1975 which are not reflected
by the tracking simulation until 1976 (for example, see public administration
wage inflation). Our general impression of the six wage and price variables
given in Figure 3.6 is that while the model may not capture single year
changes in a particular wage or price, over a two year period the errors tend
to average out (see the rate of inflation for industrial price deflator in 1975-
76 for the most obvious example).
M UL TIPLIER AlVA L YSIS: INTR OD UCTION
The examination of the results of perturbing a selection of exogenous
variables and coefficients furthers our understanding of the model’s structure
and the linkages between sectors. Furthermore, it provides a rough quanti-
fication of the relative importance, not only of the exogenous variable(s) in
question, but also of the sensitivity of the model to the choice of equation
variants. In this section we present the results of a number of multiplier
calculations where exogenous variables have been perturbed, by specific
amounts, above or below their historical values at some point in time, usually
the year 1967. Graphs are then presented to illustrate the effects of the per-
turbations on a range of key endogenous variables. These graphs plot the
deviation of an endogenous variable from the historical baseline value.
For the purposes of multiplier analysis the model has been "corrected"
so that a dynamic tracking simulation reproduces exactly the historical
data. This is done by adding the vector of single-equation estimation errors
to each behavioural equation in the model. This operation bas been carried
out so as to be able to present results in a form where they may be easily
compared with the historical data rather than with first differences of a
hypothetical simulated solution. Furthermore, it allows us carry out more
complex multipliers where marginal effects can differ from historically
average values, e.g., where the rate of interest of any increased debt may
differ from the historical average rate. From a more practical point of view,
it also permits us to have a single baseline simulation for all variants of
the model. However, if the model were significantly non-linear such a pro-
cedure would be difficult to defend since the multipliers would be sensitive
to the particular correction method used. However, quite extensive examina-
tion of the "corrected" versus "uncorrected" versions of the model showed
negligible difference in their multiplier properties.
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Figure 3.6: Within.sample tracking: inflation rates of selected wages and prices
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It would be impracticable to present multipliers for all the exogenous
variables using all possible variants of the model. Instead, we examine a
single perturbation at length using different variants of the model. We then
present results for a wider range of exogenous variables using only a "stan-
dard" version of the model with perhaps minor variants. The policy variable
we have selected for detailed treatment is government current expenditure
on goods and services net of the public administration wage bill (CGOV).
This is denominated in current prices and represents essentially purchases
by government of the output of the non-marketed services sector (NMS
sector).
The "standard" version of the model is defined, in slightly more detail
than previously, as having the following features:
(i) Industrial capacity determined by world demand and competitive-
ness
(ii) Increasing returns to scale in the industrial sector
(iii) Non-agricLdtural exports determined by world demand and pro-
fitability
(iv) Target industrial wage denominated in consumer prices and net of
tax
(v) Short-run Phillips curve in the wage equation
(vi) Interest payments on changed foreign debt financed by extra direct
taxation
(vii) The non-market service sector driven by a single government instru-
ment, employmcnt.
Variants of the "standard" model include:
(i) Domestic demand is allowed play a role in industrial capacity deter-
mination
(ii) Constant and incrcasing returns to scale in industry are examined
(iii) Exports are determined by a supply equation as well as a demand
equation
(iv) Differcnt forms of the industrial wage equation are examined, e.g.,
with and without a Phillips curve, in terms of consumer and pro-
duccr prices, gross and net of direction taxation
(v) Output in the non-market service sector is driven by nomlnalexpen-
ditnre rather than employment.
The many variants on the standard model have been included for two
reasons. First, there may be disagreement among economists about the
nature of the Irish economy and we felt it desirable to allow certain options
to give ns alternative frameworks within which to examine fiscal policy.
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Second, it is doubtful whether a single model can analyse an economy
adequately over a long period. Circumstances change and agents act dif-
ferently in some periods compared with others. For instance, the issue of
direct tax incidence is one which can vary, with direct tax awareness per-
haps more acute during the latter part of the sample period (e.g., PAYE
marches) than during the 1960s or early 1970s. As such we felt it desirable
to include the relevant option if required.
The variant of the model used in this chapter as the "standard" model
includes one distinction from that defined above. Output in the non-market
service sector is driven by nominal government consumption expenditure
rather than by employment. This specification has been substituted in
Chapter 5 by an employment-driven non-market service sector as it was
felt that when a shock introduced serious changes to the rate of inflation
(as in Chapter 5), a real instrument such as employment seems more in line
with government action over the 1960s and 1970s rather than the idea of
cash limits imposed by a nominal instrument.
For the standard model, multipliers were calculated with respect to the
following exogenous variables:
(i) A sustained increase in the value of government consumption expen-
diture, net of public administration wages, of 10 per cent of its
1967 value, i.e., £9.2 million
(ii) A sustained increase in public administration employment of 10 per
cent of its 1967 value, i.e., 4,300 extra jobs
(iii) A sustained increase in real world GDP of 1 per cent of its 1967 value
(iv) A sustained increase in the level of all exogenous prices and in world
unit labour costs of 10 per cent of their 1967 values
(v) A once-off increase in the rates of excise tax, income tax and VAT
of 10 per cent of their 1967 values
(vi) A sustained decrease in "world" unit labour costs of 5 per cent of
its 1967 value.
In Figure 3.7 we present the effect of increasing the value of government
consumption, net of public administration wages, (CGOV) by 10 per cent
of its 1967 value, i.e., a sustained increase of £9.2 million. Since CGOV
is measured in nominal rather than real terms, the real magnitude of the
sustained nominal shock decays over time due to the underlying high rate
of price inflation. The increase in CGOV initially boosts nominal aggregate
demand which translates into an increase in real GDP measured in 1975 prices
of £30 million in 1967, with total employment increases of 9,600, of which
7,600 occur in the NMS sector (directly affected by CGOV), 1,700 in the
MS sector and 300 in the industrial sector. After the initial stimulus to
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demand, tile boost to disposable income is then eroded over time by inflation
and by the increased taxation needed to finance extra interest payments.
Furthermore, the Phillips curve forces wages to rise above their historical
value since unemployment has fallen, thus causing a loss in competitiveness
and a falI in industrial output. By 1980 employment has returned to its
historical level though the unemployment rate’is higher and the borrowing
requirement rate, though improving, is still greater than its historical value.
The initial deterioration in the balance of payments rate, due to increased
impm’ts (via disposable income) and reduced exports (via loss in com-
petitiveness) is also gradually eroded over time by inflation. We now consider
the effects of wtrying some of the assumptions used in the determination of
a "standard model".
ALTERNATIVE VARIANTS OF THE MODEL UNDER A SINGLE PER-
TURBA TION
In Figure 3.8 we explore the role of the Phillips curve in the model. The
PhilIips curve plays an equilibriating role in the model, moving wage rates
inversely with the unemployment rate. The increase in labour’s share of
added-value in industry after the CGOV stimtdus, exacerbated by the low
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, reduced profitability
and, consequently, industrial capacity. As capacity output falls so also does
industrial cmploymcnt, thus directing the system back towards its "natural"
ratc of unemployment. This pattern is evident from Figure 3.8, where the
continuous line refers to the standard model and the dotted line refers to
the model without a Phillips curve (but otherwise identical to the standard
model). In the standard model industrial output falls quite sharply due to
the loss in competitiveness. Without the Phillips curve the fall is not as
severe. However, due to the absence of any equilibriating tendency, this fall
is sustained and total employment and output in industry remain below that
recorded for the standard model. Total employment settles at approximately
1,200 below the standard model solution, the loss being equally divided
between the industrial and marketed service sectors. Similar trends are
evident in the other aggregate variables such as disposable income borrowing
requirement and GDP.
In Figure 3.9 we examine the effects of a CGOV perturbation where
changes in direct taxation rates have no effects on industrial wage formation,
i.e., workers are indifferent to direct tax rates. In this variant the increase
in the direct tax rate necessary to finance increased payments has no direct
effect on the target industrial wage rate. This results in an improvement in
competitiveness and increased industrial output above the standard model
case with spin-offs into other sectors. This pattern continues so that by
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1980 total employment is approximately 1,500 higher than with the stan-
dard model, with similar effects on the other macro aggregates. Gross wage
rates are, of course, lower than for the standard model. However, since the
borrowing required has improved (due to reduced unemployment, etc.),
the taxation requirement to finance increased interest repayments has
fallen. The difference between the take-home wages in both simulations is
negligible.
The model framework provides three choices of industrial capacity output
equations. The standard version uses an export-led growth approach where
the level of domestic demand plays no direct role. The alternatives provided
include a short-run disequilibrium effect in domestic absorption (option 2)
and a permanent domestic absorption effect where a geometric average of
world and domestic absorption drives industrial capacity output (with
weights of 0.60 and 0.40 respectively - option 3). The use of the export-
led growth model does not imply that domestic absorption plays no role
in the determination of industrial capacity; rather, world demand may act as
a proxy for domestic absorption, and any increase in domestic absorption
brought about by domestic fiscal stimulation is felt by industrialists to be
unsustainable and, consequently, does not enter into their Iong-run capacity
plans. Rather, capacity utilisation in industry rises. Options 2 and 3 highlight
a more important role for domestic absorption, in ascending order. However,
the statistical estimation involved in option 3 may be somewhat dubious due
to strong multicollinearity between world and domestic absorption. Figure
3.10 illustrates the effect which the choice of industrial capacity option has
for the CGOV perturbation. Any divergences of option 2 from the standard
model are negligible. The effect of imposing option 3 has the expected
result. Increased domestic absorption, with no change in world activity,
results in higher industrial output and employment compared with the
standard model. This pattern continues until 1976, after which point the
effects of inflation and the Phillips curve guide the system back towards the
standard model solution.
Thus far, industrial wage rates have been determined using industrial
labour productivity as a key explanatory factor. Since industrial wage rates
determine wage rates in all other sectors, it is clear that the wage rates in
other sectors also depend on industrial productivity. The standard model
wage equation plays down the role which industrial productivity can poten-
tially play in the determination of competitiveness, namely, if changes in
productivity are not assumed to be fully recouped in increased wages, unit
labour costs will move in the opposite direction. To examine such a possi-
bility, we present in Figure 3.11 results for the CGOV perturbation where
industrial wages are no longer dependent on productivity. The effects of this
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change on output and employment are twofold. First, industrial wage rates
no longer respond to productivity changes so movements in competitiveness
will be more marked than with the standard model, where only lags of
adjustment to the target wage apply. Second, for the standard model increased
industrial productivity with no change in the other sectoral productivities
will result in increased unit labour costs in the MS sector, leading to price
rises for GDP and its expenditure components. The resulting effects on
industrial wages and competitiveness constrain the growth stimulus via
profitability. This second situation will no longer hold if the link between
industrial productivity and industrial wages is broken. Hence, we expect
movements in productivity to have more exaggerated effects in the modified
version of the model when compared with the standard version, largely
through changes in competitiveness and profitability. Such a pattern is
evident in Figure 3.11 where both models are subjected to the usual CGOV
shock. The oscillations about the standard version continue until the end of
the simulation period.
Another variant on the standard model which we now examine is the
substitution of the industrial wage equation by one where the target wage is
denominated in producer prices rather than consumer prices. This shifts the
emphasis in wage bargaining from the employee to the employer and corres-
ponds to the version of the Scandinavian model usually considered in the
literature (Lindbeck, 1979). Results for this variation are shown in Figure
3.12. In the standard version of the model, the Phillips curve and the increased
direct tax rates required to finance interest repayments on foreign debt
both ser,,e to increase industrial wage rates and, ultimately, consumer
prices. The industrial producer price, however, is exogenously determined.
Hence, whereas for the standard model increased consumer prices will increase
wages further, with resuhing loss in competitiveness, for the producer-price
wage variant this chain of causation is missing from the model. The effect
of this for the CGOV perturbation is to give a lasting improvement in com-
petitiveness over the standard model simulation, with consequent increases
in output and employment, though at the expense of lower real take-home
wages. The effects endure over a long period, with the difference between
the two simulations settling down after 1975 at an employment gain of
1,000, a real GDP gain of £4 million in 1975 prices and a drop in annual
average earnings in industry of £25 in 1975 prices.
The standard version of the model imposes increased returns to scale
(IRS) of 1.3 upon the industrial sector. We now examine the effect of impos-
ing constant returns to scale (CRS). Autonomousoutput increases in industry
induce productivity and wage increases under IRS but have no effect with
CRS. Therefore, we expect higher wages under IRS than for CRS after any
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expansionary perturbation. Since MS sector wages are determined by those
in industry, this results in higher unit labour costs, and hence prices, under
IRS compared with CRS. Increased service sector prices eventually have
knock-on effects on other sectors so that competitiveness is eventually lost
in industry. At the same time, employment increases will be attenuated
under IRS compared with CRS since less factor inputs are required to
produce a given output increase. The converse of these effects are initially
evident in Figure 3.13 since industrial output actually falls after the CGOV
perturbation for reasons that have been examined in previous cases. Reduced
industrial output results in wages which are higher under CRS than under
1RS (productivity has fallen), employment which is lower and consumer
price increases which are lower. The trade-off between these related effects,
plus the fact that the Phillips curve plays a stronger role in this perturbation
than under CRS, eventually results in no long-run deviation between the two
cases.
The effect of using a selection of taxes to finance the increased interest
payments on foreign borrowing consequent on the CGOV perturbation,
rather than financing it by direct income tax alone, is examined in Figure
3.14. The rates of excise tax (TEDR), value-added tax (TAVR), motor
vehicle duty (TCARR), other indirect tax (TIOR) and income tax (TYRA)
have been increased to produce the necessary extra finance, using their
relative revenue shares as weights. The standard model raises finance by
direct taxation alone, i.., its base is the wage bill. The selection of taxes
mentioned above apply to both expenditure bases (mainly proxied by house-
hold consumption) and the wage bill. The fact that the industrial target
wage is formulated in net of (direct) tax form means that the gross wage
increase under the broader financing variant is less than under the narrower
(direct taxation) standard variant. Of course, the broader financing variant
now imposes a direct inflation effect through its influence on consumer
prices (in the model all indirect taxes are assumed to bear on consumption
and not on any other expenditure component). Overall, the broader financ-
ing variant is more expansionary than the narrower one, but the effects
very slight.
Having examined the effect of different variants of the model on a single
expenditure shock, we now look at how the standard version of the model
defined above reacts to other perturbations.
ALTERNATIVE PERTURBATIONS TO A SINGLE VERSION OF THE
MODEL
Figure 3.15 examines the imptications of increasing public administration
employment by 10 per cent of its level in 1967 on the standard model. This
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Figure 3.14: Multipliers: alternative financing of the borrowing requirement
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involves a sustained increase in public administration employment of 4,300
above historical levels, a perturbation which intuitively will have greater
long-run effects on the economy than the previous nominal government
stimulus since its effects will not be eroded over time by inflation given
that pubfic sector employment must be paid the going wage. As before,
results for the standard model are given by the full line. Employment initially
rises by 5,000 suggesting slight spin-off effects to the other sectors of the
economy. Real GDP increases by £18m though is then eroded by a loss in
competitiveness induced by the Phillips curve since wages increase after
the drop in the unemployment rate and by the increased taxation required
to finance foreign debt repayments. While GDP remains approximately
£17m above its base value, disposable income falls rapidly over time since
the average rate of direct taxation has risen, with the result that it is only
£8m above its historical value by 1980. At the same time, the government
borrowing requirement has stabilised at approximately 0.2 per cent above
its baseline historical equivalent, as the increased public administration wage
bill and debt repayments outweighs increased taxation at fixed rates (since
domestic absorption rises) and reduces unemployment benefit bill.
A similar perturbation on the standard model without a Phillips curve is
given by the broken line on Figure 3.15. This shows a slight initial improve-
ment in competitiveness (since a reduced unemployment rate no longer
induces wage increases) and similar effects on industrial and market services
seftor output. However, like the nominal government expenditure pertur-
bation (discussed at length above), though there is an initial improvement in
aggregate demand and supply the omission of a Phillips curve removes an
equilibriating mechanism from the model there being no tendency to move
back towards historical levels via competitiveness after increases in taxation.
The effect on this simulation is to reduce industrial output below historical
levels by 1979 since the tax rates necessary to finance public administration
employment squeeze industrial competitiveness. Similar patterns are evident
in other major aggregates such as GDP, personal consumption, etc.
Figure 3.16 plots the likely effect of a simultaneous once-off one-year
increase in the rates of VAT, income tax and excise tax of 10 per cent of
their value in 1967. This once-off increase in taxation reduces the borrowing
requirement. Domestic competitiveness disimproves since wages are linked
to both direct and indirect taxation and disposable income falls. There is a
resulting loss in total employment of 2,000 and a reduction in real GDP of
£9m. The reduction in demand and output quickly dies off as tax rates
are returned to their historical level so losses in competitiveness are short-
lived. After a period of approximately 3 years, there seems to be no significant
net gain or loss to the economy suggesting that the initial beneficial effect on
E
M
P
I
R
I
C
A
L
 
T
E
S
T
I
N
G
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
M
O
D
E
L
73
l:igure 3.16: 
M
ultipliers for standard model: one year indirect tax increases
o
7
"?
~
,
~
.
¢~
o
c5
~
cJ
<
o
74 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
the reduced foreign debt seem to be offset by increased unemployment
transfers, an obvious consquence of reduced output.
In Figure 3.17 we examine the effects on the standard model of increasing
real world demand, trade weighted, by 1 per cent of its 1967 value. The
increase in world demand increases output initially in the industriM sector.
Gross Domestic Product increases cumulatively so that by 1980 it is £16m
above its historical level, and total employment rises by 3,000, 75 per cent
of which occurs in the industrial sector. The borrowing requirement rate has
fallen by 0.2 per cent in 1980, presumably as a result of reduced unemploy-
ment transfers. Similar improvements are evident in other major indicators
such as the balance of payments, personal consumption and market service
sector output.
The distinction between the results of this perturbation and that where
public administration employment is increased (Figure 3.15) lies in the
manner in which government expenditure is handled. A consequence of any
demand expansion is an initial increase in tax revenue and reduction in
unemployment transfers (assuming constant tax and expenditure rates) so
that the government borrowing requirement initially improves. This means
that under a world-induced demand expansion the borrowing requirement
improves vis-a-vis a situation where no account is taken of the public finances,
so that rates of direct taxation can fall (while still providing the same govern-
ment service domestically) with a resulting improvement in competitiveness
via wage bargaining. On the other hand, the borrowing requirement increases
when public administration employment increases (Figure 3.15), so that, by
the same reasoning as above, competitiveness is lost with depressing effects
upon the economy.
To take account of the possibiliw that the rate of interest in which
government debt is denominated could be dependent upon the level of debt,
we have introduced a variant to the model where a profile has been set on
the interest rate charged on marginal government debt above or below its
historical level. In other words, the marginal rate of interest is greater than
the average rate of interest on foreign government debt. We presume that
the relevant rate of interest is fixed at 2 per cent in real terms, i.e., world
inflation plus 2 per cent. This compares with a period during the 1970s when
real interest rates were significantly negative so that the constraining effects
upon the model after fiscal stimulation will be greater under this variant
than under the standard model. In order to show the importance of this
variable in examining the desirability of fiscal stimulus, we have set the
required interest rate at its hypothetical level only after 1973 when his-
toricany it became negative in real terms. This simulation has the further
aim of giving some crude idea of the implications for the model of fiscal
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expansion in a period of positive real interest rates given that all other
exogenous variables take on their historical levels. The perturbation used to
change the stock of debt is the standard CGOV perturbation considered
at length in the first part of this section.
For a given stock of foreign-held debt, an increase in the relevant interest
rates will increase interest repayments thus requiring increased taxation over
the standard model perturbation. Since wages are determined net of taxes,
this implies wage increases and, consequently, lost competitiveness over the
historical equivalent. Such patterns are evident in Figure 3.18 where the full
line refers to the standard model and the dotted line to the variant con-
sidered here. The loss in competitiveness mentioned above results in reduced
real industrial output of £6m and total employment losses by 2,000 over
the standard model stimulation, both in 1977. After 1977, the convergence
between hypothetical and historical foreign interest rates on government
debt and the effect of the Phillips curve directs the major indicators (output,
employment, consumption) back towards their standard model equivalents,
though at reduced wage rates.
The penultimate "shock" which we consider is to use the same hypothetical
real interest rate of 2 per cent but to subject the entire stock of debt to this
rate rather than the marginal effects considered in Figure 3.18 above. The
standard model is then simulated over time to examine the maguitude of the
role which the rate of interest on foreign government debt can play upon the
model. An important caveat must be mentioned here, namely, that this
simulation can be seen as realistic only with the accompanying assumption
that government would have employed the historical number of public
administration employees and spent the historical nominal amount of the
non-market service sector, unlikely perhaps given the increased cost of
foreign borrowing.
Results of this perturbation are presented in Figure 3.19 by the full line
where, as we might expect, the additional leakage from the economy via
interest repayments on government debt has a depressing effect, total
employment falling cumulatively until 1977 where it is 25,000 below its
historical level (with similar effects on other indicators) before a reduction
in the difference between the hypothetical and historical interest rates and
the Phillips curve return the system towards its historical level. An additional
simulation, where the Phillips curve has been dropped, is given by the
broken line in Figure 3.19. This perturbation shows even more severe effects
on output and employment since there is now no downward pressure on
wages once the unemployment rate rises so that competitiveness is lost. In
this scenario, employment falls by 34,000 in 1977 and only slightly returns
towards its historical solution by 1980 by reduced discrepancies between
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hypothetical and actual interest rates.
In order to examine the importance of competitiveness on the Irish eco-
nomy we now consider a situation where world unit labour costs fail by
5 per cent of their value in 1967. The results are presented in Figure 3.20.
Being an external influence which enters the model through industrial com-
petitiveness, reduced world unit labour costs initially affect the economy
through reduced industrial output, employment and investment. By 1970
the output f’ail is £27m, with a decline of 6,000 in industrial employment.
There follows a slow cyclical return to the historical values, though by 1980
industrial output is still £17m, and employment 3,600, below the historical
level. Total employment fails by approximately 5,000 from 1970 to 1978,
which reduces wage rates via the Phillips curve, thus partially offsetting the
loss in competitiveness. The borrowing requirement rate also rises, remaining
approximately 0.2 per cent above historical levels after 1970. These results
would suggest that even though a nominal exogenous v,’u’iable may have
changed for only one year, there can be very long-tailed implications. It is
certainly not sufficient to suggest that any nominal shock hits the model,
works its way through, and disappears via inflation erosion. While inflation
certainly does play an important role, there are other influences to con-
sider. The effect of a change in any variable on the model depends not only
on its effects on expenditure but also on supply considerations such as
profitability, unit labour costs and competitiveness. It can have indirect
effects as well, via the Phillips curve or the manner in which the borrowing
requirement affects the real side of the economy. It is a far more complex
situation than inflation erosion.
Care must be exercised if these multiplier results are to be used to justify
policy during the sample period or if they are to be extrapolated into the
1980s. Aside from the Lucas argument that the coefficients estimated in the
behavioural equations may depend on the level of the exogenous policy
variable(s) we shock, there is also the further problem of relating one exo-
genous variable to another, no account of which is taken here. For instance, in
Figure 3.17 we consider the effect of increasing real world demand ignoring
the potential relationship between world demand, world prices and world
competitiveness. There is a similar problem where certain government
instruments have been exogenised at their historical nominal levels so that
movements in the economy, induced by imposed shocks, do not affect these
variables in any way. In an attempt to overcome this problem, we are currently
examining methods whereby, within a multiplier analysis, government expen-
diure may be related to growth in the economy, or changes in tax revenues
with some correction for the stock of debt. One further constraint, imposed
by the simplicity of the monetary sector, is the lack of a relationship where-
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by the exchange rate~ always assumed fixed during the above perturbations,
could be related to certain indicators in the domestic and world economy.
It is particularly difficult to deduce policy implications from the above
results for the present. While demand conditions during the 1970s might be
likened to the present depression there are two crucial differences between the
1970s and early 1980s for analysis of fiscal stimulation. First, the inflation
rates experienced during the mid-1970s were far in excess of those being
presently experienced so the effect of a nominal shock such as the CGOV
perturbation considered above, which disappear quickly in a high inflation
environment, may linger in a low-inflation era. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, fiscal expansion financed by foreign borrowing must now be
repaid at significantly positive real interest rates rather than the negative
real rates which persisted for long periods during the 1970s. As a result,
the demand depressing effects of interest repayments will presumably be
that much greater now than during the period studied above.
Chapter 4
POLICY ANAL YSIS WITH MACROMODELS
INTRODUCTION
Operational macromodels of an economy are constructed mainly to pro-
vide tools to assist in historical appraisals of the role and impact of economic
policy decisions, and to provide guidance in evaluating stabilisation policies
for the present and future. With a model one can begin to attempt to answer
the counter-factual question: what would have been the state of the economy
in the absence of particular policies?
Two broad methodological approaches to policy analysis are available for
use with macromodels. The first approach originated with the work of
Hansen and his collaborators and has come to be known as the "Hansen"
methodology.5 An early application of this approach using an Irish econo-
metric model was due to Norton (1975). In the Hansen approach, an attempt
is made to isolate the component of the economic outturn which can be
attributed to fiscal and monetary policy changes and to categorise this
component in terms of "discretionary" and "automatic" effects. The pro-
cedure used involves only standard simulation techniques to carry out
counter-factual experiments. The results of such exercises are, of course,
specific to the particular model used. Although the overall methodology is
the subject of continuing but, as yet, unresoh, ed controversy,6 nevertheless
the proper focus of debate over the resuhs and conclusions of its use is most
fruitfully directed at the underlying model, its structure and its assumptions.
The second broad approach to policy analysis involves the use of optimal
control theory with economic models. Here one seeks to establish not what
the ex-post policy impacts turned out to be but rather what was the ex-ante
policy "criterion" function that guided policy makers in formulating their
policy decisions and in settling on trade-off measures between different
desirable economic objectives.7 In addition one can explore "optimal"
policy decisions using specific ex-ante criterion functions and arrive at the
"best" policy prescriptions to attain given objectives.
5. Hanson (1968; 1973), Hansen and Snyder (1968), Snyder and Tanaka (1972), Blinder and Gold-
[eld (1976), Artis and Green (1982).
6. Lucas (1976), Lucas and Sargent (1981), Simms (1982), Begg (1982).
7. The international literature in this area is immente. Standard works include C~ow (1975; 1981),
Pindyck (1973), Aoki (1975). An application to Dutch stabUisation policy has been described by
Bulter and Owcn (19811. The technique has been the subjccl of a Parliamentary report in the UK
(Ball, 1978). The only application to an Irish model appeaxs to be Bradley and O Raifeartaigh (1982).
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The control-theoretic framework is useful for formulating policy decisions
and is considerably more subtle than the simpler Hansen methodology.
However, it suffers from three major drawbacks. First, the computational
burdens are very heavy since complex non-linear optimisation algorithms are
required to solve optimal control problems.8 Second, the optimal control
analysis often forces one into policy configurations which are very different
from those which characterised the period over which the model behavioural
equations were estimated. Hence, before embarking on the application of
control techniques to economic problems, one must be sure that the model
being used is robust, stable and appropriate over a wide range of policy
configurations. Few economists can honestly say that they have such con-
fidence in their macromodels. Finally, the Lucas critique, allied to problems
with the time inconsistency of optimal plans (Kydland and Prescott, 1977),
means that optimal control calculations must be interpreted with great care.
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the Hansen methodology, particularly
in the sophisticated form developed by Blinder and Goldfeld (1976). We feel
that only when a model has been fully exposed to these simpler methods of
analysis should one turn to applications of control theory. In the next section
we describe the methodology we propose to use and how it is to be imple-
mented using a macromodel of an economy. In the following section we
illustrate the Blinder and Goldfeld methodology for a specific year (1967)
using the model described in Chapter 2 and discuss practical problems of
implementation. Having explored how policy effects can be quantified in an
experimental framework, in Chapter 5 we apply the method to an examination
of the historical fiscal policy effects over the period 1967 to 1980.
THE METHODOLOG Y OF POLICY E VALUATION
In its very simplest form, the Hansen methodology for policy evaluation
can be presented using the rudimentary model shown in Figure 4.1. If we
ignore the unrealistic nature of this model for the moment, we can say that
it is characterised by three endogenous variables (consumption (C), tax
revenue (T) and income (Y)), two policy instruments (expenditure (G) and
the tax rate (t)), one exogenous variable (investment (I)) and two behavioural
coefficients (a and #). Solving for Y (income) in terms of the exogenous and
policy variables yields
1 +l+G) (4.1)
¥= 1- a(x-t) (~
8, Typically, the computer time required to calculate an optimal policy decision over a single time
period could be one hundred times as long as the tlme required to carry out a single simulation experl-
merit.
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Figure 4.1: A simple macromodel
(1) c -- a+0(Y-T)
(2) T = tY
(3) V = c+T+G
Notation
Y    = Real National Income
C = Real Private Consumption
1 = Real Total Investment
G = Real Pubfic Expenditure
T = Real Tax Receipts
ct = Intercept
/J = Marginal Propensity to Consume
t = Marginal Tax Rate
Hence, for any given time period, and given fixed values of the behavioural
coefficients (a, ~3) we obtain the value of Y by simply inserting the values of
the exogenous variable (I) and the policy instruments (G and t).
Consider now differential changes .to the exogenous variable (AI) and the
policy instruments (AG and At). Using (4.1) this yields
OAt
aY=(~)(al+~O)- (l_t~(l_t))x (~+1+C)(4.2)
This change in income (AY), broughtabout by changes in investment (I),
government expenditure (G) and the tax rate (t),is called the total change.
If we assume that policy makers have discretion over whether or not to
make changes in the poficy instruments G and t, then if no such discretionary
changes are made, any change in income must arise as a result of changes in
the purely exogenous variable l, i.e.,
AY = (1--2- ~-]--~))A I                          (4.3)
In the complete absence of government taxation activities (i.e., t = 0), then
the income change reduces to
AY = ( ~ _-~ff-)&l (4.4)
In practice, of course, t is positive and the income change in the presence of
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taxation is less than the change in the absence of taxation, i.e., the taxation
system acts as a stabl]iser.
Since (4.2) represents the total change in income (due to combined exo-
genous and policy variable alterations) and (4.3) represents the change when
the policy variables are not altered from their base values, then the income
change attributable purely to the discretionary fiscal policy is simply the
difference of (4.2) and (4.3), i.e.,
AYdisc = (_] - 1
~At    " (a + 1 + G) (4.5)
fl(1-t))AG- (] - ~(l-t))2
where, of course, dYdisc = 0 if dG = dt = 0.
The above simple model serves to isolate three important concepts:
(i) The total change in policy targets brought about by changes in both
the purely exogenous variables and in the policy variables;
(il) The change in policy targets resulting from changes only in exogenous
(non-policy) variables. This change is, of course, influenced by the
existence of a fiscal structure and incorporates aspects of automatic
stabilisation effects;
(iii) The change in policy targets resulting from changes only in the policy
variables which are subject to discretionary variation.
For practical analysis of actual policy decisions it is necessary to generalise
this simple model of Figure 4.1 in two directions: to formulate the analysis
in terms of a general macromodel (usually large and highly non-linear), and
to deal with dynamic effects.9
Consider a single target variable Y whose behaviour is governed by the
non-linear dynamic reduced form equation
Yt = f(Xt, Yt-l’ Gt) (4.6)
where X is a vector of exogenous variables and G is a vector of policy instru-
ments.10 Suppose we now create a hypothetical series G(t, to) which follows
the historical path of G(t) up to the period to -1; remains unchanged (at
value G(t0 - 1)) during period tO ;and replicates all subsequent policy changes
exactly as found in the historical record G(t).
Since the hypothetical policy path G(t,t0) removes only the policy
changes of period to, it enables us to isolate the influence of period t0’s
policy on any future value of the target variable Y. The methodology for
9. Blinder and Goldfeld (1976), Artis and Green (1982).
10. It is not necessary to assume that f(.) can be written analytically. It is sufficient to be able to
solve the underlying structure model by numerical techniques, and such technlques.are always used
in practice. There is no loss in generality in assuming lags of only one period.
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doing so is as follows:
(i) Derive a baseline path for Y by simulating the model dynamically
using the historical values of all policy variables (yielding Y(t));
(ii) Construct a hypothetical path, denoted by ~’(t, t0), by simulating
the model using policy G(t, to) instead of G(t);
(iii) Calculate the difference (D) between the two pathsfi’(t) and /(t, to)
as a measure of the policy influence, i.e., D(t, to) = Y(t) - Y(t, t0).
This describes the impact of policy changes, made in period to, on the target
variable Y at any subsequent period t.
However, because of lags in the model structure, past policy actions will
have effects on future values of target variables, Y. This requires us to dis-
tlnguish between the effects of a particular policy action taken at time to
on subsequent levels of the target Y, and the total effect on Y of all past
actions. In any period, t, the total effect of policy may be defined as
n
D(t) = 1~ D(t,t-i) (4.7)
i=0
where n is, in theory, infinite, but in practice is truncated to a finite number. 11
The first difference of this series, i.e.,
/XD(t) = D(t)- D(t-l)
quantifies the net change in effect of policy between two periods.
The benefits of such measures are clear: the effects are precisely dated;
one can examine a range of target variables; initial conditions are taken into
account; the full non-linearities of the model are used. However, there are
the following reservations about the methodology. Any results are specific
to the model used: change the model and the results will be different. This
reservation should serve, not merely to call into question any analysis, but
more importantly to focus attention on the model as a good economy repre-
sentation. Second, it makes the assumption of the independence of policies.
In practice, certain policies (e.g., fiscal expansion) might only have been
undertaken if other policies (e.g., wage and price controls) were in force.
Third, the method requires a baseline (or indexed) policy to be defined,
deviations from which are used to quantify the discretion exercised in
policy making. It is to this important aspect that we now turn.
The fiscal instruments in our model can be classified into three types:
(i) Instruments expressed in nominal (or money) terms. Examples of
this type include government investment expenditures, certain tax
I I. A "well-behaved" model should "scttlc down" after a policy shock in the sense that
D(t, to) = D(t + 1, to) for t ~n if n is large enough.
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(ii)
(iii)
revenues (such as rates and wealth tax) and tile rate of specific excise
taxes. Of the 27 fiscal instruments used in the model, 19 fall into this
category.
Instruments expressed in real or quantity terms. The only such instru-
ments in our model are employment in public administration and
non-marketed service sector employment (expressed in thousands).
Tax rates expressed in percentage form. Examples are the average
direct income tax rate, the VAT rate, the social insurance rate, etc.
In all there are six such instruments in our model.
Two possible definitions of a "indexed" or "baseline" fiscal policy suggest
themselves.
(a) No change in any of the three types of instruments listed above, i.e.,
all nominal magnitudes remain unchanged, employment in public
administration and public services is fixed at its previous year’s
level, as also are all tax rates which are expressed in percentage terms.
We refer, subsequently, to such a policy baseline as "nominal", or:
(b) All nominal instruments are indexed to a suitable price or value
index, with no changes in other instruments. We refer, subsequently,
to such a policy baseline as "real".
Neither of these definitions is without its limitations. The "real" baseline
definition attempts to get at a concept of fiscal policy that is neutral in its
effects on the real economy in the sense of maintaining government’s share
of activity in the economy. The "nominal" baseline involves a definition
meaning literally no change in the variables the government actually con-
trois.12 The real baseline definition only considers deviations from full
indexation of all nominal instruments in line with inflation as policy: it
implicitly assumes, therefore, that the decision to index is not a policy option.
The nominal baseline definition, on the other hand, sees any change in the
value of the nominal instruments as a policy decision. In reality, of course,
it is about the current value of its expenditure and revenue instruments that
the government makes decisions, and not about their value in 1975 prices.
However, among the disadvantages of the nominal baseline definition is that
it will give different values for the effects of a given set of policy changes
according as inflation rates differ. Also the measured effects of fiscal policy
in an inflationary period will be very high using this definition if some of the
items of government expenditure and taxation designated as being exogenous
12. Artis and Green adopt the "no-change" in nominal magnitudes definition since whatever the
reason for changes fTom the chosen baseline, such changes must be financed, and hence the zero
change assumption is preferred, Bacon et al. (1982) adopt the indexation approach in a study of
Irish fiscal effects using MODEL-80. Artis (19841 has switched to the indexation approach.
88 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
policy variables are not, in fact, exogenous but have been increased in line
with inflation. This problem derives less from focusing on nominal instru-
ments than from a failure to model properly all of the components of the
government accounts and exogenising items that should in fact be endo-
genous. While we do not believe that looking only at "real" changes gets
around this problem (what in fact is needed is better modelling of the govern-
ment sector), in this study we have opted for the real baseline definition.
While not perfect, we feel that it maintains a closer consistency with the
actual budgetary procedures used in the Department of Finance than the
nominal baseline policy.13
The Blinder-Goldfeld method can also be used to examine the balance
between taxation and expenditure policies in the overall outturn for, say,
GDP by quantifying the effects of taxation and expenditure policies to-
gether, and then each separately. A simple diagram can be used to illustrate
the results (Figure 4.2), where the output effects of tax changes are shown
along the vertical axis, and output effects of expenditure changes along the
horizontal axis. The dotted line represents the locus of policy configurations
where any tax increases (with a negative effect on output) are balanced by
expenditure increases (with a positive effect on output). In a specific sense,
such policies are "neutral". The information shown in Fignre4.2 relates to
the duration of the UK labour administration of the years 1974-1979. It
shows, for example, the shift from tax financed expenditure stimulations
in 1974 and 1975 to expenditure cuts whose deflationary impacts were
partially offset by tax cuts in 1976 and 1977. Ill 1978 the role of fiscal
policy was very minor. In addition, at no time were both arms of fiscal
policy pulling in the same direction (i.e.,there are no policy configurations
in the north-cast or south-west quadrants of the diagram). In the diagram,
policy configurations in the north-east quadrant are expansionary both in
terms of taxation and expenditure policy, while points in the south-west
quadrant are contractionary in terms of both. Points in the south-east
quadrant are expansionary in terms of expenditure policies and contractionary
in terms of taxation policy. The reverse holds in the north-west quadrant.
POLICY ANAL YSIS WITH A SPECIFIC MODEL
In the previous two sections we have described the methodology of
policy analysis in general terms, in this section we examine how this general
l 3. "It is customary to assess economic prospects before the Budget on the assumption of Budget
neutrality (i.e., no change in the real level of public expendittLre and no alteration in the tax code).
The assumption is purely technical and has no implications for policy intention~’(Economlc Back-
ground to the Budget, 1981, Department of Finance, 19811. It should be noted, however, that the
spirit of the above scheme has been interpreted and implemented in differing ways over the period
1960 to 1980 by the Department of Finance.
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Figure 4.2: The output effects of taxation (AT) and expenditure (AG) changes: UK,
1974-1979
I-)’,T
%%
%*.
’k%%
%
%b,,4
’
%%
%
197C-"77 ¯
1977f70x, ~ 9~8/79
I "’    1974F/5
,. ~ 197rJ76
%%
I%
Source: Artis and Green (1982), p. 41.
methodology can be implemented with the model described in Chapter 2.
Our purpose is to illustrate the Blinder-Goldfeld approach for a single year,
1967, in order to lay the ground work for the analysis of fiscal policy effects
over the period 1967 to 1980, which is carried out in the next chapter.
The first task to be performed is to classify the exogenous variables into
policy variables (which, to a greater or a lesser extent, are under the control
of the public authorities) and purely exogenous variables (e.g., world prices,
etc). Within the class of policy variableswe make a further distinction between
the fiscal authorities, the monetary authorities and the European Commis-
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sion. Finally, within the class of fiscal policy instruments we make the
distinction between taxation instruments and expenditure instruments.
In all there are 77 exogenous variables of all types in the model. A com-
plete listing, by the above classification is given in Appendix 1. Briefly, they
split into the following groups:
Fiscal Policy: Expenditure
=15= 12 IFiscal Policy: Revenue Policy variables
Financial and Monetary Policy
__= 2European Commission
Agricultural
= i }
World Purely exogenous variables
Other (including dummy variables)
In what follows we regard the European Commission variables as being purely
exogenous to the domestic economy. Financial and monetary policy instru-
ments are considerably more difficult to handle within the model. Given
the fixed link with sterling prior to 1979 and membership of the EMS
subsequently, it may not strain credulity if the exchange rate is regarded as
purely exogenous in what follows. A somewhat similar argument will also
serve to justify exogenous interest rates.
In relation to the financing of the government borrowing requirement, we
have made the assumption that the domestic uptake of government securities
is exogenous. Hence, any rise in the borrowing requirement due to variations
in the settings of fiscal instruments is assumed to be financed by foreign
borrowing. Such an assumption is crude, but is made in order to avoid the
very complex issues related to a more sophisticated monetary sector, within
which the balance between domestic and foreign financing would be har,dled
endogenously.
In Table 4.1 we list the fiscal policy instruments used in the model, together
with the mnemonics used in Appendix 1. We also indicate how an "indexation"
change for each instrument has been defined. Where "previous year" is
shown, indexation policy is defined as involving no change from the previous
years value. This is the case for tax rates expressed in percentage or fraction
form and for employment numbers. Where "GNPV" is shown, the instrument
is indexed to the value of GNP. The same holds for QAV (the value of gross
agricultural output) and CPERV (the value of household consumption).
Finally, PCPER indicates simple price indexation, using the consumption
deflator.
In order to illustrate how the Blinder-Goldfeld method of fiscal analysis
works, we take the first year in our period of study, 1967, and we examine
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Table 4.1: Fiscal policy instruments
Taxation instruments Indexed to
GREVK:
SOCR:
TAGLEV:
TAU:
TAVR:
TCARR:
TCDR:
TEDR:
THE:
TIOR:
TRATE:
TYA:
TYRA:
TYW:
YGI:
Total revenue on capital account (£m) GNPV
Implicit average social insurance contribution rate (fraction) Previous year
Revenue from agricultural levies (~em) QAV
Effective corporate tax rate (fraction) Previous year
Effective VAT rate (fraction) Previous year
Motor vehicle road tax rate (index) PCPER
Implicit rate of customs duty (fraction) Previous year
Rate of excise duty on alcohol, petrol, etc. (index) PCPER
Rate of initial depreciation allowances on capital goods
(fraction) Previous year
Implicit rate of residual indirect taxation (index) PCPER
Revenue from property taxes (£m) GNPV
Revenue from taxes on agricultural income (£m) QAV
Implicit average rate of direct taxation (fraction) Previous year
Revenue from wealth taxes (£m) CPERV
Government trading and investment income (£m) GNPV
Expenditure instruments Indexed to
GEXPKO:
IFGOV:
|FGV:
IHGV:
LPA:
LSNM:
SUBCR:
SUBO:
TRKH:
TRKI:
TRPO:
TRUR:
Residual capacity expenditure category (£m) GNPV
Other public sector direct fixed investment (£m) GNPV
Fixed investment by public administration (£m) GNPV
Public authorities housing investment {I’m) GNPV
Employment in public administration and defence
(thousands) Previous year
Employment in non-marketed services (thousands) Previous year
Implicit rate of subsidy on private consumption (fraction) PCPER
Residual category of subsidies (£m) GNPV
Capital transfers to households for housing purposes (£m) GNPV
Capital transfers to industry (£m) GNPV
Residual category of personal transfers (£m) CPERV
Unemployment transfer payment rate PCPER
Note: In some variants of the model, the policy instrument LSNM can be replaced by
CGOV: Public authorities non-wage current expenditure (£m).
how the actual changes m the fiscal instruments differed from the "indexed"
changes. In Table 4..2 we list all the instruments, their actual values taken in
1967, the hypothetical "indexed" values, and the difference between the
actual values and the indexed values. A brief ex~tmination of the taxation
instruments in Table 4.2 (the first 15 listed) shows that in all but two cases
the indexed value of the tax instrument was lower than the actual value.
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Table 4.2: Actual and hypothetical values or fiscal instruments in 1967
Instrument Actual value Hypothetical value Difference
(1967) (1967)
GREVK 11.287 10.641 -0.64
SOCR 0.0335 0.0303 -0.0032
TAGLEV 0.0 0.0 0,0
TAU 0.1177 0.0974 -0.0203
TAVR 0.027 0.023 -0.004
TCARR 0.6613 0,6747 0.0134
TCDR 0.018 0.019 0.001
TEDR 0.5659 0.5478 -0.0181
THE 0.286 0.241 -0.045
T1OR 0.928 0.9173 -0.0107
TRATE 34.17 35.12 0,95
TYA 0.0 0.0 0.0
TYRA 0.085 0.078 -0.007
TYW 0.0 0.0 0.0
YGI 27.05 26.66 -0.39
GEXPKO 28.598 29.325 0.727
IFGOV 20.204 21,392 1.182
IFGV 11.50 11.47 -0.03
IHGV 14.176 11.895 -2.281
LPA 44.0 43.2 -0.8
LSNM 93.8 85.3 -8.5
SUBCR 0.0059 0.0058 -0.0001
SUBO 38.19 32.75 -5.44
TRKH 3.163 2.841 -0.322
TRKI 6.149 5.232 -0.917
TRPO 73.11 69.83 -3,28
TRUR 3.829 3.826 -0.003
The exceptions are TCARR (road tax) and "I~CDR (customs duty), and even
in these cases the differences are very small. A similar picture holds with the
expenditure instruments where all except two have negative differences, i.e.,
the indexed values are smaller than the actual values. The exceptions are
GEXPKO (residual capital expenditure) and IFGOV (an element of public
fixed capital formation). From the point of view of the settings of the fiscal
instruments ("the fiscal stance"), the figures in Table 4.2 would lead us to
expect that the fiscal actions taken in 1967 were expansionary relative to
"indexed" changes in expenditure and contractionary for tax changes. In
order to confirm this impression, and to quantify the magnitude of the fiscal
stimulus, we need to stimulate the model replacing the actual 1967 fiscal
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actions by the above hypothetical ones, and apply historical changes sub-
sequent to 1967, as described in the methodology section above. The remainder
of this chapter is devoted to a detailed examination of the results of this
simulation in order to prepare for the more comprehensive analysis of the
next chapter where the combined effects of many different budgets are
examined.
FISCAL POLICY IN 1967
In this section we examine in detail the impact and delayed effects of the
discretionary fiscal actions taken in 1967. We use 1967 to illustrate the
Btinder-Goldfeld methodology and to prepare the way for the more concise
treatment of Chapter 5, where we only present summary restdts for the
period 1967 to 1980.
As an illustration of the actual and hypothetical time paths for the fiscal
instruments, we show in Table 4.3 the values for the main excise duty tax
rate (TEDR), the social welfare transfer instrument (TRPO) and numbers
employed in non-marketed services (LSNM). In each case it is seen that,
subsequent to 1967, the historical change in each instrtlment is reproduced
in the hypothetical path of the instrument. Since both TEDR and TRPO
are measured in money terms (TEDR is an index of nominal duty per
physical unit of goods and TRPO is measured ill millions of pounds), the sus-
tained difference is eroded over time due to the high backgronnd inflation.
The instrument LSNM is measured in thousands of employees. Hence, the
sustained difference remains constant in real terms and is not eroded by
inflation.
We turn now to the paths of the endogenous, or target, variables and the
manner in which removal of the discretionary fiscal changes for 1967 affects
the economy (as mirrored in the model) over time. This information is pre-
sented in a series of graphs which illustrate the differences between the
evolution of a specific target variable under the hypothetical fiscal policy
and its evolution under the actual fiscal policy.14
In Figure 4.3 we examine the effects on the most aggregate indicator of
economic activity, real gross domestic product (GDPM) and the growth rate
of gross domestic product (GDPMDOT). The data for 1966 are included for
reference in order to define the base-fine zero difference between the his-
torical outturn and the "hypothetical" outturn due to indexed policies.
Relative to the historical outturn fiscal indexation (as defined in Table 4.2)
would have led to a lower value of GDP. In 1967, GDP would have been
14. Since the within-sample stochastic errors have been added back to the behavioural equations,
simulation of the model with actual fiscal instrumenu reproduces the historically observed valuci of
a/l the endogenous variables (refer Chapter $),
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Table 4.3 : Examples of fiscod indexation for 1967
TEDR -Indexofexc~eduO ra~ (base 1975 = 1,0)
Year Ac~al Indexat~n Difference
1966 0,534537 0.534537 0.
1967 0,565947 0.547837 -0.018
1968 0.595015 0,576906 -0.018
1969 0.666844 0,648734 -0.018
1970 0.682131 0.664021 -0.018
1971 0.693827 0.675718 -0.018
1972 0.697422 0.679312 -0.018
1973 0,725802 0.707692 -0.018
1974 0.742615 0.724505 -0.018
1975 1. 0.98189 -0.018
1976 1.30622 1.28811 -0.018
1977 1,33076 1.31265 -0.018
1978 1.31819 1.30008 -0.018
1979 1,45024 1.43213 -0,018
1980 2.07639 2.05828 -0.018
TRPO - Social welfare income transfers (.~ million)
Year Ac~al Indexat~n Difference
1966 65,9062 65.9062 0.
1967 73.1142 69,8322 -3.28
1968 85.019 81.737 -3.28
1969 103.054 99.7717 -3.28
1970 124,789 121.507 -3.28
1971 149.303 146.021 -3.28
1972 177.006 173.724 -3.28
1973 231.702 228.42 -3.28
1974 308.34 305.058 -3.28
1975 417.158 413.876 -3,28
1976 502.62 499.338 -3.28
1977 569.327 566.045 -3.28
1978 657.947 654.665 -3.28
1979 791.795 788.513
-3.28
1980 1004,48 1001.2 -3.28
LSNM -- Employment in non-marketed services (thousands)
Year Ac~al lndexat~n Difference
1966 85.2998 85.2998 0.
1967 93,8 85.2998 -8.50
1968 92.4001 83.8999 -8,50
1969 91.1001 82.5999 -8.50
1970 96,2 87.6997 -8,50
1971 101.4 92.8997 -8.50
1972 114. 105.5 -8,50
1973 115.8 107,3 -8,50
1974 116.3 107.8 -8,50
1975 124.7 116,2
-8.50
1976 122.2 113.7 -8.50
1977 125.5 117. -8.50
1978 130.8 122.3
-8,50
1979 145.2 136.7 -8.50
1980 148.9 140.4 -8.50
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Figure 4,3: The effects o f fiscal indexation in 1967: Gross Domestic Product
GDPM -- Gross Domestic Product (£m, 1975) GDPMDOT-- GDP growth rate (per cent)
Year Actual lndexat~n Difference Year Ae~al lndexa~on Difference
1966 2565,05 2565.05 0.00415 1966 1,25093 1.25113 0.000191
1967 2687,26 2657.14 -30.127 1967 4.76456 3.58962
-1.17474
1968 2857.48 2834.47 -23.0159 1968 6.3343 6.67372
0,339418
1969 2990.25 2981.19 -9.06836 1969 4.6463 4.17616
0.529861
1970 3080.72 8075.78 -4.93628 1970 8.02525 3.17297 0.147724
1971 5230.24 3222,85 -7.89455 1971 4.85353 4.78184 -0.072199
1972 3425.72 3409.59 -16.1274 1972 5.05154 5.79445 -0,257111
1973 3605.84 3581.55 -24,2907 1973 5.25789 5.04332
-0,214577
1974 3710.5 8687.49 -23.01 1974 2.90252 2,95782 0.055504
1975 3781.1 3709.42 -21.6787 1975 0.555184 0.594711 0,055504
1976 8851,6 3844.5 -7.09985 1976 5.22962 3.64151 0.411892
1977 4071.2 4072.01 0.814453 1977 5.70145 5,91784 0.216389
1978 4364.1 4364.68 0.578125 1978 7.19488 7.18708 -0,007248
1979 4536. 4558.95 2.95703 1979 3,95887 3.99284 0.053978
1980 4602.89 4611.02 8.12109 1980 1.47476 1,58758 0.11282
GDPM -- Gross Domestic Product (£m, 1975) GDPMDOT-- GDP growth rate (pey cent)
io,
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£30m lower (in 1975 prices) and the growth rate would have been 1.2 per-
centage points lower. The subsequent evolution of the economy is clear from
Figure 4.3. A gradual convergence back to the historical level and growth
rate of GDP is interrupted by a cycle, but by the last year in our sample
(1980) adjustment is almost complete. Hence, in terms of its effect on GDP
one would describe the actual fiscal policy of 1967 as fairly expansionary.
However, the stimulatory effect of the expansion gradually dies away over
time. The economic mechanisms by means of which this happens are explored
below.
In Figure 4.4 we look at another aggregate economic indicator, the total
number unemployed (O) and the unemployment rate (UR). For the three
years after 1967 unemployment and the unemployment rate would have
been higher than their historical values if the 1967 fiscal policies had been
based on indexation, as defined by Table 4.2 above. In 1967, about 8,500
extra persons would have been unemployed and the unemployment rate
would have been 0.8 percentage points higher. From 1970 to 1975 there
are only very small differences between the actual and hypothetical out-
turns. After 1975 the earlier impact effects tend to be partially reversed
and unemployment tends to fall below the historical level. Hence, in terms
of its effect on unemployment, one would describe the actual fiscal policy
of 1967 as initially expansionary but that this expansionary effect is lost
within three years through mechanisms which we examine below.
A third aggregate indicator of the effect of policy changes is the balance
of payments surphls (BPV) and the surplus expressed as a percentage of GDP
(BPVR) and these effects are explored in Figure 4.5. In the year 1967 the
actual balance of payments was mildly in surplus (to the extent of about 1.4
per cent of GDP). Not surprisingly (in view of the fiscal policy effects on
GDP and unemployment above), fiscal indexation in 1967 would have further
increased this surplus by about one percentage point of GDP in the first year.
The delayed effects on the balance of payments endure and remain positive.
However, the units of measurement for BPV are current prices. Expressed as
a percentage of GDP the surplus peaks in the second year (at 1.1 percentage
points extra) and gradually declines to zero change by 1976. In the sense
that the actual 1967 fiscal policies relative to fiscal indexation in 1967 caused
the balance of payments surplus to fall (or, equivalently, the deficit to rise),
policy can be said to have been expansionary.
In Figure 4.6 we examine an aggregate indicator of the state of the public
authorities finances: the public authorities surplus (GBR), and the surplus
expressed as a percentage of GDP (GBRR). As expected, fiscal indexation
in 1967 would have led to a smaller deficit. In 1967 the actual deficit was
£55.8 million (or 5.1 per cent of GDP). Under fiscal indexation the deficit
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Figure 4.4: The effects of flscal indexation in 1967: unemployment
U - Total Numbers UnemPloyed (thousands) UR -- Unemployment Rate (per cent)
Year Acmal Indexatwn Difference Year Ac~al Indexat~n Difference
1966 40,$003 40.2983 -0.001953 1966 3,74886 3.74968 -0.000179
1967 41.8 50.S003 8.50024 1967 3.86858 4.66811 0.799525
1968 46.2 53.4668 7.26685 1968 4.28253 4,97086 0.688327
1969 43.4001 46.4043 3.00415 1969 4.03347 4,32629 0.292817
1970 52,4004 52.0369 -0.363525 1970 4.86947 4.85284 -0.016626
1971 49.7002 47.9585 -1.7417 1971 4.6023 4.4602 -0.142096
1972 56.6001 55.4197 -1.18042 1972 5.16424 5.08313 -0.081115
1973 52.4004 52.0488 -0.551563 1975 4.71184 4.7075 -0.004336
1974 62.6003 62.1409 -0.459473 1974 4.65448 4.64141 -0,013078
1975 73. 71.5144 -1,4856 1975 6,$6998 6.27689 -0.093084
1976 90. 86.6501 -3.$4985 1976 7.79896 7.55019 -0.248773
1977 88.8999 84.0454 -4.85449 1977 7.58596 7,20739 -0.378567
1978 85. 79.9546 -5.04541 1978 7.11297 6.7201 -0.392866
1979 74. 69.6621 -4.33789 1979 6.07056 5,73592 -0.334628
1980 76, 71.8708 -4.12915 1980 6.13398 5.8187 -0.315274
U- Total Numberg Unemployed (thousands) UR -- Unemployment Rate (per cent)
-6,o 0.40
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Figure 4.5: The effects of fiscal indexation in 2967: balance of payments
BPV -- Balance of Payments Surplus (£m) BPVR -- Balance of Payments Surplus as
per cent of GDP
Year Actual lndexat~n Difference Year Actual lndexat~n     Difference
1966 "-15.8
-15.799 0.000977 1966
-1.57047 -1.57037 9.822845E-05
1967 14.9998 25.2852 10.2855 1967 1.36107 2.34549 0.984417
1968 -15.9002
-2.6551 13.2447 1968
-1.28298 -0.219685 1.0633
1969 -69.1002
-56.7561 12.3441 1969 -4.84031
-4.05033 0.78948
1970 -65.3004
-54.6505 10.6498 1970 -4.05685 -8,4446 0.612245
1971 -71.0003 -57.2871 18.7182 1971 -8.8549 -3.15042 0.704477
1972 -48.4004 -32.2849 16.1155 1972 -2.17797
-1.47351 0.704462
1973 -93.3003 -74.2857 19,0146 1973 -3.48874
-2.82507 0.66367
1974
-294.5 -276.157 18.3428 1974 -9.84716 -9.40799 0.439174
1975 -19.7
-9.62173 10.0785 1975
-0.528004 -0.262507 0.265496
1976 -180,2
-172,587 7.61328 1976
-3.93301 -8.81786 0.115648
1977 -191.8
-183.073 8.22705 1977 -3.47701
-3,35938 0.11768
1978 -256.3 -245.448 10,8519 1978 -3.99142
-8.86144 0.129988
1979 -843.701 -829.839 14,3628 1979 -11.2792 -11.2172 0.061996
1980
-881.897 -866.519 15.3784 1980 -9.94844 -9.89051 0.052929
BPV -- Balance of Payments Surplus (£m) BPVR -- Balance of Payments Surplus as
per cent of GDP
io,o
O’4O
0,00
1966 1971     t976 19g0
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Figure 4.6: The effects of flscal indexation in 1967: public authorities ~urplus
GBR --Public Authorities Surplus (£m)
GBRR -- Public Authorities Surplus as per cent
of GDP
Year Ac~al    lndexation lhfference Year Ac~al lndexation    Difference
1966 -54.2347 -54.2347 O. 1966 25.39075 -5.39074 6.675720E-06
1967 -55.8125 -47.8807 7.93178 1967 -5.0644 -4.44147 0.622931
1968 -75.016 -67.5845 7.43155 1968 -6.05303 -5.59111 0.461917
1969 -99.8821 -91.1449 8.7372 1969 -6.99651 -6.50524 0.491261
1970 -102.163 -91.7377 10.4249 1970 -6.34695 -5.7822 0.564752
1971 -110.356 -98.6823 11.674 1971 - 5.99169 -5.42689 0.564802
1972 -132.818 -122.457 10.3612 1972 -5.9767 -5.58904 0.387656
1973 -188.595 -180.419 8.17592 1973 -7.05205 -6.8613 0.190747
1974 -395.74 -389.789 5.95117 1974 -13.2323 -13.2792 - 0.046825
1975 -543.366 -530.395 12.9719 1975 -14.5634 -14.4706 0.092811
1976 -510.604 -497.979 12.625 1976 -11.1443 -11.0146 0.129788
t977 -582.252 -565.969 16.2832 1977 -10.5828 -10.3853 0.197482
1978 -822.365 -806.569 15.7961 1978 -12.8069 -12.6891 0.117797
1979 -1094.32 -1077.6 16.7192 1979 -14.6296 -14.575 0.054581
1980 -1424.52 -1401.98 22.5425 1980 -16.0615 -16.0023 0.059265
GBR -- l~blic Authorities Surplus (£m) GBRR -- Public Authorities Surplus as per cent
of GDP
24.0,
16.0
8+0
0+0
Per ¢~t 0+70
0.45
0.70
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would have been reduced by £8 million (or 0.6 percentage points of GDP).
As in the case of the balance of payments, this reduction (expressed as a
percentage of GDP) eventually vanishes by 1973.
Finally, in Figure 4.7 we examine policy effects on the inflation rates of
consumption (PCPERDOT) and the industrial average earnings (WIDOT). In
both cases we find that actual fiscal policy relative to fiscal indexation was
inflationary. Consumption price inflation was approximately 0.6 percentage
points higher due to a higher net indirect tax rate and industrial wage inflation
was almost 2.1 percentage points higher in the first year due to a combination
of higher prices, higher direct taxes and lower unemployment. In neither
case is there any long-run effect.
To summarise the position, we examined the actual fiscal policy of 1967
and compared it to a hypothetical "indexed" fiscal policy. By looking at the
effects of both policies on a range of aggregate economic indicators (GDP,
unemployment, the balance of payments, the public authorities borrowing
requirement and inflation) we found that the actual fiscal policy was expan-
sionary relative to the "indexed" fiscal policy. In all cases the difference
between the effects of both policies was eroded over time except in the case
of unemployment, where there appeared to be a small long-run fall in
unemployment in the case of "indexation" relative to the actual policies.
We now turn to an examination of some more disaggregated economic
indicators, particularly sectoral disaggregation, to gain further understanding
of the economic processes involved.
In Figure 4.8 we examine some of the fiscal effects on the supply side of
the economy. Four indicators are included: industrial capacity (OCI), industrial
capacity utilisation (CURl), non-agricultural exports (XNA) and industrial
competitiveness (ECOMP). As before, the graphs illustrate the differences
between policy "indexation" and actual policy in 1967. Under policy
indexation, industrial capacity would have been higher, utilisation would
have fallen very slightly, non-agricultural exports would have been higher,
and competitiveness would have improved.15 The better performance of
the industrial sector under fiscal indexation, particularly the gain in com-
petitiveness, comes about through three mechanisms: the lower (indexed)
direct tax rates, the lower indirect tax rates and the higher initial unemploy-
ment rate. These three mechanisms operate through the process of wage
determination in industry and serve to offset the domestic deflationary
effects of fiscal indexation, as already discussed in the presentation of model
multipliers in Chapter 3 above.
The consequences for employment are examined in Figure 4.9 in terms of
15. Remember that competitiveness (ECOMP) is defined in the model in such a way that a fall in
ECOMP represents a gain in competitiveness relative to the world.
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Figure 4.7: The effects o f fiscal indexation in 1967: price and wage inflation
PCPERDOT- Consumption Price Inflation WIDOT- Industrial Earnings Inflation
(p~ cent)
Year Acmal lndexation Difference Year
1966 3.72229 3.72229 O. 1966
1967 3.07217 2.48814 -0.58403 1967
1968 5.15537 4.64172 -0.519649 1968
1969 7.53061 7.5844 0.053787 1969
1970 .8.22792 8.34837 0.120449 1970
1971 9.44252 9.62276 0.180244 1971
1972 9.6261 9.64146 0.015354 1972
1973 11.516 11.33 -0.185966 1973
1974 15,7072 15.47 -0.237179 1974
1975 22.3472 22.304 -0.043106 1975
1976 18.8944 18.9774 0.082977 1976
1977 12.7666 12.865 0.098419 1977
1978 7.03545 6.90918 -0.126266 1978
1979 13.4211 13.2778 -0.143242 1979
1980 18.5923 18.5334 -0.058929 1980
(perceNt)
Actual Indexatmn Difference
10.0047 10.0048 9.536743E-05
6.61116 4.55816 -2.05297
13.211 12.3574 -0.859539
12.1278 12.8052 0.677395
15.5499 16.4959 0.946045
12.603 13.2272 0.62418
18.647 18.5067 -0.140289
14.2797 13.6618 -0,617981
16.0401 15.6765 -0.363632
28.3431 28.4692 0.120071
22.963 23.2593 0.290298
15.4525 15.6925 0.24004
15.7624 15.6345 -0.127888
19.3828 19.1417 -0.241089
17.9212 17.0851 -0.23613
PCPERDOT-- Consumption Price Inflation
(per cent)
WIDOT -- Industrial Earnings Inflation
(per cent)
0.20
per cem 1.4
0.~
pe~ cent
I,O
-2.~.
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Figure 4.8: The effects of fiscal indexation in 1967: supply side measures
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total employment (L), marketed sector employment (LM) and non-marketed
sector employment (LNM). The marketed sector is further disaggregated
into industry (LI) and marketed services (LSM). Finally, net migration
abroad is shown (NMA). Relative to the case of the actual fiscal policies of
1967, fiscal indexation leads to a sharp drop in total employment of 11,500
in the first year. This fall is steadily eroded over time and, by 1978, the dis-
crepancy has been removed. Total employment is decomposed into employ-
ment in the market sectors (LM) and the non-market sectors (LNM). In the
case of LNM the two component parts (public administration employment
(LPA) and employment in non-marketed services (LSNM)) are policy instru-
ments. The removal of the employment changes in 1967 (using the Blinder-
Goldfeld method), causes a permanent drop of about 9,300. For the first
two years, employment in the market sector drops slightly with fiscal
indexation (largely due to a fall in marketed services employment of 2,500).
However, by 1969 a rise in LM is registered and, by 1978, a rise of 9,100 is
registered, thus eliminating the discretionary cut in public employment.
About two-thirds of the rise in market sector employment comes from
industry, the remainder arising in marketed services. Finally, the graph for
net migration abroad shows that, under fiscal indexation, outward migration
flows are induced (largely due to the rise in unemployment). By 1976 these
flows are eliminated and are reversed after 1976.
Finally, in Figure 4.10 we examine policy effects on household consump-
tion (CPER) and total investment (IFT). Taking consumption first, in the
short-run policy indexation restdts in a fall in real personal disposable
income (YRPERD) and, consequently, in personal consumption. However,
by 1973 disposable income is starting to rise and has stabilised at a gain of
almost £39 million (in 1975 prices) by 1978. Turning to total investment
(IFT), the dominant causal influence is the stimulation of industrial capacity
(refer Figure 4.8). Fiscal indexation induces increased investment, which
stabilises at an additional £14 million (in 1975 prices). The fluctuations
already present in industrial capacity are further magnified by relative factor
price fluctuations. Labour productivity in industry (OPRI) is also boosted in
the long run by indexation, and reflects the investment fluctuations.
We have provided in this section an investigation into the nature of the
fiscal policy changes carried out in the year 1967. Using aggregate economic
indicators we have characterised the 1967 fiscal changes as expansionary,
relative to a policy of fiscal indexation. Further understanding of the fiscal
effects was obtained by looking at the sectoral effects, particularly the
relationship between the market and non-market sectors. The purpose of
the following chapter is to extend our analysis to the entire period 1967 to
1980 in order to study each individual year’s policy stance and to look at
how different "vintages" of fiscal policy interacted over time.
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Figure 4.10: The effects or fiscal indexation in 1967: consumption and investment
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Chapter 5
FISCAL POLICY EFFECTS: 1967-1980
INTR OD UCTION
In this chapter we present a preliminary analysis of the effect of fiscal
policy on the economy over the 1967 to 1980 period. The particular period
chosen was dictated by the available data since estimation and lag require-
ments used up the years from 1960 to 1966. However, the period includes
the run-up to the economic crisis associated with the first OPEC oil price
rises. The period also includes two of the "financial turning points" discussed
by Whitaker, (1983, pp. 98-114), namely, the introduction of current budget
deficits as an explicit policy measure in 1972 and the very expansionary
budgets of 1978]1979. Over the period 1965 to the present there were
seven changes of government. Summary details are given in Table 5.1 below.
Hence, it can be seen that our 1967 to 1980 period includes the full duration
of the Fianna Fail administration of 1969/73, the Fine Gad--Labour coali-
tion of 1973/77 and all but six months of the succeeding Fianna Fail single
party government which remained in office until June 1981.
In analysing the economic policy effects which charactcrise any adminis-
tration, three aspects are of importance: first, the fiscal effects inherited
from the previous administration, over which there is no control; second,
the fiscal effects that take effect within the lifetime of that administration
and finally the fiscal effects passed on to the succeeding administration. For
our period of analysis we are forced to disregard the delayed effects of
policies inherited by the Fianna Fail administration prior to 1967. However
Table 5.1 : Changes of governmen t: 1965-1984
Date of appointment Government party Nature of government Duration
April 1965 Fianna F~il
July 1969 Fianna F~iil
March 1973 Fine Gad/Labour
June 1977 Fianna F~iil
June 1981 Fine Gad/Labour
March 1982 Fianna F:i.il
December 1982 Fine Gad/Labour
One Party: Majority 4 years 3 rots.
One Party: Majority 3 years 8 mts.
Coalition: Majority 4 years 3 rots.
One Party: Majority 4 years
Coalition: Minority 9 mts.
One Party: Minority 8 mts.
Coalition: Majority Still in Office
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we do consider the delayed effects of policies on later administrations.
Clearly the analysis could be extended further back in time prior to 1966
and forward beyond 1980. However this is left to a future study. Further-
more, it must be understood that we are studying annual fiscal changes
and do not consider the individual budgets, which sometimes occurred
more than once per year. Material on the individual budgets is treated in
Chapter 6.
Our objective in this chapter is to gain a thorough understanding of the
role played by fiscal policy during the period 1967 to 1980. To this end,
we apply the methodology of Blinder and Goldfeld (1976) with our medium-
term model along the lines discussed in tile previous chapter. This chapter
is organised as follows. In the second section we apply the Blinder-Goldfeld
method in its "incremental" form (to use the terminology of Artis et al,
1984), in order to examine the economic effects of fiscal policy specific to
each individual year of our sample. For space reasons we restrict our com-
ments to the fiscal effects on a range of eight major indicators: the real GDP
growth rate, the level of real personal disposable income, the balance of
payments surplus as a percentage of GDP, the public authorities surplus as a
percentage of GDP, the numbers unemployed, the total employment in the
market sector, price inflation and wage inflation. Using the table format
developed by Artis et al, (1984), we present our results in a way which is
reminiscent of a geological cross-section with the effects of current annual
policies shown as being imposed on top of layers of policy effects stemming
from actions taken in earlier years.
In the following section we look at the Blinder-Goldfeld method in its
"integral" form. Here the analysis is started in 1967 and a process of con-
tinual fiscal indcxation is followed through to 1980. The relationship between
the "incremental" analysis and the "integral" analysis has been considered
in Chapter 4 and in Appendix 3.
FIS CA L POLICY EFFECTS 1967-1980: INCR EMENTA L APPR OA CI-I
The tabular form of presentation to be used in this section is illustrated
in Table 5.2. This table attempts to summarise the effects on the growth
rate of GDP of all fiscal policy changes made over the period 1967 to 1980.
In the methodology chapter (Chapter 4) we have "already examined 1967 in
detail and the 1967 results are shown in the top line of Table 5.2 (compare
with the material in Figure 4.3). Consider the top left-hand-side entry: the
number 1.17. This represents the difference between the actual growth rate
and the growth rate which would have resulted if a process of policy indexa-
tion had been performed in 1967 (refer Table 4.3 also). The fact that the
entry is positive means that actual policy in 1967 added to the growth rate
Table 5.2: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on growth rate of real gross domestic product ("actual" minus "indexed")
Actual Growth
Rate 4.76 6.33    4.65 3.03 4.85 6.05 5.26 2.90 0.56 3.23 5.70 7.19 3.94 1.47
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which would have resulted from a hypothetical process of indexation. In
what follows, we will say that this increment in growth of 1.17 per cent
points resulted from "discretionary" fiscal action. Since the actual growth
rate in 1967 was 4.76 per cent, almost one-quarter was accounted for by
discretionary fiscal stimulation.
Two issues are of interest in relation to Table 5.2:
(i) The nature of the impact, or first year, effects of fiscal policy changes
in each year.
(ii) The nature of the delayed effects of fiscal policy changes for each
specific year’s policy.
If we denote each entry in Table 5.2 by
Aij , i= 1967.. 1980
j= 1967.. 1980
then
Impact Effects Aii , i= 1967...1980
Delayed Effects All ,j = i + 1 ... 1980
Impact Effects: Growth Rate
Working down the diagonal of Table 5.2 we can read off the impact
effects of each years fiscal changes. In only three cases were these effects
negative, i.e., actual fiscal policies led to a lower growth rate than fiscal
indexation. These were 1968 (-0.42%), 1976 (-0.47%) and 1977 (-0.33%).
In "all remaining years the discretionary fiscal impact was positive. Ranking
the years in terms of the absolute addition to the growth rate yields the
following:
Year Additional growth Historical growth
(percentage points) (per cent)
1972 +2.06 6.05
1973 +1.65 5.26
1979 +1.47 3.94
1980 +1.29 1.47
1967 +1.17 4.76
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Hence, in terms of its impact effect on the GDP growth rate, the discretionary
fiscal policy of 1972 was the most expansionary, followed by the years
1973, 1979 and 1980.
Delayed Effects: Growth Rate
We have already examined the delayed effects of thc 1967 fiscal policies.
We saw, in Figure 4.3, that the impact effect of an additional 1.17 per cent
points is quickly eroded over time and that there is no long-run change in
the growth rate. A similar pattern is followed in all the other years. In the
case of policy actions taken in 1976 and 1978 the second year effect is
larger than the impact effect. Hence, the main deflationary effect of the
1976 budget does not come through until 1977, when it reduced the growth
rate by over 1½ percentage points.
In Table 5.3 we examine the fiscal policy effects on real personal dis-
posable income. In many ways this variable provides a key to understanding
Irish budgetary policy since our range of fiscal instruments bears most heavily
on it. Direct taxation and income transfers feed directly into nominal
disposable income and the range of indirect taxes and subsidies influences
real disposable income through its effects on the consumption deflator. Two
points are immediately clear from Table 5.3. The budget of 1976 was
massively deflationary (removing £204 million from disposable income
relative to a policy of fiscal indexation), and the budgets of the years 1978
and 1979 were very expansionary (adding £143 million and £140 million,
respectively, in the first year). In all cases there are very long-tailed effects,
but it must be remembered that the effect on the absolute level of disposable
income is being tabulated, not the effect on its growth rate.
In Table 5.4 we show the effects of fiscal policy on the balance of pay-
ments surplus.16 Some characteristics stand out immediately. Prior to 1974
the first year effects of discretionary fiscal policy (i.e., policy which deviated
from strict indexation) on the balance of payments surplus were relatively
minor. The largest effect occurred in 1972 and represented an increase in the
deficit of 1.16 percentage points of GDP. However, after 1973 the discre-
tionary fiscal effects on the balance of payments were considerably larger
than for the earlier period. In 1974 and 1975 the impact "discretionary"
element in the deficit increased sharply (by 3.6 and 2.7 per cent of GDP,
respectively). In 1976 a sharp correction to the deficit was made, to the
16. Thii unconventional use of terminology ("surplus" instead of "deficit") is forced on us by the
data sign convention used in the computer data b~nk. A negative effect in the table represents a fall
in the balance of payments saJrplus (or, equivalently, a rise in the deficit). Similar terminology is used
to handle the public a uthoritles "surplus".
Table 5.3: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on real personal disposable (RPD) income ("actual" minus "indexed")
Cumulative effects by year (£ million, 1975)
Policy Actions
TakenDuringYear 1967 1968    1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1967 26.2 19.4 5.2 -.4.2 -4.6 -2.5 -1.6 -7.6 -14.2 -22.8 -30.9 -36.3 -38.6 -38.5
1968 -- -1.4 -2.8 -4.9 -6.4 -7.1 -8.3 -10.2 -11.7 -11.8 -12.1 -13.0 -14.3 -15.0
1969 -- 1.7 -4.1 -7.5 -15.1 -21.8 -25.5 -29.3 -28.1 -33.1 ..-44.3 -46.6 -38.4
1970 -- 22.6 17.3 -0.1 -13.9 -20.9 -19.9 -21.6 -31.5 -48.5 -58.8 -53.1
1971 -- -34.7 -55.3 -97.7 -114.3 -110.9 -104.9 -116.0-145.2-167.9-162.4
1972 63.8 59.4 35.1 22.5 22.5 33.3 48.4 48.8 28.8
1973 -- 57.3 43.7 19.5 13.1 14.7 20.7 24.7 21.7
1974 -- 113.2 105.1 84.1 73.6 80.8 87.8 88.1
1975 -- 111.5       89.1 65.7 58.3 58.4 59.9
1976 -203.9 -229.2 -274.0-270.7 -229.2
1977 -- -34.6 -31.6 -32.6 -32.8
1978 -- 142.8 147.7 122.9
1979 140.4 114.5
1980 -- -67.5
Actual R.P.D.
Income 2012 2172    2293 2420 2483 2739 3007 3066 3206 3116 3291 3630 3774 3656
Table 5.4: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on balance of payments surplus as a percentage of gross domestic product ("actual" minus "’indexed")
Cumulative effects by year (percentage points)
Policy Actions
TakenDuringYear 1967 1968    1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
eq
¢3
0
0
1967 -0.98 -1,06
-0.79 -0,61 -0.70 -0.70
-0,66 -0.44 -0.27 -0.12 -0.12
-0.13 -0.06 -0.05
1968
-0,29 -0.42
-0.43 -0.47 -0,48 -0.48
-0.45 -0.46 -0.48
-0.55 -0.55 -0.52 -0.57
1969 0.4.__.~30.32 0.28 0.37 0.47 0.94 0.77 0.66 0,72 0.89 0.95 0.75
1970
-0.20 -0,44 -0.16 0.08 0.40 0.41 0.29 0.45 0,75 0.98 0.81
1971 0.5.~2 0,27 0.90 1.69 1,36 0,76 0.76 1.11 1.45 1,35
1972
-1.16 -1.44 -1.33
-0.89 -0.95 -1.47 -1.72
-1.24 -0.70
1973
-0.71
-0.93 -0,62 -0.51 -0.96 -1,08
-1.01 -0.96
1974
-- -3.59
-4.10 -3.17 -2,94 -2.85
-2.64 -2.80
1975
-2.66 -2,51 -2.00 -1,67
-1,71 -1.77
1976 4.81 4.65 4,82 4.05 2.62
1977
-0.04 0.08 0.00 0.09
1978
-- -3.69 -3.68
-3.19
1979
-- -3.71
-3.27
1980 1.20
c~
t"
o~
t’3
o~
ActualB,P. Rate 1.36 -1.28 ~t.84 -4.06 -3,85 -2,18 -3.49 -9.85 -0.53 -3.93 -3.48 -3,99 -11.28 -9.94
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extent of 4.8 per cent of GDP. Fiscal policy in 1977 left the deficit largely
unchanged while in 1978 and 1979 the discretionary element in the deficit
increased (by 3.7 per cent of GDP in both years). By the last year in our
sample, 1980, the discretionary impact effect had reversed and served to
reduce the deficit.
In Table 5.5 we show the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on the public
authorities surplus, expressed as a percentage of GDP. A negative value in
this table represents a situation where failure to follow policy indexation
resulted in a fall in the public authorities surplus (or, equivalently, a rise in
the deficit)¯ For the years 1974 to 1979 an adjustment must be made to
this table to eliminate the effect of the timing of intervention transations on
the capital account. These were as follows:
Net payments received Uncorrected impact Corrected impact
from the intervention effect on surplus effect on surplus
agency rate rate
£m. Per ten t of GDP
1974 -56.9 -1.90 -6.13 -4.23
1975 46.7 1.25 1.15 -0.10
1976 11.3 0.25 3.92 3.67
1977 -25.0 -0.45 0.95 1.40
1978 - 3.5 -0.05 -2.72 -2.67
1979 28.5 0.38 -2.26 -2.64
In terms of the discretionary impact effect on the adjusted public authori-
ties snrplus, we can characterise the following budgets as contractionary
(in the sense of increasing the surplus, or equivalendy, decreasing the deficit).
¯
1970 (mildly contractionary, 0.56%)
.1971 (contractionary, 1.09%)
.1976 (strongly contractionary, 3.67%)
¯1977 (contractionary, 1.40%)
In all other years, discretionary fiscal policy impact was expansionary,
particularly so in the years 1974 (-4.23%), 1978 (-2.67%) and 1979 (-2.64%).
In Table 5.6 we tabulate the first year effects of discretionary policy on both
the balance of payments surplus and the public authorities surplus, showing
the close relationship between the two variables given that government
Table 5.5: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on public authorities surplus as a percentage of gross domestic product ("actual" minus ’qndexed")
Cumulatioe effects by year (percentage points)
Policy Actions
TakenDuringYear 1967 1968    1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
O
Z
0
E
1967 -0.62 -0.46 -0.49 -0.56 -0.56
-0.39 -0.19 0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.20 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06
1968
-1.07 -1.00 -0.96 -0.93 -0.85 -0.73 -0.58 -0.59 -0.54 -0.53 -0.47 -0.40 -0.42
1969 -0.82 -0.68 -0.70 -0.54 -0.36 -0.18 -0.22 -0.14 -0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.04
1970 0.56 0.48 0.40 0.37 0.47 0.59 0.70 0.67 0.61 0.46 0.37
1971 1.09 0.97 0.96 0.88 1.05 1.19 1.32 1.28 1.01 0.80
1972 -0.87 -0.71 -0.69 -1.01 -0.91 -0.75 -0.48 -0.32 -0.42
1973
-1.66 -1.24 -1.27 -1.27 -1.27 -1.06 -0.85 -0.81
1974 -6.13 -5.14 -4.46 -4.44 --4.17
-3.58 -3.29
1975 1.15 1.13 0.75 0.56 0.26 0.46
1976 3.29 2.93 2.51 2.35 2.34
1977 0.95 0.69 0.55 0.50
1978
-- -2.72 -2.01 -1.71
1979
-2.26 -1.51
1980
-0.01
Z
G~
Oc~
t-’
;o
G~
¢3
o)
.d
ActuaIP.A. Surplus-5.06 -6.06 -7.00 -6.35 -5.99 -5.98 -7.05-13.23-14.56-11.14-10.58-12.81-14.63-16.06
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Table 5.6: First year effects of discretionary fiscal policy on balance of
payments and public authoritl~s surplus
Balance of payments Public authorities surplus
Year Surplus (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1967 -0.98
-0.62
1968 -0.29 -1.07
1969 +0.43 -0.82
1970
-0.20 +0.56
1971 +0.52 +1.09
1972
-1.16
-0.87
1973 -0.71
-1.66
1974 -3.51
-6.13 (-4.23)*
1975 -2.66 +1.15 (-0.10)*
1976 +4.81 +3.92 (+3.67)*
1977
-0.04 +0.95 (+1.40)*
1978 -3.69
-2.72 (-2.67)*
1979 -3.71
-2.26 (-2.64)*
1980 +1.20
-0.01
* denotes the corrected value to eliminate the intervention transactions.
intervention was mainly concerned with expanding demand rather than
supply.
In Tables 5.7 and 5.8 we examine the effects of discretionary fiscal
policy on the numbers unemployed and on employment in the markct
sectors (industry, agriculture and marketed services). In the unemployment
table, a negative entry denotes the case where discretionary policy reduced
numbers unemployed compared to a policy of indexation. In the employ-
ment table, a negative entry denotes the case where discretionary policy
reduced numbers employed compared to a policy of indexation.
In only three years of the sample did discretionary fiscal policy have a
positive impact effect on unemployment numbers, the most important
case being 1976 when 6,600 additional workers were unemployed, relative
to a policy of fiscal indexation. For the years 1972, 1975, 1978 and 1979
unemployment was greatly reduced by fiscal discretion (by 20,100 in the
case of 1979). As we saw in Chapter 4 for the case of 1967, the lags in un-
employment effects are quite long and complex. In the case of 1967, an
Policy Acdons
TakenDuringYeat 1967 1968
Table 5.7: Fiscal policy effects, 1967.1980
Effects on number; unemployed ("actual" minus "indexed")
Cumulative effects by year (’O00s)
1969 1970 1971 1972 1975 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
t’q
Mt~
o
o
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
-8.5 -7.3           -3,0 0.4 1.7
0.7 1.2 1.7 2.1
0.4 0.8 1.2
-6.2 -4.5
-3.4
1.2 0.4 0,5 1.5 3.3 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.1 C~
>
2.5 2.7 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.2 4,4 4.4 4.5
1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1,4
-1,1 2.0 3,1 2.4 1.6 2.2 4.0 5.5 5.8
1.1 8.2 12.9 13.8 13.2 13.2 15,3 17.9 20.1 >
r
-15.6 -14.3 -8.3 -3,1 -1.0 -2.5 -5.2 -5.4 -2,9
-5.4 -5,3 -2.3 0.4 1.1 0.1 1.6 1.9          r~
-6.7 -10.3 -9.0 -5.2 -2.9 -3.1 -5.0 >
-- -11.3 -10.4 -4.4 1.4 3.5 2.3
-- 6.6 18.2 25.9 25.2 21.5 :=
-5.2 -1.6 0.1 1.3 ~
-11,4 -15.6
-14.6 -’~
-20,1 -21,9 C
-4.2 r~
Actual
Unemployment 41.8 46.2 43.4 52.4 49.7 56.6 52.4 52,6 73.0 90.0 88.9 85.0 74.0 76.0
Table 5.8: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on marketed sector employment (MS) (mdustry and marketed sero ces) ( actual m nus ndex d )
Cumulative effects by year (’O00s)
Policy Actions
TakenDuringYear 1967 1968    1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1967 2.17 1.16 -2.19 -5.86 -6,40 -4.75 -3.21 -3.04 -4.11 -6.31 -8.35 -9,13 -9.13 -9.60
1968 -- -0.54 -1.10 -1,42 -1.73 S-].89 -2.08 -2.24 -2.43 -2.78 -3.08 -3,30 -3.48 -3.60
1969 -0.3 -0.8 -1.8 -2,7 -3.4 -4.0 -4.4 -4.9 -5.5 -6.2 -6,8 -6.9
1970 0.9 -0.6 -4.1 -7.1 -7.9 -6.4 -5.4 -6.3 -8.6 -11,0 -12,1
1971 -- -1.6 -6.7     -15.1 -20.9 -20.5 -19.2 -19.7 -22.9 -27.4 -30.9
1972 3,8 4.0 -1.1 -5.2 -5.5 -2.1 2,3 3.7 1.3
1973 -- 2.2 2.7 -0.4 -2.9 -3.2 -1.5 0.4 1,0
1974 5.2 9,9 9,6 7.1 6.1 7.7 10.7
1975 3.3 3.3 -1.1 -4,9 -4.9 -1.3
1976 -9,5 -23.7 -34.7 -37,0 -34.5
1977 -0.5 -1.9 -3.3 -3.9
1978 6.3 12.9 14.2
1979 7.0 10,9
198o -2..._!4
Actual M.S.
Employment 900.0 895,2 895.5 879.5 879.9 873.4 888.9 903,2 888.3 877.8 892.5 912.2 929,8 940.1
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initial drop of 8,500 in numbers unemployed becomes a rise of 4,100 by
1980, on the basis of 1967 changes in isolation. For 1971, an initial drop
of 3,400 becomes a rise of 20,100 by 1980. These effects appear to have
been induced by a serious loss in industrial competitiveness, the reasons
for which are further examined in Chapter 6. For 1976, the initial rise of
6,600 in numbers unemployed becomes a rise of 21,500 by 1980. We return
to the particularly inflationary consequences of the 1971 and 1976 budgets
below.
Turning to Table 5.8 wc see the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on
total market sector employment (i.e., the sum of industrial, agricultural
and marketed services employment). While employment in marketed ser-
vices is sensitive to the level of domestic demand, industrial employment is
mainly determined by capacity, which is sensitive to world demand and
competitiveness. Agricultural employment is largely institution~ly deter-
mined and is only subject to minor influences from outside agriculture.
From Table 5.8 the impact and long-run deflationary effects of the 1976
budget are apparent. In Table 5.9, where we consider the total market
Table 5.9: Impact and long-run employment effects of discretionary fiscal
policy for industry and marketed services
Industry
Year
Impact Long run
Marketed services
Impact Long run
1967 +0.28 -6.42 +1.89 -3.04
1968 -0.19
-2.00 -0.35 -1.67
1969
-0.09 -3.63 -0.19 -3.23
1970 -0.17 -7.67 +1.06 -4.36
1971 -1.09 -18.18 -0.52 -12.73
1972 +0.82 -0.93 +3.03 +2.74
1973 +0.73 +0.25 +1.46 +0.85
1974 +2.40 +5.79 +2.82 +4.94
1975 +0.66 -2.78 +2.64 +1.46
1976 -4.11 -18.91
-5.36 -16.29
1977 -0.27 -2.59
-0.19 -1.26
1978 +2.44 +7.43 +3.86 +7.22
1979 +2.40 +5.00 +4.60 +6.54
1980 -1.40 -- -1.05 --
FISCAL POLICY EFFECTS: 1967-1980 119
sector components relating to industry and marketed services, we see that
the bulk of the employment loss came in the service sector. The expansion-
ary effects of the budgets of 1978 and 1979 are also apparent, where again
the marketed services sector dominates. Of particular interest is the budget
of 1971. In this year the rather small impact effect (a fall of 1,600 in total,
of which 1,090 came in industry and 520 in services) resulted in a cumulative
loss of 30,900 by 1980 (of which 18,180 were in industry and 12,730 in
services). As we shall see in Tables 5.10 and 5.11, the inflationary effects
of discretionary fiscal policy were greatest in the years 1971 and 1976.
Finally, in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 we examine the effects of discretionary
fiscal policy on consumption price inflation (Table 5.10) and industrial
wage inflation (Table 5.11). For all years except 1968, 1974-1975 and
1977-1979, discretionary policy was inflationary in its impact effect on
the consumption price, resulting from either increases in taxation or wage
increases induced through the Phillips curve. During 1974-1975 the wide
extension of subsidies on consumption goods (bread, milk, etc.) was res-
ponsible. During 1977-1979 the drastic cutting and elimination of certain
indirect taxes was responsible. The highly inflationary impact of the 1976
and 1979 budgets is apparent. In all cases the long-run effect tapers off to
zero. The effects of policy on wage inflation are more complex, involving
net indirect taxes (via the consumption, or cost-of-living price), direct
taxes and the unemployment rate (i.e., the so-called Phillips curve effect).
The impact effects for three years in particular stand out: 1971 (plus 3.9
percentage points), 1976 (plus 4.2%) and 1980 (plus 4.4%). Only for one
year, 1978, was the discretionary impact fiscal effect on wage inflation
negative (i.e., -1.15 percentage points).
FISCAL POLICY EFFECTS 1967-1980: INTEGRAL APPROACH
In this section we examine the effects of simulating the model, starting
in 1967, and pursuing a policy of strict fiscal indexation through to 1980.
We then isolate the difference between this simulation and the historical
values of the key economic indicators. We call this method of analysis the
"integral" or "cumulative" approach, to distinguish it from the "incremental"
approach of the previous section.
If the "incremental" policy analysis is suitably defined, it is possible to
sum the individual year’s "incremental" policies to obtain an approximation
to the "integral" policy. However, we have chosen a definition of fiscal
indexation in order to gain as much insight as possible into the individual
year’s fiscal policy, given that a certain position has been inherited from
the previous year. The technical issues involved are considered in detail
in Appendix 3. The advantage of such an "incremental" approach is that it
Table 5.10: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on consumption price inflation rate ("actual" minus "indexed")
Cumulative effects by year (percentage points)
Policy Actions
TakenDuringYeat 1967 1968    1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1967 0.58 0.51 -0.05 -0.12 -0.18 -0,02 0.19 0.24 0.04 -0.08 -0.10 0.13 0.14 0.06
1968 -0,30 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.06
1969 1.11 0.12 -0.15 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.15 -0.05 -0.21
1970 0.90 0,27 -0.05 -0,05 0.01 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.00 -0.18
1971 1.84 0.49 -0,07 -0.18 0.06 0.28 0.13 0.28 0.04 -0.24
1972 0.17 0.67 0.26 -0.42 -0.36 -0.10 0.27 0.39 0.11
1973 -- 0.71 0,29 -0.10 -0.32 -0.23 -0.06 0.05 0.09
1974
-- -0.98 0.43 0.02 -0.20 -0.31 -0.17 0.15
1975 -- -1.26 0.67 -0.05 -0.30 -0.19 0.14
1976 3.41 -0.06 -0.35 -0.10 -0.02
1977 -- -0,56 0.12 0.16 0.11
1978 -- -2.47 0.71 0.85
1979
-- -1.32 1.33
1980 3.10
Actual Inflation
Rate 3.07 5.16 7.33 8,23 9.44 9.63 11.52 15.71 22.35 18,89 12.77 7.04 13.42 18.59
Table 5.11: Fiscal policy effects, 1967-1980
Effects on industrial wage inflation rate ("actual" minus "indexed")
Cumulatwe effects by year(percentage point)
Policy Action
TakenDufingYe~ 1967 1968    1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 19771978 1979 1980
1967 2.05 0.85 -0.68 -0.95
-0.62 0.14 0.62 0.36 -0.12 -0.29
-0.24 0.13 0.24 0.24
1968
-- 0.35 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.07
-0.04 0.00 0.03 0.14
1969
-- 0.75 -0.07
-0.29 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.07 -0.09
1970 1.76 0.66 -0.68 -0.63 -0.45 0.44 0.61 0.11 -0.04 -0.30 -0.14
1971
-- 3.94 0.13
-1.24 -0.82 0.23 1.16 0.51 0.29 -0.30 -0.21
1972
-- 1.88 1.87 -0.70
-2.08 -1.02 0.25 0.92 0.57 -0.27
1973 1.72 0.27
-0.94 -0.67 -0.39 0.09 0.40 0.29
1974 0.89 0.75
-0.72 -0.90 -0.84 -0.46 0.37
1975 1.84 1.40
-0.84 -1.29
-0.93 0.33
1976
-- 4.21 -1.20 -1.24 0.54 1.57
1977
-- 0.06 0.31
-0.04 -0.16
1978
-- -1.15 2.00 0.34
1979 0.59 2.67
1980 4.36
Actual Wage
Inflation 6.61 13.21 12.13 15.55 12.60 18.65 14.28 16.04 28.34 22.96 15.45 15.76 19.38 17.32
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allows one to study the effects of fiscal policy for each year in complete
isolation from other years’ fiscal actions. However, a disadvantage is the
heavy computational burden (since fourteen separate simulations are needed
to study 1967 to 1980) and our inability to cumulate the effects of all
years. The computational burden of the "integral" approach is reduced to
one simulation, but, of course, much interesting information is lost. However,
the fact that only one simulation is involved permits us, at low cost, to
examine the sensitivity of our results to some key assumptions in the model.
In addition to the "standard" model variant (for an exact definition refer
to Chapter 3), i.e., the variant used in the "incremental" analysis of Tables
5.2 -- 5.11, we have examined three other variants:
(i) The Phillips curve relationship is dropped from the industrial wage
equation.
(fi) The direct tax incidence elasticity in the wage equation is reduced
from unity to 0.5, i.e., the value found by Hughes, (1985).
(iii) The direct tax incidence elasticity in the wage equation is set to
zero.
In each of the three variants, only a specific single change is made to the
standard model. All three changes deal with the question of wage formation
which is probably the single most important mechanism in the model. The
results for the integral fiscal policy analysis, using the "standard" model and
the above three variants, are presented in Tables 5.12 to 5.16.
Turning to Table 5.12 first, we examine the effects of fiscal indexation on
the growth rate of GDP and on the level of real personal disposable income.
For the growth rate, only fairly minor differences Between the four variants
exist. Consider the first line of Table 5.12. This shows, for the standard
model, the cumulative discretionary effects of fiscal policy since 1967 on
the real growth rate. The first entry, 1.17, is identical to the first entry of
the incremental analysis contained in Table 5.2. By the year 1968, the dis-
cretionary effect on growth amounted to -0.77, i.e., the difference between
the actual growth rate and the growth rate which would have resulted if all
fiscal instruments had been "indexed" since 1967, to a 1966 base, involved
a drop of 0.77 points of growth. The last entry in this line, 1.74, has the
following interpretation: the difference between the actual growth rate
in 1980 and the growth rate which would have resulted if all fiscal instru-
ments had been systematically indexed since 1967, is 1.74 points. It is of
interest to compare the entry for the year 1978 in Table 5.12 and Table 5.2.
The impact effect of 1978 discretionary fiscal policy in 1978 was a rise of
0.38 points (Table 5.2). The cumulative effect of discretionary fiscal policy
between 1967 and 1978 (inclusive) was a fall of 1.42 points. Hence, although
Tablc 5.12: In tegral fiscal policy analysis. 1967-1980
GDPMDOT: Growth rate of real gross domestic product (per cent)
Cumulative dlscreffonary effect by year (percentage points)
ModelVariant 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
StandaxdModel 1.17 -0.77 0.22 0.90 0.13 1.24 0.56 -0.16 0.78 -1.19 -3.74 -I.42 2.75 1.74
No Phillips Curvc 1.19 -0.58 0.34 0.97 0.06 1.06 0.70 -0.04 0.82 -I.30
-4.06 -I.96 1.78 1.45
Direct Tax Ehsticity 0.5 1.24 -0.62 0.33 1.04 0.35 1.49 0.96 0.08 0.93 -0.67
-2.92 -0.79 2.92 1.57
ZeroDircctTaxElasticity 1.32 -0.45 0.44 1.12 0.50 1.68 1.35 0.24 0.97 -0.42 -2.49 -0.32 3.09 1.76
YRPERD: Real personal disposable income
Cumulative discretionary effect by year (I mittion. 1975)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Standard Model             26.2 21.5 12.9 24.0 -7.5 91.9 49.0 122.1 239.7 64.5 -2.5 191.7 888.4 378.5
No Phillips Curve 26.2 21.2 14.7 32.9 -0.4 35.4 50.2 128.3 251.6 69.8 -2.6 128.1 303.2 328.5
Direct Tax Elasticity 0.5 25.9 22.0 15.8 51.0 -0.5 45.0 73.7 151.8 268.3 99.7 55.6 216.1 420.7 447.6
ZcroDircctTaxElasticity 25.7 22.9 20.6 99.1 5.2 53.6 94.5 178.6 293.0 122.6 92.6 274.5 478.1 496.8
~gJ
7~
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Table 5.13: In tegval fiscal pollcy analysis. 1967-1980
BPVR: Balance of payments surplus as per cent of GDP
Cumulative discretionary effect by year (percentage points)
Model Variant 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
StandaxdModel -0.98 -1.45 -1.04 -1.37 -1.61 -3.18
-3.55 -6.65 -11.26 -7.57 -9.13 -12.51 -17.74 -20.93
No Philfips Curve -0.97 -1.26 -0.66 -1.27 -1.62 -2.94 -3.18 -6.21 -11.42 -7.45
-8.59 -12.73 -18.27 -20.46
DirectTaxElasticity0.5 -0.92 -1.22 -0.78 -1.18 -1.17 -2.47 -2.88 -5.92 -10.38 -5.94 -7.29 -11.10 -16.28 -18.66
ZcroDkcctTa.xElasticity -0.82
-0.93 -0.50 -1.07 -0.77 -1.78
-2.24 -5.29 -9.84 -4.63 -5.53 -10.22 -15.27 -16.72
GBRR: Public authorities surplaJ as per cent of GDP
>
>
Cumulative discretionary effect by year (percentage points)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Stand~rdModel           -0.62
-1.69 -2.69 -2.97 -1.79 -2.91 -4.42 -10.54 -10.70 -6.91 -7.60 -10.97 -13.39
-15.52
No Philllps Curve -0.61 -1.57 -2.51 -2.25 -1.67 -2.79
-4.25 -10.33 -10.54 -6.72 -7.47 -11.06 -13.76 -10.03
DirectTaxElasticits, 0.5 -0.58 -I.57 -2.54 -2.18 -1.45 -2.47 -3.91
-9.90 -9.84 -5.87 -6.40 -9.65 -11.96 -13.84
ZcroDirectTaxElasticity -0.52 -1.42 -2.38 -2.02 -1.14 -2.06 -3.44 -9.36 -9.15-5.05
-5.49 -8.70-10.88-12.47
"fable 5.14: Integral fiscal policy analysis, 1967-1980
U: Numbers unemployed
Cumulative discretionary effect by year (’OOOs)
Model Variant 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Stand~trdModel -8.5 -6.6 -1.7 -4.0 -4.0 -12.5 -7.7 -3.1 -11.2 -1.3 15.7 20.0 -2.3 -15.0
NoPhillipsCurve -8.5 -7.2 -3.5 -7.1 -7.0 -14.6 -9.7 -6.2 -15.3 -4.7 13.8 21.1 5.6 -1.2
Direct Tax Elasficity 0.5 -8.7 -7.5 -3.7 -7.2 -8.4 -19.1 -17.4 -15.4 -25.6 -18.7 -7.4 -9.2 -34.5 -47.7
Zero DirectTax Elasticity -8.9 -8.6 -6.0 -10.5 -12.4 -24.7 -25.9 -26.4 -37.9 -32.2 -24.2 -30.3 -57.3 -72.2
¯LM: Numbers employed in market sector
Cumulative discretionary effect by year ( ~OOs)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971    1972 1973 1974 19751976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Standard Model 2.2 0.7 -3.8
-6.3 -10.5 -13.0 -19.7 -24.3 -19.8 -27.1
-44.9 -51.5 -85.6 -20.8
No Phillips Curve 2.2 1.5 -1.7 -3.1
-7.3 -11.0 -17.8 -21.1 -15.9 -23.7 -43.2
-53.2 -44.8 -35.7
DirectTaxElasticity0.5 2.4 1.8 -1.5 -2.9
-5.6 -6.2 -9.4 -11.0 -5.4 -9.6 -20.8
-20.1 -1.7 +13.3
ZeroDirectTaxElasficity 2.7 3.1 1.2 0.7 -1.3
-0.6 -0.6 0.4 6.5 3,5 -4,1 - 1,3 21.4 38.3
Tablc 5.15: Integral fiscal po~cy analyf.L 1967-1980
PCPERDOT: Consumption p~ce inflation rate
c3
Cumulatlae discretionary effect by year (percentage points) 0
Z
Model Variant 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1978 1980         0
8tandaxd Model 0,58 0.19 0,96 0.75 1.52 0.49 1.28 -0.65 -1.88 2.72 -2,18
-8.47 -0,77 2.91 >
No Phillips Curve 0.57 --0.05 0.88 1,09 1.61 0,85 0.99 -0,59 -1.46 2,55 -2,12 -2.77 -0,48 1,11
DircctTax Elasticity0,5 0.49 0.04 0.96 0.78 1.28 0.30 1.22 -0.59 -1.97 2,15 -2.99 -8.30 -0.56 1,89
OZero Dircct Tax Elastidty 0.37 -0.18 1.08 0.90 0.99 0.14 1.12 -0.41 -1.88 1.52 -2.55 -3.00 -0.81 1.08
>
I-
WIDOT: Industrial wage inflation rate
>
Cumulative di~cretiona~’y effects by year (percentage polnts)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980           -~
Standard Model 2.05 1,21 -0.01 0,58 3.53 1.54 2.58 -0.49 O,00 4.47 -3.60
-8.54 2,56 7.18
~
No Philllps Curve 1.97
-0.09 0,25 1.94 9.38 1.15 1.11 0,58 1.58 2.83 -2.99 -0.56 2,53 2.11
,H
DkcctTax Elasticity0.5 1,58 0.62 0.91 0.55 2.24 1.23 2.46 -0.17 -1.02 2,08 -3.49 -2.26 2,93 4.69 rn
ZcroDircctTaxElastldty 0.94 -0,05 1.05 0,83 0.60 0.92 2,21 0.88 -1,37 -0.81 -2.74
-0,88 2,00 1,45
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the discretionary stance of 1978 fiscal policy was mildly expansionary, tile
cumulative stance since 1967 in 1978 was deflationary, largely on account
of the dcflationary budget of 1976.
The differences between the four variants of the model can be more
clearly seen in Figure 5.1 where we graph the differences between "integral"
policy and actual policy for the level of GDP. The presence or absence of the
Phillips curve is scen to makc very littlc difference. However the progrcssive
lowering of the direct tax elasticity in the wage equation is seen to greatly
accentuate the discrctionary fiscal effects. For example, by 1980, for a model
with zero direct tax elasticity, a policy of integral fiscal indcxation would
have led to a fall of .£400 million (in 1975 prices) relative to the actual
(historical) outturn. Wc rctttrn to the trade-off with rcduced wage inflation
later in the section.
The second variable considered in Table 5.12 is real personal disposable
incomc, also graphed in Figure 5.2. Two points stand out for all four model
variants: the counter-cyclical effects on income during the recession of 1975-
1976 when the cumulative fiscal stance was expansionary, and the much
more vigorous expansional"y effccts ovcr the years 1978 to 1980. By 1980,
for the standard model, the cumulative effect of fiscal discretion added
.£378.5 million (in 1975 prices) to disposable income, i.e., disposable income
was 11.5 per cent up from the level that would have applied if strict fiscal
indexation had been imposed since 1967. The effects of introducing the
other model variants is similar to the previous case of GDP.
In Table 5.13 we examine the integral policy effects on both the balance
of payments rate and the borrowingrequirement rate. In Figure 5.3 we graph
thc discretionary effects for the b’,dance of payments for the four model
variants and the actual and "indexed" balance of payments rate for the
standard model. To take the most extreme result, for the standard model
Table 5.13 shows that fiscal discretion over the 1967-1980 period resulted
in a deterioration of the balancc of paymcnts by almost 21 per cent of GDP
by 1980. Under a policy of strict fiscal indexation, there would have been a
balance of payments surplus o f 11 per cent of GDP by 1980, as against an actual
balance of payments deficit of 10 per cent of GDP. The mechanisms causing
such extraordinary behaviour relate mainly to the export-led orientation of
the industrial sector, the aecnmulation of foreign assets as the borrowing
requirement falls (the domestic financing component of the borrowing
rcquirment being exogenous), and the massive gains in competitiveness.
Needless to say it does not need the Lucas critique to warn us that such
an extraordinary economic configuration would have caused shifts in many
of the parameters of the model (even if we grant that it would have been
politically feasible) and the assumption of a fixed exchange rate might not
Figure 5.1: Cumulative discretionary fiscal effect Figure 5.2: Cumulative discretionary fiscal effect
on GDP (indexed minus actual) on real disposable income (indexed minus actual)
oo
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-200.
-400.
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Figure 5.3:
Cumulative discretionary fiscal effect on the Actual and indexed balance of payments rate for
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have been tenable.
The second variable examined in Table 5.13 is the borroxsdng requirement
rate (GBRR) and in Figure 5.4 we graph the discretionary effects fox" the four
model variants and the actual and "indexed" borrowing requirement rate for
the standard model. The remarks made about the interpretation of the balance
of payments effects apply equally to the borrowing requirement effects. Of
interest, from a technical point of view, is the extent to which our process of
fiscal "indexation" stabilised the borrowing requirement rate (GBRR)
near its original 1967 level (-5.1% of GDP). From Figure 5.4 we see that for
the standard model under fiscal indexation, GBRR takes the value of -0.5
per cent by 1980. Hence, over the years 1967 to 1980, fiscal indexation
has induced an improvement of almost 4.5 percentage points in GBRR.
The explanation for this lies mainly with the non-neutrality of the tax
revenue with respect to GDP in the public authorities section of the model
(refer Appendix 2) and the fact that our indexation rules apply to the fiscal
instruments, not the fiscal constraints or budget constraints which arc
endogcnous in the model. The effects of the counter-cyclical fiscal policy
operated during the years 1974 and 1975 are clearly apparent from Figure
5.4: the cumulative discretionary effect of fiscal policy on GBRR rose from
4.4 per cent in 1973 to 10.5 per cent and 10.7 per cent of GDP in 1974
and 1975, respectively. The reversal of these policies in 1976 reduced the
cumulative effect on GBRR to 6.9 per cent of GDP and, in a classical counter-
cyclical pattern, the cumulative effect would have further reduced it between
1977 and 1979 during the world economy upswing, perhaps even going into
surplus to balance out the large counter-cyclical deficits of the years 1974/75.
Of course this did not happen. A policy of sustained fiscal expansion was
embarked on in the second half of 1977, with the advent of the Fianna
Fail administration which replaced the National Coalition in June 1977,
leading to the massive deterioration apparent in Figure 5.4. This issue is
further explored in Chapter 6, when we examine the individual budgets
of the 1970 period and relate them to our more formal analysis.
In Table 5.14 we examine integral fiscal effects on numbcrs unemployed
and on numbers employed in the market sector of the economy. Negative
entries in the unemployment table represent situations where cumulative
fiscal discretion has lowered unemployment relative to a situation of fiscal
indexation. For the standard model, the cumulative effects of fiscal dis-
cretion were beneficial until the year 1976, and were particularly so in the
years 1972 and 1975. However, the situation reversed in the years 1977 and
1978, but by 1980 the cumulative effect of fiscal discretion accounted for
a fall of 15,000 in the numbers unemployed. The different implications of
the four model variants are quite striking, particularly the effects of changing
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the direct tax elasticity from unity in the standard model to zero. Clearly, if
by lowering this tax elasticity we lessen the harmful effect of higher direct
taxation on wage infla’tion and competitiveness loss, we simultaneously
lessen the "beneficial" effects of fiscal indexation, i.e., the effects of lower
taxes on inflation and competitiveness. For example, by 1980 the model
variants with elasticities of 0.5 and zero show cumulative discretionary
effects of a lowering of unemployment by 48,000 and 72,200 respectively,
in stark contrast to the lowering of unemployment by only 15,000 in the
case of a unitary elasticity. In many ways the fiscal effects on market sector
employment are the mirror image of the unemployment effects. A negative
entry in this table represents a fall in employment due to fiscal discretion.
For the standard model, the fall in numbers by 1980 was 20,800. The
exclusion of the Phillips curve makes only minor changes, but the variation
of the size of the direct tax elasticity brings about large differences from the
"standard" case.
We can summarise the situation of the labour market in 1980 in terms of
the standard model and cumulative effects of fiscal discretion over the case
of indexed policies:
Numbers unemployed (U)
-15,000
Total labour force (LF) +58,600
Net migration abroad (NMA)
-15,700
Total employment (L) +73,600
Non.agricultural employment (LNA) +75,500
Market sector employment (LM)
-20,800
Non-market sector employment (LNM) +94,400
Non-agricultural market sector employment (LMNA)
-18,900
Industrial sector employment (LI)
-22,100
Marketed services sector employment (LSM) +3,200
Employment by public authorities (LPA) +30,800
Employment in non-market service sector (LSNM) +63,600
In interpreting the above table it must be remembered that the migration
variable measures a flow (net migration abroad per annum) while all the
other variables measure stocks. Under a policy of strict indexation of fiscal
actions since 1967, a continual net outward flow of migrants would have
been induced, relative to the actual historical outturn (Figure 5.5). Hence,
the rise of 58,600 in the labour force induced by fiscal discretion is accounted
t~
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for largely by the induced net inward flow as the labour market responded
to expansionary policies. The bulk of the employment rise of 73,600 came
in the non-market (discretionary) sector (+94,400) with an offsetting loss of
20,800 jobs in the marketed sector. In the marketed sector, fiscal discretion
induced a loss of 22,000 jobs in industry, but a slight gain of 3,200 in mar-
keted services.
Fir.tally, in Table 5.15 and Figure 5.6 we examine the cumulative effects of
fiscal policy on price inflation and wage inflation. The effects on price infla-
tion are characterised by the inflationary effects in the years 1971, 1976 and
1980, all years characterised by either explicit or implicit high taxation budgets
(we return to this point in the next chapter). However, the years 1975,
1977 and 1978 were (price) deflationary, mainly due to tax cuts and/or
subsidies. All four model variants yield broadly similar conclusions.
The results for wage inflation are rather larger and also differ between
model variants. The only years in which the cumulative discretionary effects
lowered wage inflation were 1977 and 1978 due to the very explicit policies
of cuts in both direct and indirect taxes. The Phillips curve introduces im-
portant changes in the wage effects, as a comparison of the first two rows
shows. The lowering of the direct tax elasticity dampens down the wage
effects since it progressively reduces the role of the direct tax rate on wage
formation (eliminating it entirely for a zero elasticity).
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have provided basic tabular results showing the effect
discretional, fiscal policy has had on the economy over the period 1_967 to
1980. We have looked at the effects of the fiscal changes introduced, in
isolation, in each individual year ("incremental" analysis) and the cumulative
effects of fiscal changes from all prior years ("integral" analysis). In the next
chapter we attempt to relate our formal analysis with the details of the in-
dividual budgets introduced to implement fiscal changes.
Figure 5.6: Cumulative discretionary fiscal effect
(indexed minus actual)
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Chapter 6
BUDGETAR Y OBJECTIVES AND POLICY CONSEQUENCES
In this chapter we attempt to reconcile our analysis of the role of dis-
cretionary fiscal policy with the information and analysis contained in the
annual budget documents. The budgetary process is not a simple matter but
consists of five distinct phases. The first phase consists of publication of
the Book of Estimates, usually about one month before the budget speech.
This document contains detailed estimates of all expenditures on current
goods and services on the basis of unchanged policies -- a somewhat nebulous
term which sometimes means differing types of indexation of the previous
year’s nomin’,tl expenditures and in other cases means unchanged nominal
expenditures. The second phase consists of the publication of the Public
Capital Programme, usually a few weeks before the budget speech. This
document gives details of government plans for expenditure on fixed capital
formation for the coming year. The third phase consists in the actual budget
speech itself, a performance surrounded with much traditional drama and
media speculation. Many of the substantive policy changes in the budget
deal with current and capital taxation and, in addition to modifying existing
tax rates and income tax bands, new taxes, or major changes to existing
t,~xes, can be introduced. Details of provisions being made for the single
largest element of current expenditure, i.e., public sector pay, are also
announced. In addition, changes to other items of expenditure (social welfare
transfers, etc.) are often made. The fourth phase consists in the announce-
ment, usually by the Minister responsible for Social Welfare, of the changes in
social insurance contribution rates necessitated by the previously announced
alterations in transfer payment rates from the budget speech. The final
phase consists of policy changes made to the draft budget during the Drill
debates on the legislation needed to enact the budget.
It should be fairly clear that the complexities of the above process (involv-
ing a multitude of policy instruments and complex timing of changes) can
only be imperfectly captured by the twenty seven policy instruments con-
tained in our macromodel. Two major simplifications have been made in our
analysis. The first is the aggregation of many different policy instruments
into a single instrument (e.g., a wide range of different excise duties is treated
in the model as a single aggregate index, TEDR, operating on an aggregate
tax base, total personal consumption). Similar aggregation is used in dealing
with the range of different VAT rates, the range of unemployment transfers,
136
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etc. The second simplification concerns the tinting of policy changes. Cbanges
arc made at various times tbroughout the year, thus seriously complicating
the timing of policy effects using an annual model. The situation is par-
ticularly complex when there is a change of political administration following
a budget and the new administration implements policies substantially dif-
ferent from those of its predecessor (as happened in 1977, for example). In
our model we quantify the fiscal instruments mid their changes in the follow-
ingw~vy. Suppose a tax rate, T, stands at 100 from January 1 to March 31,
is then increased to 120 from April 1 to September 30, and to 150 from
October 1 to December 31. The value of the tax rate used in the model is
calculated as
Tl = 3X 100+6X 120+3X 150
12
i.e., each rate is weighted by the number of months it is in force. If TO
represents the tax rate for the previous year, the change in tax rate is cal-
culated as
dx’FI,0 = T1 - TO
Hence, if one political administration is responsible for the change from 100
to 120 and another administration makes the change from 120 to 150, it is
difficult, with our approacl~, to disentangle subannual effects, i.e., &TL0
represents "fiscal policy" for one whole year.
In preparing for, and executing a budgetary policy, the public authorities
(particularly the Department of Finance) carries out analysis of the kind we
have described in the previous chapter. However, in comparing our results
with the analysis contained in the budgetary documents, certain differences
in approach must be taken into account. First, although formal models of
tile economy are often used in official budgetary preparation and analysis
(Ryan, 1963; Cavanagh a31d Mooney, 1972; FitzGerald and Keegan, 1982),
much budgetary analysis seems to be of a relatively inform’,d or eclectic
kind, and is often presented with a strong normative bias.17 Even in the
informal analysis, it is often difficult to interpret what is the government’s
view of the economy underlying a budgetary strategy. For example, in the
1978 budget, the idea of Ireland as a small open economy appeared to be
.rejected.18 Ideally, in addition to using our view of the economy, we would
I 7. "While the Government hope that everybody will play their part in making economic advance
possible, they are entitled to expect that business will make the most of an environment favourable
to growth" (Budget Speech, 1978, p. 37).
18. "It is fatally easy to adopt the attitude that we must trail along behind the large developed
countries and wait for them to pull us out of our troubles. We can rationalise this by facile excuses,
by saying that we are a small country, that our industries have a small home market, that our tech-
niques in production and marketing are relatively unsophisticated and so on. Thankfully there are
signs that this defeatist attitude is on the wane" (Budget Speech, 1978, p. 36).
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like to check the budgetary analysis within the framework used in its pre-
paration. On the basis of published information this is impossible so we must
settle for a formal analysis using our articulated model framework such as
was described in Chapter 2.
A second problem concerns the quality of data available to contemporary
budget analysts. If a budget is prepared for presentation in January, its main
outline will be drawn up some months before. Hence, the short-run economic
indicators will be those of the latter part of the previous year, e.g., inflation,
trade statistics, the last quarter’s revenue and expenditure data for the public
authorities, etc. It is sobering to realise that preliminary national accounting
data only become available with a six-month lag (in the publication Economic
Review and Outlook), and first full estimates of the National Accounts only
become available with an eighteen-month lag, and are often the subject of
major subsequent revisions. In attempting to study budgetary actions and
effects ex-post one is in the enviable position of possessing perfect hind-
sight. While it is of interest to attempt to isolate the manner in which an
incorrect interpretation of the economic indicators led to an inappropriate
budgetary stance, such an investigation must await further research. It behoves
us to temper our critique of budgetary actions in the light of this important
information difference.
A particular case of the issue of the quality of data concerns the manner
in which price indexation (as a policy rule) is carried out. Ex-ante indexation
rules must use available price indicators and the best available forecasts. For
some years these forecasts were badly wrong as innation both accelerated
throughout the 1970s and when it behaved erratically, as between 1976 and
1980. For example, in preparing the 1974 and 1975 budgets, it is tmlikely
that the full magnitude of price inflation was anticipated (15.7% in 1974 and
22.4% in 1975). In our formal analysis of Chapter 5 we assume that the fiscal
authorities were able to pursue exactly any given indexation rule. The stylised
nature of such strong assumptions must be borne in mind when comparing
our results with those of the actual budgets.
We turn now to a brief and very superficial look at the individual budgets
of the 1970s. Our objective in doing so is to gain some insight into four
issues: what were perceived as the main problems facing the government;
what fiscal actions were taken; what were the expected consequences; what
actually happened using our method of analysis. Some summary data are
contained in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
The first two budgets of the decade can be seen, in retrospect, as the
last of the traditional budgets which characterised the 1960s. They were
also the last budgets which accepted the balancing of the current account as
a binding constraint on government activity (Whitaker, 1983, pp. 98-108).
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Table 6.1: Summary post-budget estimates from budget speeches
(£ million)
139
Taxation Current expenditure
Years Additional Additional Additional Other net Deficit
revenue concessions pay expenditure
1970171 20.1 7.4 10.1 11.9 0.0
1971/72 9.25 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.0
1972/73 0.0 14.1 0.0 12.1 34.8
1973/74 22.0 1.3 1.0 38.8 39.3
1974/75 2.50 27.3 0.0 12.0 66.7
1975 39.20 27.8 40.0 32.6 125.4
1976 124.0 17.0 5.5 -4.5 327.0
1977 112.0 55.2 46.0 66.0 217.8
1978 0.0 90.9 40.0 9.3 405.0
1979 57.2 37.0 75.0 26.3 288.9
1980 292.0 143.4 100.0 65.6 353.4
Table 6.2: The Public Capital Programme
Value % Volume % %
(£ million) change (£ million, 1975) change Inflation
1970/71 194.5 385.9 -- 8.4
1971/72 193.4 -0.1 351.6 -8.8 10.2
1972/73 251.3 29.9 420.9 19.7 9.2
1973/74 305.0 21.4 453.9 7.8 10.7
1974/75 384.4 26.0 460.9 1.5 23.4
1975 467.5 19.0 457.5 -0.7 19.0
1976 595.3* 30.3* 501.5" 9.6" 17.9
1977 627.1 15.3"* 447.9 -10.7"* 17.3
1978 767.3 22.4 494.1 10.3 10.5
1979 974.0 26.9 552.6 11.8 14.1
1980 1154.1 18.5 563.8 2.0 17.9
*Outturn was £544 million (18.9%).
**Percentage change on 1976 outturn.
The main focus of the budget of May 22, 1970, was the widening trade gap
of the previous two years which was reflected in the growing deficit on
current account of the balance of payments. The aim of the budget was to
"get back, as quickly as possible, to the moderate external deficits envisaged
in the Third Programme". The rising rates of price and wage inflation were
also a preoccupation. In the event, a net increase of about £13 million in
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tax revenue was planned, mainly from higher turnover tax rates. From
Table 5.4 we see that as a result of fiscal changes in 1970 (i.e., discretionary
changes relative to a fully indexed policy), the balance of payments deficit
did fall as a percentage of GDP (by 0.20 percentage points in 1970).
Turning to the 1971 budget (introduced on 28 April), the central theme
was the reduction of what were perceived as inflationary pressures in the
economy, particularly the role played by accelerating wages and increased
indirect taxes. Ministers of Finance traditionally make exhortations on the
desirability of curbing innation and the 1971 budget was a good vintage. 19
The 197l budget increased taxation by £9.25 million and made very minor
expenditure changes. From Table 5.10 we see that fiscal policy in 1971 added
nearly 2 percentage points to the constimption price inflation rate and
nearly 4 points to the industrial wage inflation rate. It is slightly ironic that
a budget designed to curb inflation should have been so inflationary in its
impact[ To some extent the problem may have been that the impact of the
rising inflationary background on the taxation system was not fully appreci-
ated at the time. For example, the average implicit direct tax rate rose from
8.9 per cent in 1970 to 11.1 per cent in 1971, a process which, in our
analysis of discretionary fiscal policy, will add over 2 percentage points to
the wage inflation rate. Public sector employment increased by over 6,000
in 1971, which further exacerbated wage inflation pressures through the
Phillips curvc. We have already seen (Tablc 5.7) that the long-run cmploy-
ment consequences were quitc serious. By our analysis, the consequenccs of
the 1971 budget would appear to have greatly stoked inflation and had a
serious impact on industrial competitiveness. The supplementary expansionary
measures taken in the Autumn of 1971 (mainly an extra £20 million PCP
injection) may have further increased presstlres on prices and wages.
The long-tailed delayed effects of the 1971 budget have already been noted
in Chapter 5, particularly in connection with Table 5.3 (real disposable
income), and Table 5.7 (numbers unemployed). There appears to have been
little contemporaneous formal comment on long-run effects, as distinct
from short-run impact. In the case of 1971, the impact effects (other than
on inflation) were quite minor. Most of the influence of 1971 fiscal changes
took many years to work out and were enduring. They involved a complex
interaction of inflation, wage bargaining, competitiveness and supply res-
ponses, and were unlikely to have been understood in the absence of formal
model-based analysis.
The 1972 budget will probably be best remembered for the introduction
19. "I do not think the general public, the worker, the man in the street, even the business man,
fully appreciates the horror of unchecked inflation" (Budget Speech, 1971, p. 30); "This budget is
designed to protect the gains we have made and to en~are that all we have achieved does not vanish in
an inflatioru’try whirlpool" {ibid., p. 31).
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of a planned current dcficit of almost £35 ntillion.2° The budget speech
estimate of the rise in growth due to the expansionary policy was lSA per
cent. Our analysis of Table 5.2 shows just over 2 per cent as the impact
effect. "fire Minister was aware of the effect his policy might have on external
balance, but his concern was hardly pressing.21 In Table 5.4 we saw that the
balance of payments deteriorated by 1.2 percentage points of GDP, the
borrowing rcquirement by almost 1 percentage point (Table 5.5), unemploy-
ment fcll dramatically (Table 5.7), prices were unaffected (Table 5.10), but
wages increased by almost 2 percentage points, as the restllt of discretionary
policy by our definition. The main inflationary influence was through the
Phillips curve.
The 1973 budget introduced on May 16) was the first of five budgets
prepared under the National Coalition. Besides the obvious commitments
contained in pre-electlon statements, the overriding perception of the state
of the economy was of it running well below capacity and a desire to expand
cconomic activity to obtain "a higher growth rate which, apart from increas-
ing employment and improving living standards, will helI) to take up the
slack and nnderused capacity of recent years" (Budget Speech, p. 7). The
deteriorating inflation position was also a major preoccnpation, bnt priority
was given to’need for stimulus. A deficit on current account was regarded
as neccssary and it was decided to impose some additional taxation in order
to "reduce the deficit to a more tolerable level". The necessary increases in
taxation in order to eliminate the deficit were rejected on the basis that they
would "only accentuate inflationary pressurcs". It was estimated that the
growth rate of the economy would be about 5½ per cent over the following
twelve months and there would be no apprecial)le deterioration in the balance
of payments. To achieve these aims, the PCP was increased by about 21 per
ccnt in value (9.6% in volumc), indirect taxes were raised and social welfare
expenditttre was increased. The opening deficit of £20 million was increased
to £39 million by these measures.
From Table 5.2 we saw in Chapter 5 that the iml)act effect of 1973 dis-
cretionary fiscal policy was to raise the growth rate by over 1V2 points, the
balance of payments rate deteriorated by about 0.7 points, and the total
borrowing rcquircment rate by over IV2 points. From Tablcs 5.10 and 5.11
20. "Faced with competing requirements [i.e., high inflation and underutilisation of industrial
capacityI the Government have opted for growth rather than stability. The level of Government
expenditure this year WIB, therefore, be determined by reference to our economic requirements and
will not be cut back to estimated yield of revenue. There will not be any increases in taxation, and the
resultant deficit in the current budget will be financed mainly by borrowing" (Budget Speech, p. 16).
21. "The increased spending power is likely to cause a substantial increase in imports, and the balance
of payments deficit will clearly have to be watched carefully. If, however, during the year ahead our
costs become more competitive and pnce increases are abated, 1 will have no great worry regarding
our external position" (Budget Speech, pp. 28-29).
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we can see that the 1973 policies were mildly inflationary, adding 0.7 points
to consumption price inflation and 1.7 points to wage inflation.
The 1974 budget (3 April) was drawn up in the immediate aftermath of
the first OPEC oil crisis and was coloured by the recognition that world
growth was not buoyant. Inflation was an abiding preoccupation, particularly
wage inflation.22 There was also a revealing observation concerning tax
buoyancy which indicated the very doubtful nature of the process of budgetary
calculation.2s Concerning the objectives of budgetary policy, it was noted
that the success of the 1973 policies would have indicated the need for a
"neutral" budget in 1974 were it not for the "energy situation, unfavourable
movements in world prices of raw materials, and recession in the economies
of many of our most important trading partners". In such circumstances it
was deemed appropriate to maintain the growth of the Irish economy "at at
level close to full utilization of capacity" and to implement a counter
cyclical policy. The PCP was increased by 26 per cent in nominal terms (2.1%
in real terms). The further stimulation of the economy through large tax
concessions and increases in social welfare benefits (by £27 million and £12
million, respectively), was projected to raise national output by 1½ points
"over what it would otherwise have been".
Our analysis of Table 5.2 showed the effect of 1974 discretionary policy
on growth to have been only 0.8 points. Real personal disposable income
rose by 3.7 per cent as a result of discretionary policies (Table 5.3). The
price paid for this expansion was very large. The balance of payments rate
deteriorated by 3.6 points (Table 5.4) and the public authorities borrowing
requirement rate deteriorated by 4.2 points (Table 5.5 adjusted for inter-
vention loan payments). The budget effects on unemployment were bene-
ficial (an impact reduction of 6,700), and there were only minor inflationary
consequences (price inflation was reduced by 1 per cent (Table 5.19) and
wage inflation was increased by about 0.9 points).
The single most important element of the 1974 budget was that it marked
the beginning of a series of rising current deficits (Table 6.1.). One is forced
to agree with the comment of Whitaker that
whatever the explanation (which historians will no doubt un-
earth) the consequences were most unfortunate [...] in the mis-
22. "Over the period since 1969, employee incomes have accounted for between one-third and one-
half of the rise in consumer prices" (Budget Speech, p. 9).
23. "Last yeax’s budget -- which, as I have already mentioned, was deliberately aimed at the expan-
sion of the economy -- envisaged a nominal current deficit of .E39 million, t use the word **nominal",
because I speciflcally recognised that raising the growth rate would bring in more tax revenue and
reduce the deficit. This is what happened although I must admit that the process was assisted by the
higher-than-expected price increa.~s which boosted VAT receipts. Although expendlturc was some-
what greater than expected, the actual deficit was .~10.4 million" (Budget Speech, p, 13),
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guided dismantling of a disciplinary safeguard and in the creation
of a spurious respectability, for fiscal decisions of a nature and on a
scale which in their cumulative effect have misused and almost
exhausted our foreign borrowing potential and have deprived fiscal
policy, of its capacity to serve as an instrument of economic mmlage-
ment (Wbitaker, 1983, p. 101).
The 1975 budget was the first to be presented on the revised calendar
year basis (15 January). It is permeated by a grim realisation of the "intensity,
duration and nnprecedentcd nature of the unfavonrable economic forces
operating across the world since late 1973". There was also a dawning realisa-
tion of the verb, limited power of fiscal policy to insulate the Irish economy
from world developments.24 The central economic strategy was defined as
"maintaining employment and preserving living standards", but the danger
of the huge balance of payments deficit was also recognised (10% of GNP in
1974). Tbe PCP was increased by 19 per cent in nominal terms (zero change
in volume). A net increase of £10 million in tax revenue and an increase of
£73 million in current expenditure were budgeted for, with a planned current
deficit of £125 million. For thc first time in a budget, a large extra sum
(£40 million) was allocated for additional public sector pay, thus introducing
a curious distinction between the pre-budget Book of Estimates and the
budget itself. Once again there was an explicit reluctance to raise taxation to
meet the deficit "at a time when what the economy needs is the maximum
sustainable expansionary action". In his concluding remarks, the Minister
cbaractcrised his budget as "carefully expansionary", but did not hazard
any quantification as to its likely, impact of the economy.
In our formal analysis of the impact of discretionary fiscal policy in 1975,
we found a small boost to growth (0.4 points, Table 5.2), a stimulation to
real disposable income (3.5 points, Table 5.3), a deterioration of the balance
of payments (by 2.7 points, Table 5.4) and no effect on the (adjusted)
borrowing requirement. Numbers unemployed were reduced by 11,300
(Table 5.7) and there was a drop in inflation by about 1.3 points (assisted
by the introduction of subsidies on food, clothing and fucl in a supplemen-
tar3, budget introduced in June 1975) but a rise in wage inflation of about
1.8 points (Tables 5.10 and 5.11). The 1975 budget was the second counter-
cyclical budget. Such a policy stance was greatly facilitated by the improving
balance of payments position (due to world recession) and the low real interest
rates.
24. "While there is a natural tendency to look upon the budget as the principal national corrective
measure, the truth today is that a budget is but one of several economic influences, and on its own can
have but limited effect". "Today as we are not dealing with traditional problems we cannot rely solely
on traditional ways of handling them" (Budget Speech, p. 7).
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The 1976 budget (28 January) opened with a clear statement of tilree
facts which characterised the position of the economy: the vulnerability of
the economy to the prevailing world depression; the limited power of domestic
policy measures to safeguard employment and living standards in the absence
of any increase in world trade; and the expectation that future growth
patterns were likely to be less strong than those prior to 1973. Three priorities
for policy in 1976 were emphasised; the need to curb inflationary tenden-
cies; tile need to safeguard employrnent within a fiscal constraint; the need
to limit growth in government expenditure. The publication of a "tax-free"
price index was proposed as a means of preventing workers from "compen-
sating themselves by wage increases for the effect of indirect taxes imposed
to finance transfer payments or to meet the general needs of managing
demand" (Budget Speech, p. 11). However, there appeared to be no under-
standing of the equally important role of the direct tax system in influencing
wage bargaining. On the issue of the current deficit, there was felt to be no
option but to accept it as being continually necessary because of the reces-
sion, with the aspiration that it must be reversed when the recession passed.
The vulnerability of the htrge and rapidly growing foreign debt to increases
in interest rates was Mso emphasised. The projected slow growth of the
economy in the absence of further stimulus (less than 1 per cent) was unac-
ceptable to the Minister and another large deficit was planned which was
only partly financed by massive increases in taxation. On the capital side, the
PCP was increased by 28 per cent in nominal terms (10.5% in volume). Tax
increases (mainly VAT on "the old reliables") were made to yield an extra
£124 million and only trivial tax concessions were given. Essentially no net
increases in nominal expenditure were planned. The Minister must have
realised the deflationary nature of his budget, but suggested otherwise.25 An
estimate of an extra 1 per cent growth was given by the Minister as the
iml)act effect of the budget. Our analysis of 1976 fiscal policy suggests that
the growth rate in fact fell by almost V2 percentage point relative to a policy
of strict indexation (Table 5.2). Real personal clisposable income suffered
a massive fall of almost 6Y2 per cent (Table 5.3). The balance of payments
rate improved by 4.8 points and in the absence of clelayed effects from
previous years’ policies would have gone into surplus. The borrowing require-
ment rate (adjusted, as before, for intervention payments) improved by
nearly 3.7 points. Unemployment rose by 6,600 in the first year, and peaked
at an extra 25,900 by the third year due to 1976 fiscal policy (Table 5.7).
25. "There is a misconception that because a budget contains increases in taxation it is therefore
necessarily deflationa~’ [ l Leaving as de the niceties of academic debate it is the overall impact
of the budget that matters: in other words, the total effect of the increases in current and capital
expenditure after account is taken of the offsetting influence of increased taxation" (Budget Speech,
p. 37).
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The inflation rate jumped by 3.4 points and wage inflation by 4,2 points.
If such a budget had been implemented against an economic background as
pessimistic as that outlined in the 1976 budget speech, the impact on the
economy would have been seriously deflationary. In the event, atttonomous
economic growth (induced by a strong revival of world trade) mitigated the
cffects of the budget. In fact thc planned deficit of .£327 million resulted in
an outturn of only £201 million and the budget had a correct cotmter-
cyclical stance.
The 1977 budget (26 January) was the last one prepared under the
National Coalition administration of 1973-1977, who went out of office in
June 1977. It was characterised by a spirit of optimism that the worst of the
world recession had passed and that the world economy was picking up. As
in previous budget speeches, one must attempt to infer from the manner and
style in which the Minister states his objectives, what his true intentions
were.26 For this particular budget it must be remembered that it was quite
likely to be an "election" budget. Hence, the Minister’s natural desire to
eliminate the current dcficit would be tempered by the knowledge of the
unpopularity of such policies. For the first time it was recognised that "much
of our inflation stems fl’om forces outside domestic control", although
there was a reluctance to abandon policies aimed at curbing inflation com-
pletely. There was a clear recognition that, since the economy was moving
into a recovery phase, a policy of increasing deficits was inappropriate but
that any "over-sharp" reduction in the deficit would seriously affect the
performance of the economy. An increase of 15 per cent in the nominal
PCP (a fall of 2% in volume) was planned. Large improvements to social
welfare payments were planned (£33.4) and a sum of £46 million was
allocated for public sen, ice pay. The income tax system was overhauled,
involving concessions costing £50 million in lost revenue. There was an
understandable reluctance to increase taxation, where explicit changes
were confined to tax on farm income (£35 million) and Post Office charges
(£17 million). The remaining £60 million extra tax revenue was somewhat
ingenuously referred to as originating from "tax revenue buoyancy arising
from the budget". An essentially unchanged budget deficit of £218 million
was i)lanned, but the Minister congratulated himself on the fact that "this
deficit, which is a reduction of one-third on that envisaged when last year’s
budgct was introduced, represents a very considerable progress towards ful-
filling the Government’s declared aim to phase out the current deficit as
26. "The main aims of economic policy for 1977 will be to expand economic growth closer to exist-
ing capacity so as to facilitate the transition to the higher growth rates outlined in the recent Green
Paper, to cut our inflation rate further and to reduce unemployment to the maximum extent possible.
Public expenditure will continue to be subjected to stringent control" (Budget Speech, p. 9).
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announced in last year’s budget statement" (Budget Speech, p. 38). An
interesting observation was also made towards the end of the speech con-
cerning the "unwanted side effects of increased public expenditure which
has restlhed in a diversion of an increasing share of national resources away
from the private sector" (ibid., p. 38). No firm quantitative predictions on
the likely effects of the budget were made by the Minister.
A new administration came into office in June 1977, whose commitment
to economic planning was characterised by what Whitaker (1983) bas termed
"irrational optimism".27 Immediately oil taking office the new Fianna F~,il
administration resumed public service job creation, increased capitaI spending
("effective measures were taken to ensure that there would be no repeat of
the massive underspending.., of the previous year" (Budget Speech, 1978,
p. 8)), and cut a range of indirect taxes. This extra expenditure was largely
offset by savings on expenditure, mainly on the lower cost of servicing debt
due to a fall in interest rates and a rise in the value of sterling.
Our formal analysis of the impact effect of 1977 fiscal policy indicated
that discretionary actions led to a slight fall in the growth rate (by i/sol one
percentage point), a slight fall in real disposable income, no effect on the
balance of payments rate, a rise of 1 point in the borrowing requirement rate
(Table 5.5), and a fall of 3,200 in numbers unemployed. Price inflation fell
by slightly more than ½ percentage point (Table 5.10)and wage inflation
was unaffected. The expansionary post-budget changes of the Fianna F~il
administration seem to have effectively neutralised the deflationary bias in
the original National Coalition budget.
The 1978 budget (February 1) was the first full budget of the new Fianna
Ffiil administration and was set in the context of a formal and positive com-
mitment to medium-term planning. (National Development 1977-1980, and
Programme for National Development, 1978-1981). A crucial element in the
1978 budget and in its accompanying planning document was its rejection of
the limitations of policy in a small open economy (refer footnote 18 above).
The PCP was increased by over 22 per cent in nominal terms, ( 11% in vohlme),
no increases in tax revenue were planned, tax concessions costing .£91 million
were granted (mainly income taxes and business taxes), and net expenditure
increases of £49 million were proposed. The opening deficit of £265 million
became .£405 million as a result of budgetary changes. A stress was laid on
the "temporary" nature of this increase in the deficit, which would be fully
27, "Conscious planning of development was a casualty of the first oil crisis and when it did reappear
in 1977, top-of-the-scale targets were set which could be reallsed if at all only in ideal conditions.
Public expectations, never easy to contain, were thus inflamed, with effects on the rate of pay increase
and the scale of expansion of public services which have rendered almost insoluble the problem of
budgetary imbalance, Demand management sank in a sea of current deficits" (Whitaker, 1983, p, [ 4J.
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justified if "the challenge is taken up by workers and employers alike". No
formal quantification of the likely effects of the 1978 budget was contained
in the speech itseIf. However, the budget was designed to "underpin" financially
the policies outlined in the White Paper National Development, 1977-1.980,
issued in .January 1978. The key aggq’egate targets for the period 1977-1980
were as follows:
Targe ted variables 1977 1978 1979 1980
Reduction in numbers unemployed 5,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
End-year rate of inflation 103..6 7 5 5
Increase in National Output 5 7 7 7
Borrowing as % of GNP l I l I 1 OVa 8
Balance of Payments as % of GNP 4 13 n.a. 6tA
In achieving these targets, both a projected domestic fiscal stance was
assumed, together with an optimistic world trade scenario. Four constraints
were identified: investment and its financing, the evolution of the public
sector deficit, the balance of payments and the rate of growth in world trade.
In relation to the first, the lack of detailed analysis hardly inspired con-
fidence, and it is difficult to see upon what basis the second and third con-
straints were evaluated (see table above). No formal view was taken of likely
developments in world activity other than the expectation that "growth
rates during the next few years in the member countries of the EEC should
be strong enough to support the projected expansion of exports" (National
Development, 2977-1980, p. 26).
Our formal analysis of Chapter 5 indicated that the impact effect of 1978
discretionary fiscal policy added 0.4 percentage points to the growth rate,
4.1 points to real disposable income, and reduced unemployrnent numbers
by 11,400. However, the balance of payments rate deteriorated by 3.7
points, and the borrowing requirement rate by 2.7 points. Price inflation
fell by 2.5 points, and wage inflation by 1.2 points.
The 1979 budget initiated the second stage of the government’s medium-
term strategy and was accompanied by an updated White Paper, Programme
for National Development 1978-1981. The first stage of this strategy (1978)
was marked by direct government action to boost growth, increase employ-
ment and reduce inflation. In this second stage, public resources were to be
used again to the same ends, with the expectation that the "increased
dynamism of the private sector, resulting from the success of the govern-
ment’s policies, will enable the contribution to growth from the public sector
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to be scaled down" (Budget Speech, p. 7). However, the White Paper intro-
duced a slightly plaintive note: "It is unfortunate tltat the degree of pay
moderation and of industrial relations harmony required to enstlre success
in the fields of employment and inflation were not forthcoming, especially
having regard to the tax reliefs afforded by the 1978 Budget" (White Paper,
p. 16). Cutting through the detail of the actual budgetary proposals, the
1979 budget was very similar to the 1978 one, with the exception that
additional tax revenue was raised (£57 million), tax concessions costing
£37 million were granted, and slightly over £100 million in extra expenditure
was planned. A budget deficit of £289 million was estimated. In the event,
the deficit outturn was £522 million, i.e., 81 per cent up on the estimate.
As Whitaker comments:
One of the most disturbing features of the administration of the
public finances in recent years is the chasm that has opened up
between budgetary projections and actnal results. The under-
estimation of current deficits, and consequently of the exchequer
borrowing requirement, has been so seriously disproportionate as
to invalidate the whole budgetary exercise (Whitaker, 1983, p. 112).
As shown in Table 6.3, the error in 1979 was to be merely the first of a
series of such errors.
Our formal analysis of Chapter 5 confirms the expansionary nature of the
1979 discretionary policies: the growth rate raised by 1.5 points, real dis-
posable income raised by 3.9 points, and unemployment numbers reduced
by 20,100. Price inflation was reduced by 1.3 points and wage inflation was
Table 6.3: Current deficits: budget projections and outturns
Year
(£ million) (£ million) (£ million)
Excess of outturnbudget projection outturn
over projection
1974175 66.7 64.2 -2.5
1975 125.4 259.0* 133.6
1976 327.0 201.0 -126.0
1977 217.8 201.0 -16.8
1978 405,0 397.0 -8.0
1979 289.0 522.0 233.0
1980 353.4 547.0 193.6
1981 495.0 802.0 307.0
1982 679.0 988.0 309.0
*Deficit at June 1975 supplementary budget was £222 million.
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only marginally raised (by 0.6 points). However, the price paid in terms of
balance of payments and borrowing requirement deterioration was high: the
balance of payments rate deteriorated by 3.7 points (to an actual value of
-11.3 per cent of GDP); the borrowing requirement deteriorated by 2.3
points (to an actual value of - 14.6 per cent of GDP). These modest gains in
growth and unenaployment reduction, combined with serious external and
internal imbalances, could have been (and were) foreseen by many economic
commentators. Whitaker, in a speech in Seanad Eireann on 17 May 1978
had drawn attention to the fact that the government programmes for eco-
nomic development and their accompanying budgets made
¯ . . no allowances for contingencies, inadequate discussion of the
stringent conditions necessary to attain the objectives, no pre-
caution against the disruption of confidence by failure to do so
and undue reliance on global demand expansion rather than selective
supply side measures
(Whitaker, 1983, p. 110). The mood of optimism had almost completely
evaporated by 1980.
The introductory paragraphs of the 1980 budget (27 February) dealt with
the downturn in world economic activity as a result of the second major
OPEC price rises of 1979, and the rather dismal prospects for the year 1980.
The massive overrun in the borrowing requirement for 1979 (14.6 per cent
of GNP as against the earlier projections of 10.5) and the emergence of a
balance of payments deficit of 11.3 per cent of GNP as against the target of
about 4 per cent), were singled out as being particularly serious. A sense of
realism began to colour the government’s view of the inter-relationship
between borrowing, the external deficit and the level of external reserves.28
The PCP for 1980 was increased by 15 per cent over the 1979 outturn
(0.5% in volume). On the expenditure side, a provision for £100 million in
cxtra public sen, ice pay was made even though "there would not appear to
be scope from a strictly economic viewpoint for further increases in rates of
pay". A further increase in net expenditure (mainly social welfare) of
£56 million was made. Given the opening deficit of £346.4 million, net tax
increases of an amount planned to almost exactly offset the net expenditure
rise wcrc plamacd (i.e., about £190 million from the "old reliables", £44 mil-
lion from income and resource taxes, £18 million from VAT). Tax conces-
sions of £143 million were granted, mainly in the personal income tax
28. "Borrowing, the balance of payments and the external reserves are all interlinked. Government
borrowing allows a higher level of expenditure in the economy, which generates a demand for further
imports and adds to the external deficit. A reduction in borrowing is required in the short-term in
order to help reduce the balance of payments deficit to a sustainable level" (Budget Speech, p. 12).
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system. The projected deficit was £353.4 million, only £7 million higher
than the opening deficit.
No formal quantification of the likely effects of the budget were presented
in the speech. In the event, the projected deficit was so different from the
actual outturn (£353.4million as against £547 million) that any such estimate
would be of little interest. Given our restriction to the 1967-1980 period,
our formal analysis can only deal with the impact effects of the 1980 budget.
From Table 5.2, 1.3 points were added to the growth rate as a result of fiscal
discretion and real disposable income was lowered by 1.9 per cent. While the
balance of payments rate was improved by 1.2 points, the borrowing require-
ment was unchanged. Unemployment fell by 4,200, but, rather ominously,
employment in the market sector also fell by 2,400. From Tables 5.7 and
5.8, the pattern of the budgets of 197t and 1976 indicate the likely long-
term detrimental effects of the 1980 budget in terms of higher unemployment
and lower market sector employment. The explanation partially lies in the
effects of the budget on price and wage inflation (rises of 3.1 points and
4.4 points, respectively). In terms of its impact on the inflation rate, the
budget of 1980 was second only to that of 1976. In terms of its impact on
wage inflation, the 1980 budget was the highest over the 1967-1980 period
in absolute terms, although exceeded by the 1971 effects in relative terms
(refer Table 5.11).
The decade of the 1970s was characterised by fluctuations in the inter-
national economy of a kind which had not been experienced since the
1930s. Even with the wisest and most prudent fiscal management it would
have been impossible for the Irish economy to have emerged unscathed from
the world recession. In this chapter we have seen the budgetary policy in
ireland during the 1970s started in a very conventional manner, the previous
major departures from convention going back to the early 1950s when the
concept of a Public Capital Programme, funded by borrowing, was intro-
duced. In 1972, for the first time a planned deficit on current account was
budgeted for, and during the first OPEC oil crisis (with its consequential
depressing effect on world activity) this deficit was progressively widened
in a vigorous and sustained counter-cyclical policy aimed at insulating
Ireland from the effects of world recession. Although an initial attempt was
made in 1976 to reverse this trend, particularly in view of the improving
world situation, the budgets of 1978 and 1979 were decidedly pro-cyclical.
The budget of 1980 marked the end of such policies but by then the fiscal
imbalance had become so serious as to largely predetermine budgetary policy
for the greater part of the 1980s. In onr final chapter we turn to some of the
lessons which we might learn from the experience of the 1970s with the
benefit of hindsight.
Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper we have attempted to quantify the effects of fiscal policy on
the Irish economy over thc 1967 to 1980 period using the technique of
Blinder and Goldfcld. (1976) in conjunction with the macro-econometric
model described in Chapter 2. We now turn our attention to an overview of
the effectiveness of fiscal policy and tile lessons which might be learnt for
the present period. Wc also consider some of the areas of the model which
could be improved with future research.
RE VIEW
In Chapter 6 we examined individual budget speeches and, from what can
be inferred from these documents, fiscal policy over the period in question
had two main purposes - first, the management of short-term demand in
order to keet) capacity utilisation high and to maintain what was perceived
as a required standard of living, and second, the creation of an environment
in which economic growth could be sustained over a longer period. This latter
aim was promoted by a number of means, which in many cases may have
been contradictory. Behind the complex and extensive changes which were
made during the 1970s there were two basic types of policy. First, there was
policy which aimed to promote growth via increased government expenditure,
taking up pre-existing sIack in the Irish economy and promoting growth of
GDP, from which increased tax revenue would help to repay any increased
public sector debt. The alternative policy stance which was taken during the
’seventies was to reduce inflation, or the balance of payments deficit, rather
than increase demand, as a result of which gains in competitiveness would
have caused growth of GDP. The usual manifestation of such a policy was in
reduced government expenditure and increased rates of taxation.
Our analysis, provided in Chapters 5 and 6, suggests that neither of these
stylised policies has proved successful in the creation of an environment
where long-term growth could be encouraged. Rather, the overall impression
taken from the two preceding chapters is of a fiscal policy which has suc-
ceeded in attaining short-run benefits to either demand, the balance of
payments or inflation with no beneficial long-term consequences. Further-
more, the expansion of current government expenditure in excess of growth
in tax revenues has resulted in a situation where governments of the 1980s
have inherited a public authorities deficit of almost 16 per cent of GNP,
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which will impose a severe constraint on fiscal policy for years to come.
This level of debt might be justified if expansionary fiscal policy over the
period considered had succeeded in increasing GDP and living standards by
an approximately similar amount. However, our estimates of the cumulative
effects of fiscal policy, given by the integral approach in Chapter 5, suggest
that by 1980 its effects on GDP and living standards were small. Ironically,
it appears to us that the long-term effects of aggregate fiscal policy from
1967 to 1980 has simply been to provide a constraint in the form of a huge
debt which must be l:epaid in future periods rather than create an environ-
ment for growth.
The purpose of the demand expansion budgets was to return the economy
towards full utilisation of capacity and, consequently, full employment. It
was presumed that expansion of the economy would allow for the garnering
of sufficient tax revenue to pay off some of the required borrowing incurred
by the expansion of demand. For this to happen, a favourable world economy
was usually envisaged. This did not, in general, occur, particularly in the
1979 and 1980 period when booming world conditions were supposed to
bring in increased revenue in order to begin to pay off previous debts.
Unfortunately, the second OPEC-induced price crisis occurred with the
result that unemployment increased, interest rates became high in real
terms and GDP growth fell, all of which imposed further pressures on
the public finances. The governments of the ’seventies cannot be held to
blame for a failure to forecast the unexpected price shocks of 1973 and
1979. It should be noted, however, that even in conditions of booming
world demand these policies need not have been appropriate.
It is our view, based on the properties of the macromodel, that even had
world demand growth continued in line with the expectations made in the
budgets of the 1970s, governments seriously underestimated the leakages
from the economy, in the form of increased savings and imports, so that it is
unlikely that sufficient tax revenue to repay debts incurred would be raised
on the basis of GDP growth alone. Such counter-facttLal analysis would be a
relatively simple procedure within the framework of the model and could
be considered for future research.
A more fundamental problem regarding the handling of the public finances
during the 1970s is the apparent lack of continuity or symmetry in govern-
merits’ views of the economy. Demand expansion was seen as an instrument
where major gains in growth could be obtained without seriously impairing
inflation. For instance, in the 1975 budget speech it was asserted that a
"failure to pursue the objectives of maintaining employment and preserving
living standards would be likely to lead to further inflationary pressures"
(Budget Speech, 1975, p. 9). Similarly in 1976, though it was conceded
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that "some economic commentators . . . point to the rapid growth in public
expenditure as a primary causc of inflationary pressure in the economy"
(Budget Specch 1976, p. 12) this view was brushed aside by suggesting that
"this is an over-simplified view of the situation and tends to blur the distinc-
tion betwcen cause and effects" (ibid., p. 12). In 1978, in a year characterised
by an increase of 7,300 in public sector employment, it was asserted that
"the improvement in competitiveness resulthag from Government economic
proposals should also stimulate investment in the exporting sector and lay
the foundations for continued cxport-lcd growth" (Budget Speech, 1978,
p. 11). On the other hand, demand contraction, such as that carried out in
1976, was aimed at controlling inflation withont serious effects on GDP or
living standards. The lack of symmetry in these views should bc apparent.
Another example of the inability to perceive or acknowledge trade-offs
hctween economic objectives lies in the manner in wbich the balance of
payments is treated in successive budgets. By 1971 it was believed that
increases in taxation with consequent reduction in demand would improve
the balance of payments. By our analysis, this policy proved correct with a
reduction of over 0.5 per cent of GDP occurring as a result of discretionary
fiscal policy. By 1975, the problcm of the balance of payments deficit had
arisen once again where it was suggested that "unless we start now the
correctivc process will be more abrupt and more painful" (Budget Speech,
1975, p. 9) advising that "any domestic action that would cause it to rise
must of course be avoided" (ibid, p. 9). Yet government expenditure increases
that year raised disposable income and imports with a consequent fiscally-
induced increase in the balance of payments deficit of 3.6 pcr cent of GDP
(see Table 5.4).
Those budgets which were used dlrcctly to increase outpnt appear to have
been reasonably successful in the first year of their implementation. Gross
Domcstic Product grew by between 0.3 per cent and 2.1 per cent as a result
of indivitlual expansional3, policies in the year of implementation at the
expense of increases in the horrowing requirement rate of bctween 0.9 per
cent and 4.0 per cent. It is wortb noting that our analysis suggests that
there is no simple relationship hetween fiscally-induced increases in GDP
and a rise in the borrowing requirement. For instance, a 2 per cent growth
in GDP was obtained by fiscal policy in 1972 at the expense of an increase
of 0.9 per cent in the borrowing requirement. At the other extreme, a 0.4
per cent incrcase in GDP was induced by fiscal policy in 1978, though in
this case at the expense of a 2.7 per cent increase in the borrowing requirement.
The major failure of expansionary fiscal policics over the 1970s has not
been their inability to increase GDP over the short run but rather their in-
effectiveness over the long run. The tables in Chapter 5 provide a depressing
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characterisation of the long-run effects of demand expansion in that increases
in GDP which were induced by expansionary government policy were, by
the second year, either eliminated (1979) or reversed (1972, 1973). This
must be seen within the context of a government which is continuing to
borrow to provide finance for the revenue shortfalls induced by previous
years’ policies. The reason for this turnabout in the effects of fiscal policy
are due to the links between demand expansion and inflation. The 1970s
were characterised by rapidly increasing direct tax rates with variable indirect
tax rates showing a slow trend increase also. Increases in indirect taxation
feed directly in!o consumer price inflation which influence the determination
of wage bargains. Furthermore, we have determined wage bargains net of
direct taxation so the historical increases in rates of direct taxation during
the ’seventies, used to partially pay for increased government expenditure,
also induce further wage inflation. The consequence of such cost-induced
wage inflation on competitiveness on world markets should be obvious,
with the resulting "crowding-out" of the exposed sectors.
This explanation of cost-induced inflation brought about by fiscal expan-
sion can be used to interpret partially the early to mid-1970s, though not the
1978 and 1979 period where rates of indirect taxation were reduced suffici-
ently for price inflation to initially fall, relative to a fiscally-indexed policy.
Further strengthening the increases to inflation induced by tax rises is a
pressure on wages brought about by the Phillips curve. Government policy
over the ’seventies succeeded in initially creating increases in both public
and private sector employment, thus reducing the unemployment rate below
that whicb would have resulted tinder fiscal indexation. As a result, bargain-
ing strength of workers increased and wages rose as employees sought to
capitalise on a stronger bargaining position than they would otherwise have
experienced. This form of inflation, brought about by excess demand in the
labour market, appears to have eliminated any gains to GDP caused by fiscal
policies of 1978 and 1979 in the succeeding years.
Our analysis suggests that deflationary policies have been little more
successful. Fiscal policies of 1976 and 1977 appear to have long-tailed
negative effects upon GDP, disposable income and employment. The assump-
tion underlying these budgets was prestlmably that inflation, caused either
by the Phillips curve or bottlenecks in supply, could be averted by reduced
disposable income and government expenditure, with beneficial effects on
the borrowing requirement. Furthermore, it was prestlmed that the contrac-
tion of demand would improve the balance of payments position. From our
analysis presented in Chapter 5, such budgets were partially successful.
Fiscal policy in 1976 and 1977 did, in fact, reduce the balance of payments
deficit and borrowing requirement quite considerably. On the other hand,
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these policies were singularly unsuccessful in containing inflation. While
they may have bccn partially successful in constraining demand-induced
inflation, the increases in direct and indirect taxation were sufficient to add
4.2 per cent to wage inflation in 1976 and to leave it relatively constant in
1977. This apparent link between taxation and inflation appears to explain
the failure of the private sector to respond to these supposed output incentives.
The budgets of 1971 and 1980 arc possibly the most interesting of those
implemented. Both budgets managed initially to increase GDP -- by 1.14 per
cent in 1971 and 1.29 per cent by 1980 - while suffering no disimprovement
in the borrowing requirement. In fact, the fiscal policies of 1971 redtlced
the borrowing requircment by 1 per cent. This combination of beneficial
effects, almost unique in the histoW of Irish fiscal policy, was obtained by
rapidly increased rates of direct taxation. This would appear to follow the
textbook pattern of a balanced budget multiplier where reductions in
Icakagcs via savings and relative propensitics to import succeed in increasing
GDP. However, prohlems arise when taxation increases induce inflation, the
effects of which cumulate over a two to three year period, competitivcness
deteriorates and output is lost. This is cvidcnt in Chaptcr 5 where the delayed
effects of the policies of 1971 reverse the initial increase in GDP via inflation.
Similar results are unavailable for 1980 as it is the last year of the sample
but wc have little doubt hut that a similar sitnation will evolve.
Throughout the calculations discussed ahove, there is an assumption that
policies introduced in one period are indepcndent of those taken in any
other period. One instance where this assumption may be less appropriatc
is in the aftermath of a deflationary budget such as that of 1976. By redtlc-
ing the borrowing requirement hy 4 per cent as wc suggest, pressure upon
future fiscal policy is redticed since finance was no longer necessary for
payment of interest on that portion of debt. As a result, there is more finance
available for future government expcndlturc domestically with a constant
borrowing requirement. Therefore, it should be noted that some of the bene-
fits of dcflationary budgets, in the form of reduced pressure on future fiscal
policy, are not given in the analysis of Chapter 5. On the othcr hand, fiscal
expansion resulting in an increased borrowing requirement cxacerbatcs
the constraints on future fiscal policy since part of tax revenue must now be
used to pay for expenditures already made, with the resuh that the expan-
sionary effects of those types of budgets over the long run is over-stated in
Chapter 5. The issue of temporal independence of policies is returned to
below.
At the beginning of this chapter, we highlighted two roles for govern-
mcnt--the maintenance of living standards in the short term and the creation
of growth in a more long-term perspective. By its policies during the 1970s,
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governments have certainly succeeded in maintaining short-term living stan-
dards, though lit the expense of a massive borrowing requirement which wilI
surely stunt growth in the future. It is because government has this dual role
to play that it would be unfair to crlticise the overall effect of fiscal policy.
For instance, transfer payments have increased at a rate far in excess of that
which would ’have been envisaged under policies of fiscal indexation. It is
impossible to suggest that merely because in our counter-factual experiments
GDP growth was as high as with historical fiscal policy, this represents a
failure on the part of government since welfare considerations, both short
term and long term, must be taken into account in cvalnating fiscal policy.
As a result, in our analysis we must limit ourselves to an evaluation of fiscal
policy in terms of its effects on economic growth.
To conclude, our analysis suggests that the .effect of fiscal policy on
economic growth has fallen well I)elow that which was expected of it by
policy makers. Rather than create an environrnent in which growth cotdd
flourish, fiscal policy during the ’seventies has imposed a financial constraint
in the form of a massive public debt, which will hinder growth for future
generations. The reasons behind the failure of economic policy during this
period are twofold. First, the world recessions occurred unexpectedly in
1973 and 1979, thus greatly hlndcring possibilities for the correction of
public deficits. It is, of course, debatable whether government policies during
this period would have been appropriate even with a buoyant world eco-
nomy. Second, there appears to have been fundamental misunderstandings
of the structure of the Irish economy, most particularly the relationship
between fiscal expansion, taxation, and competitiveness. This has, wc
believe, rcsultcd in a major shift of resources from the exposed industrial
sector to the public sector, and has thus left the economy less capable of
reacting to an improvement in world conditions than it otherwise might
have been.
FUTURE RESEARCH
In considering ways in which the analysis of this paper could be improvcd
upon it is best to look at it under two different headings. First of all, we
consider how we could improve the specification of our model as a represen-
tation of the Irish economy. Second, we consider the whole methodology of
policy evaluation and possible shortcomings of the Blinder-Goldfeld approach.
Model Specification
The results of the dynamic simulations and multiplier calctdations pre-
sented in Chapter 3 suggest that while our model is a good representation of
major relations in the Irish economy, it is far from being perfect. In con-
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sidcring possible improvements to tile model we will go through it block by
block as outlined in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2.
In the industry sector we have resclx, atlons about the concept of capacity
output and its determination. Capacity output is an elusive concept and we
measure it rather crudely using a linked-peaks approach (see Bradley and
Fanning, 1984, Chapter 3). Capacity output thus defined is specified as being
deterrnined by expected "world" GDP and expected competitiveness. This
specification may underestimate the obviously vel3, iml)ortant role played
by the IDA in the development of industrial capacity in Ireland and the role
of othcr elements of the Public Capital Programme in providing new infra-
structure. The restrictive nature of the two factor (KL) CE8 putty-putty
technology is also undesirable but was forced on us by the difficulties we
experienced in trying to operationalise more flexible specifications. While a
four factor (KLEM) putty-clay technology might seem more attractive, our
experience with the HI~RMES project leaves us sceptical about the feasibility
of operationalising such a specification (see, for example, Bradley and Wymle,
1983 and Wynne, 1984).
The key weakness in the agriculture sector lies in our inabiIity to iml)le-
ment any form of consistent technological relationship between output and
factor inl)uts. We measure capacity (gross) output using a moving average of
actual output. Material inputs as a fraction of output are determined solely
by a time trend: a relationship such as this may track well within slmlple
but will invariably cause problems when Ol.lt of sarnple forecasting is attempted.
Ideally we would like a situation where the inputs of labour, capital and
materials were determined in a manner consistent with the determination
of agricultural output on the basis of some assumption (such sis cost minimi-
sation or profit maximisation) al)out farmers’ behaviour. Indeecl, before such
a system could be implemented in a model it might bc necessary to break
agricultural enterprises down into two or more groups, such as commcrcla]
and subsistence, and posit different behavioural assumptions for each. In
addition, output may need to be disaggregated into its main conlponents.
In the mode] we have attempted to decompose service sector activities
into market and non-market components. This breakdown is, of necessity,
very crude, due to the poor quality of the data available on this sector.
Further advances here must await new and better data. It is difficult to
know to what extent it is reasonable to hope for improvements in our
modelling of the behaviour of public administration, given that the decision
processes are very different to those normally looked at by economists
(Delorme, 1984).
As regards improving the equations in the absorl)tion block of the rnodel
there are two imrnediatc issues which we must tackle. First of all, the deter-
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ruination of imports of industrial materials for further production as a
residual item to ensure balance between output and expenditure means that
the resultant series picks up all of the errors in the other absorption and
supply block equations. One could consider trying to model such imports
explicitly as part of the firm’s decision process. But if we are to determine
all of the components of output and expenditure by bchavioural equations
we must abandon any hope of ensuring that the national income identity
of output and expenditure will hold. The price paid for obtaining exact
equality is the residual determination of at least one variable on either the
output or the expenditure side.
Second, the equation determining non-agricultural exports in the standard
model is in essence a hybrid equation with industrial exports determined by
world income and competitiveness. The statistical fit was not particularly
good. In future work we would hope to develop a better equation that
takes more account of explicit supply constraints.
The main problems in the modelling of the income distribution block
come from our inadequate treatment of the monetary sector. In particular,
we are dissatisfied with the way in which the relationship between the size
of the national debt and the interest payments thereon is dealt with in the
model. One of the shortcomings of the analysis in the previous chapters
stems from the fact that in the model interest payments on the foreign debt
were determined as if all foreign bonds were perpetuities, with the amount
of net foreign borrowing endogenously determined as the component of the
budget deficit remaining after the take-up of debt by domestic agents. While
this does not create problems for the within-sample tracking performance of
time model, it does have implications for the multiplier calculations and the
policy analysis for which the model is used. Although domestic debt interest
payments are formally endogenous to the model, the manner in which they
are endogenised by relating them to two other exogenous variables leaves a
lot to be desired. More research is required in this area if we are to improve
on these rather crude representations. Such research might be undertaken as
part of a larger project aimed at modelling the way in which the financial
sector interacts with the real economy in Ireland.
The Methodology of Policy Evaluation
In evaluating fiscal policy in Ireland we used a methodology that was
explicitly model-based. This means that using the same methodology with
different models could possibly give different inferences about the effect of
fiscal policy. Only if the model being used is a good representation of the
economy being examined can we have any confidence in the results of such
an analysis. Thus, to the extent that the model we used is imperfect in cap-
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turing important interactions in tile Irish economy the results of the analysis
of fiscal policy in Chapter 5 must be interpreted with caution. We would
want to repeat our calculations, either with an irnproved version of the
present model or else with a different model, in order to increase confidence
in the answers we obtained.
The second source of errors in the analysis is in the Blinder-Goldfcld
methodology itself, Perhaps the key assumption underlying thcir approach is
that of independence of policies. This assumption has two dimensions to it.
First, it is assumed that policy actions in any given year arc all strictly, in-
dependent of one another. However, one can easily conceive of situations
where a decision by the government to undertake some particular policy
change necessitated a wlriety of other concomitant changes in policy. Second,
temporal independence of policy actions is assumed also. Again it is not
difficuh to imagine a situation in which a government might decide to
increase expenditure this year with the intention of raising taxcs the follow-
ing year. The extent to which this assumption is violated in any particular
application of the Blintter-Goldfeld methodology largely depends on how
well the model being used captures adequately the features of the decision-
making processes of the fiscal authorities. This issue tics in with the question
about whether one should look at changes in nominal or real iustruments.
By looking at changes in nominal instruments we implicitly assume that the
government has absolnte discretion about whether to hold certain items of,
say, cxpenditure fixed in the face of high inflation. By doing so thcy would
exert a deflationary pressure on the economy and in reality they, may in
some sense feel "obliged" to increase such expenditure in line with inflation.
By !ooking at instrunlents in real terms we go some way towards capturing
this phenomenon but ;it the price of classifying a decision to index fully in
line with inflation as no change in policy. Onr nsc of real instruments is no
more than avery crude way of modelling the response of the fiscal authorities
to inflation. What is rcally needed is bctter modelling of the behaviour of the
ileal attthorities that endogenised most, if not all, components of taxation
and expenditure by allowing them to respond to expected (rather than
actnal) inflation.
Finally, mention must be made of the Lucas critique of econometric
policy evaluation as a possible source of error in our analysis. There is little
to be added at this stage to our discussion of this point in Chapter 1, except
perhaps to note that it can only nndcrmine onr analysis of fiscal policy if it
can be shown that the parameters of the behavioural equations of our model
are not invariant with respect to the type of policy changes being considered.
How one might go about establishing such invariance is no simple matter and
is an area of active research in macroeconomics.
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APPENDIX 1
MODEL VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Exogenous Variables Listed by Main Category
(i) Taxation lnstrun3ents
(ii) Expenditure Instruments
(iii) Other Fiscal Variables
(iv) Financial and Monetary Variablcs
(v) Agricultural Variablcs
(vi) European Economic Community Variables
(vii) World Variablcs
(viii) Other Exogenous Variables
Endogenous Variables Listed in Alphabetical Order
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(i) Taxation Instrumcnts: Endogenous Variables Listed by Mabz Category
GREVK
SOCR
TAGLEV
TAU
TAVR
TCARR
TCDR
TEDR
THE
TIOR
TRATE
TYA
TY RA
TYW
YGI
Total revenue on capital account (£m)
Implicit average social insurance contribution rate
Revenue from agricultural levies (£m)
Effective corporate tax rate
Effective VAT rate
Motor vehicle road tax rate
Implicit rate of customs duty
Rate of excise duty on alcohol, pctrol, etc.
Rate of initial depreciation allgwances on capital goods
Implicit rate of indirect taxation on residual category
Revenue from property taxes (£m)
Revenue from taxes on agricultural incomes (£m)
Implicit average rate of direct taxation
Revenue from weahh taxes
Government trading and investment income (£m)
(ii) Expenditure Instruments:
CGOV : Government current expenditure on goods and serviccs,
GEXPKO
1FGOV
IFGV
IHGV
LPA
LSNM
SUBCR
SUBO
TRKH
TRK1
TRPO
TRUR
excluding the public administration wage bill (£m)
Residual capital expenditure category (£m)
Other public sector direct fixed investment expenditure (£m)
Fixed investment by public administration sector (£m)
Public authorities housing investment expenditures (£m)
Employment in public administration and defence (’000)
Employment in non-marketed services sector (’000)
Implicit rate of subsidy on private consumption
Residual category of subsidies (£m)
Capital transfers to households for housing purposes (£m)
Capital transfers to industry (£m)
Residual category of personal transfers (£m)
Unemployment transfer payment rate
(iii) Other Fiscal Variables:
DUMED Dummy variable for state secondary education scheme
WKI Proportion of social insurance contributions paid by em-
ployers
WLI Proportion of road tax duties paid by company sector
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(iv) Financial and Monetary Variables:
DC
FGN
FSPFN
FXA
NFLB
ONLB
RD
RF
RFGL
RGL
RPL
SECBG
SECCBG
SECGNL
SECHGDL
SECHGO
SECTF
TRCFG
TRCGF
TRDIF
YFNPER
Private sector domestic credit (£m)
Government net capital receipts frorn abroad (£m)
Private international capital transfers (£m)
£ lrish/£ US exchange rate
Net foreign liabilities of commercial banks (£m)
Other net domestic liabilities of the banking system (£m)
Ordinary deposit rate of interest
Rate of interest on new foreign borrowing
Average rate of interest on foreign loans outstanding
Rate of interest on national loans
Prime lending interest rate
Banking sector lending to government (£m)
Central Bank lending to government (£m)
National Loans outstanding (£m)
Change in private non-bank holdings of government debt
(£m)
Residual category of government borrowing from private
non-bank sector (£m)
Stock of foreign debt outstanding (derived) (£m)
Government current transfers abroad (£m)
Government current receipts from abroad (£m)
Debt interest payments on foreign borrowing (£m)
Net factor income from abroad, excluding foreign debt
interest on government borrowings (£m)
(v) Agricultural Variables :
IIA
IIAV
OFF
OFFV
PQA
PXA
WEATH3
: Agricultural stock changes (£m, 75)
Agricultural stock changes (£m)
Value-added in forestry and fishing (£m, 75)
Value-added in forestry and fishing (£m)
Price of gross agricultural output
Price of agricultural exports
Index of weather (degree-days above 6°C)
(vi) European Economic Community Variables:
ECBUD Irish EEC budget contribution (£m)
IIEC lntela,ention stock changes (£m, 75)
IIECV Intervention stock changes (£m)
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SUBEC
TMCA
TREC
YASAEC
Subsidies from the EEC (£m)
Monetary compensation amounts (£m)
Transfers from the EEC (£m)
Adjusmlent for intervention stock appreciation (£m)
(vii) World Variables:
PMG Price of imports of goods
PMMFPA Price of imports of agricultural raw materials
PMS Price of imports of services
PWORLD Trade-weighted price of world exports of manufactured
goods
URUK Unemployment rate in the United Kingdom
WIRUK Index of real industrial earnings in the United Kingdom
YWORLD Trade-weighted index of real world GDP
UCLW Trade-weighted index of world unit labour costs
(viii) Other Exogenous Variables:
D73M
D74M
D75
T
Wi
l)ummy variable to eliminate the year 1973
Dnmmy variable to eliminate the year 1974
Dommy variable to eliminate the year 1975
: Time index (1953=1)
: Expectation weight (0.5 (i = 1), 0.25 (i = 2), 0.125 (i = 3)
Endogenous Variables Listed in Alphabetical Order
BPTV
BPV
BPVR
CCAAFFV
CCAIV
CCASV
CG
CGO
CGV
COI
COIL
COSML
CPER
Balance of trade surplus (£m)
Balance of payments surplus (£m)
Balance of payments surplus as percent of GDP
Depreciation allowances in agricuhural sector (£m)
Depreciation allowances in industry (£m)
Depreciation allowances in services (£m)
Public net current expenditure on goods and services
(£m, 75)
CG, less public administration wage bill (£m, 75)
Public net current expenditure on goods and services (£m)
Average unit factor costs in industry
Ratio of added-value deflator to unit labour costs in industry
Ratio of added-vMue deflator to unit labour costs in marketed
services
Personal consumer expenditure (£m, 75)
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CPERV
CURl
ECOI
ECOMP
EDPR
EGDAO1
EGSOSM
EOPRI
EOPRS
EPRX
EPSI
ERAW
ERFPI
ERFPSM
EUCCI
EUCCS
EUCLI
EWI
EWSM
EYWORLD
FPN
GBR
GBRCR
GBRR
GDA
GDAOI
GDAV
GDE
GDEV
GDGDPR
GDPFC
GDPFCV
GDPM
GDPMDOT
GDPMV
GEXPC
Personal consttmer expenditure (£m)
Rate of industrial capacity utilisation in industry
Expected value of the variable COl
Expected international competitiveness in industry
Working age participation rate in full-time education
Expected value of the variable GDAO1
Expected vatue of the variable GSOSM
Expected value of the variable OPRI
Expected value of thc variable OPRS
Ratio of EPXNA and EUCLI, i.e., export profitability
Rate of investment grants in industry
Expected value of the variable RAW
Ratio of EWI and EUCCI, i.e., expected relative factor
prices in industry
Ratio of EWSM and EUCCS, i.e., expected relative factor
priccs in marketcd sen, ices
Expected value of tbc variable UCCI
Expected value of the variable UCCS
Expected value of the variable UCLI
Expected value of the variable Wl
Expected value of the variable WSM
Expected value of the variable YWORLD
Net capital inflow of the non-bank private sector
Public authorities borrowing requirement (£m)
Public authorities current borrowi~g requircment-GDP
ratio
Public authorities borrowing requirement-GDP ratio
Gross domestic absorption (£m, 75)
Gross domestic absorption of industrial output (£m, 75)
Gross domestic absorption (£m)
Gross domestic expenditure (£m, 75)
Gross domestic expenditure (£m)
Public authorities debt-GDP ratio
Gross domestic product at factor cost (£m, 75)
Gross domestic product at factor cost (£m)
Gross domestic product at market prices (£m, 75)
Rate of change of GDPM (%)
Gross domestic product at market prices (£m)
Public authorities total current expenditure (£m)
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GEXPK
GEXPR
GFD
GFDV
GFX
GFXR
GNP
GNPV
GREVC
GREVR
GSOI
GSOSM
IFAFF
IFAFFV
IFG
IFI
IFIV
IFS
IFSM
IFSV
IFT
IFTNG
1 FTV
IH
IHG
IHP
IHPV
IHV
IINA
I1NAV
liT
IITV
KFAFF
KFCIP
KFI
KFSM
KINA
KINAV
Public authorities total capital expenditure (£m)
Public authorities cxpenditure-GDP ratio
Gross final demand (£m, 75)
Gross final demand (£in)
Official external reserves (£m)
Official external reserves-total imports ratio
Gross national product (£m, 75)
Gross national product (£m)
Public authorities total current revenue (£m)
Public authorities total current revenuc-GDP ratio
Gross expenditure on industrial goods (£m, 75)
Gross expenditure on marketed services (£m, 75)
Fixed investment in agricultnre (£m, 75)
Fixed investment in agriculture (£m)
Fixed investment by public authorities (£m, 75)
Fixed investment by industry (£m, 75)
Fixed investment by industry (£m)
Fixed investment by marketed and non-marketed services
(£m, 75)
Fixed investment b5, marketecl services sector (£m, 75)
Fixed investment by marketed and non-marketed services
(£m)
Total fixed investment (£m, 75)
Total non-public administration fixed investment (£m, 75)
Total fixed investment (£m)
Total housing investment (£nl, 75)
Public authorities housing investment (£m, 75)
Private housing investment (£m, 75)
Private housing investment (£m)
Total housing investment (£m)
Non-agricultural stock changes (£m, 75)
Non-agricultural stock changes (£m)
Total stock changes (£m, 75)
Total stock changes (£m)
Fixed capital stock in agriculture (£m, 75)
Full capacity capital stock in industry (£m, 75)
Fixed capital stock in industry (£m, 75)
Fixed capital stock in marketed sen, ices (,£m, 75)
Non-agricultural stock level (£m, 75)
Non-agricultural stock level (£m)
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L
LAFF
LBFGN
LCIP
LF
LFPR
LI
LM
LNA
LNM
LS
LSM
MAT
MATV
MC
MG
MGS
MGSV
MGV
MMFPA
MMFPI
MMFPIV
MON
MPCG
MS
NDPFCV
NGE65
NLE14
NLF
NLFED
NMA
NT
N1564
N1564A
OA
OAFF
OAFFV
OAV
Total numbers employed (’000)
Numbers employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing (’000)
Public authorities net foreign borrowing (£m)
Industrial employment at full capacity utilisation (’000)
Total number in labour force (’000)
Labour force participation rate
Numbers employed in industry (’000)
Numbers employed in marketed sector (’000)
Numbers employed in the non-agricultural sector (’000)
Numbers employed in non-marketed sector (’000)
Numbers employed in non-public administration services
(’000)
Numbers employed in marketed services sector (’000)
Material inputs in agriculture (£m, 75)
Material inputs in agriculture (£m)
Imports of consumption goods (£m, 75)
Total imports of goods (£m, 75)
Total imports of goods and services (£m, 75)
Total imports of goods and services (£m)
Total imports of goods (£m)
Imports of agricultural raw materials (£m, 75)
Industrial materials imports for further production (£m, 75)
Industrial materials imports for further production (£m)
Broad money supply (£m)
Imports of producers capital goods (£m, 75)
Imports of services (£m, 75)
Net domestic product at factor cost (£m)
Population numbers aged 65+ (’000)
Population numbers aged less than 15 years (’000)
Population of working age not in the labour force (’000)
Population of working age in full-time education (’000)
Net migration abroad (’000)
Total population (’000)
Population numbers aged between 15 and 64 years (’000)
N1564 less NLFED (’000)
Added value in agriculture (£m, 75)
Added value in agriculture, forestry and fishing (£m, 75)
Added value in agriculture, forestry and fishing (£m)
Added value in agriculture (£m)
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OCI
OI
OIV
OPA
OPAV
OPRI
OPRS
OPRSM
OS
OSM
OSMV
OSNM
OSNMV
OSV
PCGO
PCPER
PCPERDOT
PGDE1
PGDE2
PGDPFC
PGDPFCDT
PGNP
PIF
PIFAFF
P1FG
PIFI
PIFS
PIH
PIINA
PKINA
PMAT
PMGS
POAFF
PO1
POS
PQTI
PSUBT
PTET
PXGS
PXNA
Capacity output in industry (£m, 75)
Added value in industry (£m, 75)
Added vahle in industry (£m)
Added vah.le in public administration (£m, 75)
Added value in public administration (£m)
Labour productivity in industry
Labour productivity in services
Labour productivity in marketed services
Added value in services (£m, 75)
Added value in marketed services (£m, 75)
Added value in marketed ser-,,ices (£m)
Added value in non-marketed services (£m, 75)
Added value in non-marketed services (£m)
Added value in services (£m)
Deflator of the variable CGOV
Deflator of the wtriable CPERV
Inflation rate of the wlriabIe PCPER
Deflator of the variable GDEV from expenditure side
Deflator of the variable GDEV from the output side
Deflator of the variable GDPFCV
Inflation rate of the wiriable PGDPFC
Deflator of the variable GNPV
Deflator of total non-public administration investment
Deflator of the variable IFAFFV
Deflator of the variable IFGV
Deflator of the variable 1FIV
Deflator of the variable IFSV
Deflator of the variable IHV
Deflator of the variable IINAV
Deflator of the variable KINAV
Deflator of the variable MATV
Deflator of the variable MGSV
Deflator of the variable OAFFV
Deflator of the variable OIV
Deflator of the variable OSV
Price of gross ou tput of transportable goods industries
Deflator of the variable SUBT
Deflator of the variable TET
Deflator of the variable XGSV
Deflator of non-agricultural exports
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PYAFS
QA
QAV
QCA
QDA
RATWI
RATWSM
RAW
RE
RETRAT
RW
SECTD
SOC
SOCE
SOCP
SUBC
SUBRT
SU BT
TAV
TAVB
TCD
TED
TEMVDC
TERT
TET
TINC
TIO
TMVD
TOTRADE
TRDI
TRDID
TRDIR
TRPT
TRU
TRUYW
TYC
TYMVDP
TYPER
Deflator of the variable YAFS
Gross agricultural output (£m, 75)
Gross agricultural output (£m)
Capacity gross output in agriculture (£m, 75)
Domestic absorption of gross agricultural output (£m, 75)
Real after tax annual earnings ill industry (£’000, 75 pa)
Real after tax annual earnings in marketed services
Average agricultural earnings relative to non-agriculture
Employment rate in Ireland relative to UK
Average retentions ratio from wages (%)
Real earnings rate in Ireland relative to the UK
Total public authorities domestic loans outstanding (£m)
Total revenue from social security contributions (£m)
Employer’s social security contributions (£m)
Employee’s social security contributions (£m)
Subsidies oil consumption (£m)
Total subsidies (£m, 75)
Total subsidies (£m)
Revenue from value added taxes (£m)
Tax base for value added taxes (£m, 75)
Revenue from protective customs duties (£m)
Revenue from specific excise and customs duties (£m)
Portion of road tax of vehicles paid by company sector (£m)
Total indirect tax revenue (£m, 75)
Total indirect tax revcntie (£m)
Average net indirect tax rate on consumption
Revenue from residual category of indirect taxes (£m)
Total revenue from road taxation of vehicles (£m)
Overall terms of trade
Total public authorities dcbt interest payments (£m)
Public authorities debt interest on domestic debt (£m)
Public authorities debt interest -- GDP ratio
Total personal transfer payments (£m)
Unemployment assistance and benefit transfers (£m)
Pay-related unemployment transfers (i’m)
Revenue from company taxes (£m)
Portion of road tax on vehicles paid by household sector (£m)
Revenue from tax on personal non-agricultural incomes (£m)
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TYT
TYTOTR
U
UCCAFF
UCCI
UCCS
UCLI
UCLS
UCLSM
UR
URNAT
WAFFIMP
Wl
WlDOT
WIRIR
WlRIRDOT
WNA
WPA
WS
WSM
WSMDOT
WSNM
XA
XGS
XGSV
XNA
Y
YAFF
YAFS
YASA
YC
YCI
YC175
YC175R
YCU
YC75
YFN
YP
Total revenue from taxes on incomes (£m)
Total implicit average direct tax rate
Total numbers unemployed (’000)
User cost of capital to agricultural sector
User cost of capital to industrial sector
User cost of capital to sen, ices sector
Unit labour costs in industry
Unit labour costs in services
Unit labour costs in marketed services
Unemployment rate
Trend unemployment rate
Implicit average annual earnings in agriculture (£’000 pa)
Implicit average annual earnings in industry (’000 pa)
Rate of inflation of the variable W1
Real non-agricultural average annual earnings
Rate of inflation of the variable WIRIR
hnplicit average annual earnings in non-agriculture
Implicit average annual earnings in public administration
Implicit average annual earnings in services
Implicit average annual earnings in marketed services
Rate of inflation of the variable WSM
Implicit average anmml earnings in non-marketed services
Total agricultural exports (£m, 75)
Total exports of goods and services (£m, 75)
Total exports of goods and services (£m)
Total non-agricultural exports (£m, 75)
Net national product at factor cost before adjustment for
stock appreciation (£m)
Income in agriculture, forestry and fishing (£m)
Adjustment for financial services (£m)
Adjustment for stock appreciation (£m)
Total non-agricultural profits (£m)
Industrial profits (£m)
Industrial profits deflated by the investment price, PIFI
Real industrial profits per unit of industrial capital stock
Undistributed non-agriculturaI profits (£m)
Total non-agricultural profits deflated by PIF
Net factor income from abroad (minus indicates net outflow)
Private income (£m)
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YPER
YPERD
YPERT
YPO
YRAFS
YRFN
YRPERD
YWI
YWNA
YWPA
YWS
YWSM
YWSNM
Personal income (£m)
Personal disposable income (£m)
Taxable income (£m)
Non-wage taxable income (£m)
Adjustment for financial services (£m, 75)
Net factor income from abroad (£m, 75)
Personal disposable income (£m, 75)
Wage bill in the industrial sector (£m)
Wage bill in the non-agricultural sector (£m)
Wage bill in public administration (£m)
Wage bill in services (£m)
Wage bill in marketed services (£m)
Wage bill in non-marketed services (£m)
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In this appendix we present a concise listing of all the equations in the
model. For those equations estimated using time-series data, we present the
estimated coefficients and a variety of diagnostic statistics. In all cases the
estimation technique used was single equation ordinary least squares (OLS)
except in the case of the joint factor deraand system for industry and for
marketed services, where full information maximum likelihood (FIML) was
used. In cases where autocorrelation was seen as presenting a serious problem
(DW less than dL), the equation was re-estimated using generalised least
squares (GLS) with the error term assumed to be a first order autoregressive
process. In such cases the estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient (RHO)
is presented with the estimation restdts.
In presenting the statistical restllts, the following notation is used:
(i) RSQ dcnotes the multiple correlation coefficient, corrected for de-
grees of freedom
(ii) DW denotes the first-order Durbin-Watson statistic
(iii) EST indicates the period of estimation
(iv) RHO gives the first-order autoregressive parameter
(v) The t-statistics are indicated in parentheses below the coefficients.
Descriptions of the variable mnemonics are contained in Appendix 1. This
listing is intended only for reference purposes and should be read in con-
junction with the economic description of the model. Full details of the
computer data bank can be obtained on application to the authors.
THE SUPPL 1: BLOCK
Industry
Three versions of the equation for capacity output in industry (OCI) are
provided:
(i) log OCI = 7.05 + 1.32 log EYWORLD- 1.22 log ECOMP + 0.04 T
(36.7) (5.3)            (4.2)         (9.4)
RSQ=0.993 DW= 1.79 EST= 1965-80
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(ii) logOCl= 7.01+(1.09 +3.94&IogEGDAOI) logEYWORLD
(39.5) (4.2) (1.8)
1.15 log ECOMP + 0.04 T
(4.2)         (11.6)
RSQ=0.995 DW=2.00 EST=1965-80
(iii) logOCI=2.15+ 1.992 [0.572IogEYWORLD+(1-0.572)
(5.7) (3.9)
log EGDAOI] - 1.119 log ECOMP
(2.4)
RSQ-- 0.976 DW= 1.48 EST= 1965-80
Tile assuml)tion that tile technology of tile industry sector is of CES type
gives the following long-run factor demand equations for cal)ital (KF’C1P)
and labour (LCfP):
log KFCIP = - (l/m/~) log a + (s(l - s)) log (1 - d) + (l/mu) log OCI - lmk T
+ (s/(l- s)) log [(d/(l- d))s ERFPI(i s) cxp {(s- l)(I ml-lmk)T } + 1 ]
logLCIP =-(l/mp)loga+(s](I-s))logd +([]rn#)logOCl-hnkT
+ (s/(1-s))log [(d/(l- d))"~ ERI’PI-(1 -s) exp {- (s- I)(hnl-lmk)T}+ 1]
Estimation
meters:
a
ill tl
S
d
Imk
lml
by FIML yielded the following production functions para-
Paramctcr Interpretation IRS CRS
Scale/Efficiency parameter 1.5536 1.5536
Returns to scale parameter 1.3 1.0
Elasticity of substitution 0.2926 0.2926
Labour intcnsity parameter 0.7745 0.7745
Capital saving rate of technical change - 0.0562 - 0.0447
Labour saving rate of technical change 0.0251 0.0367
These long-run factor demand equations are translated into actual factor
demand equations I)y means of error-correction mechanisms (ECM):
Alog KFI = at Alog KFCIP + a2 log (KFCIP/KFI i )
+ as (aI log CURl + (a2- at) log CURl.I)
Alog LI = bl&log LCIP + b2 log (LCIP]LI.I)
+ b3 (b] log CURl + (b2- bI ) log CURI.j )
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CRS: aI = 0.668 (8.8) bI = 0.395 (2.9)
a2 = 0.553 (4.1) b2 = 0.646 (4.1)
a3 = 0.117 (0.5) bs = 0.851 (4.3)
RSQ= negative RSQ-- 0.543
DW = 1.73 DW-- 1.89
IRS: aI = 0.678 (9.6) bI = 0.349 (2.3)
a2 -- 0.582 (4.4) b2 = 0.766 (4.6)
as = 0.118(0.6) bs = 0.803(5,0)
RSQ= negative RSQ=- 0.609
DW -- 1.83 DW -- 1.91
IFI= KFI- (1-0.05) KFI.I
Industrial capacity utilisation is determined as a function of sales-capacity
disequilbrium and of short-run profitability.
log CURl =-0.157 + 0.615 log (GSOI/OCI) + 0.270 log COIL
(12.4) (18.7) (7.4)
RSQ--0.950 DW=2.51 RHO =-0.69 EST= 1965-80
OI = CURl * OCI
OIV=PO[*O[
UCCI = PIFI * (0.02*(]-TAU*THE- EPSI) + 0,05)/(I-TAU)
EPSI-- TRKI ] IFIV
EWI = w~ * Wl.l + w2 * Wl.2 + w3 * WI.s + (l-wl-w2-w~) * WI4
EUCC1 -- wI * UCCI.I + w2 * UCCI.2 +w3 * UCCI.s + (l-wl-wz-ws) * UCCI4
ERFPI = EWI ] EUCCI
YWI = LI * WI
YCI = OIV- YWI- CCAIV
YCI75 = YCI [ PIFI
YCI75R = YC175 ] KFI
UCLI = Wl ] OPRI
EUCLI = wI * UCLI.I + w2 * UCLI_2 + wB * UCLI3 + (1-WI-W2-W3) *
UCLI.4
OPRI = Ol ] LI
EOPRI = wI * OPRI.I + w2 * OPRI.2 + w3 * OPRI.3 + (1-wl-w2-wB) *
OPRI.4
COl = (L[ * W[ + UCCI * KFI) ] Ol
ECOI = wt * COI.I + w2 * COI.2 + ws * CO1.3 + (1-Wl-W2-W3) * COl.4
COIL= POI ] UCLI
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Log CCAIV =-0.900 + 0.717 log (PIFI * KFI.I )
(2.5) (13.9)
RSQ=0.910 DW=I.53 RHO=0.794 EST= 1961-80
ECOMP = w~’ COMP.I + w~ COMP.2 + v,,~ COMP.s + ( I- wI - w2- w3 )* COMP.4
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Agricultural capacity output is derived as a five year moving average of
actual output.
QCA = (QA_I + QA.2 + QA.s + QA.4 + QA.5) * 1.11753 [ 5.
Actual agricultural output is determined by capacity output, but is
modified by profitability and the weather conditions.
QA = 211.1 + 10.00215 WEATI-I3 + 0.340 (PQA/PMAT.I)] QCA
(4.4) (3.5)           (4.3)
RSQ=0.893 DW=209 EST= 1962-80
The materials/output ratio is determined simply as a time trend.
log (MAT/QA) =- 1.362 + 0.027 T
(32.7) (12.8)
RSQ=0.895 DW= 1.50 EST= 1961-80
OA = QA - MAT
OAFF = OA + OAFF
QAv = eQa * QA
MATV = PMAT * MAT
OAV = QAV - MATV
OAFFV = OAFF* PQA
Employment in agriculture is a function of the relative agriculture/non-
agriculture earnings, the overall national unemployment rate and a time
trend (acting as a proxy for labour productivity or technical change).
log LAFF = 6.151 + 0.073 log ERAW + 0.011 log UR- 0.029 T
(127.0) (1.8)         (0.5)       (14.3)
RSQ-0.930 DW= 1.48 RHO= 0.898 EST= 1963-80
ERAW = (RAWq + RAW 2)/2.
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The agricultural capital stock is a function of output (added-value
the real cost of capital. The relationship displays great inertia.
IogKFAFF= -0.563+0.1621og(OAFF.I +OAFF2)]2
(2.1) (2.6)
-0.057 log (UCCAFF/POAFF) + 0.924 log KFAFF.I
(2.6)                  (43.0)
RSQ=0.998    DW= 1.72    RHO= 0.656    EST= 1963-80
and
UCCAFF = PIFAFF * (0.02 + 0.05)
YAFF = OAFFV- CCAAFFV
WAFFIMP = YAFF ] LAFF
RAW = WAFFIMP ] WNA
IFAFF= KFAFF-(1.0-0.05)* KFAFFI
The fraction of total agricuhural output which is absorbed domestically
is very stable and trending downwards slowly.
QDA / QA = 0.565 - 0.010 T
(36.1) (12.1)
RSQ=0.884 DW=2.15 EST= 1961-80
XA = QA- QDA- llA- IIEC
log CCAAFFV = -2.52 + 0.957 log (PIFAFF * KFAFF)d
(8.1) (20.5)
RSQ=0.957 DW= 1.16 RHO=0.944 EST= 1961-80
Services Sector
(i) Marketed Services:
Two versions of the equation determining marketed services output are
provided. The key explanatory variable is a weighted measure of gross sales,
where the weights reflect the services output content of each component of
sales.
(i) log OSM = 0.709 + 0.873 log EGSOSM + 0.313 log COSML
(2.6) (27.6)          (1.9)
RSQ=0.982 DW= 1.66 EST= 1965-80
(ii) log OSM = 1.091 + 0.850 log EGSOSM
(4.0) (21.3)
RSQ=0.968 DW= 1.74 RHO--0.274 EST = 1965-80
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The technology of the marketed services sector is of generalised Leontief
form, with tile factor demand equations estimated using FIML.
KFSM / OSM = -2.18 + 1.045 ERFPSM°’5 - 0.053 T
(3.1) (3.7) (1.9)
RSQ=0.982 DW=0,530 EST= 1965-80
LSM / OSM = 0.202 + 1.045 ERFPSM"°’5 - 0.005 T
(2.2) (3.7) (3.3)
RSQ=0.947 DW=0.96 EST= 1965-80
UCCS = PIFS * (0.02 + 0.05)
EUCCS = w~’ UCCS.I +w~ UCCS.2 +w~ UCCS.3 + (l-wl-w2-ws)* UCCS.4
EWSM = w~’ WSM4 + w~ WSM2 + w~ WSM.a + (1-wl~w2-w3)* WSM.4
ERFPSM = EWSM / EUCCS
OSMV = POS * OSM
YWSM = LSM * WSM
UCLSM = WSM / OPRSM
COSML = POS [ UCLSM
OPRSM = OSM / LSM
IFSM = KFSM - (1.0 - 0.05) * KFSM
Non-marketed services output is determined by labour inputs with a sm,’dl
correction for the trending "quality" of labour.
log (OSNM ] LSNM) = 1,05 + 0.0087 T
(16.2) (2.8)
RSQ=0.294 DW= 1.60 RHO=0.500 EST= 1964--80
log YWSM = 0.719 + 0.880 log CGOV
(11.0) (76.5)
RSQ= 0.997 DW = 1.75 EST= 1965-80
LSNM = YWSNM / WSNM
OSNMV = YWSNM
log OPA= 1.214+ 1.011 log LPA+ 0.004 T
(3.9) (10.7) (1.1)
RSQ=0.994 DW= 1.39 EST= 1961-80
YWPA = OLA * WPA
OPAV = YWPA
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LS = LSM + LSNM
IFS = IFSM + IFGOV / PIFS
OS = OSM + OSNM
OSV = POS * OS
YWS = YWMSM + YWSNM
UCLS = WS / OPRS
OPRS=OS/ LS
EOPRS = w~’ OPRSq + w~’ OPRS.2 + w~ OPRS.s + (1- wI - W2- W3 )* OPRS_4
log CCASV =- 1.770 + 0.914 log (PIFS * KFS.I)
(7.5) (26.9)
RSQ=0.974 DW = 1.85 RHO= 0.760 EST= 1961-80
Imports and the Balance of Payments
Imports of producers capital goods are determined by total fixed invest-
ment and the rate of industrial capacity utilisation.
log MPCG = -2.370 + 1.222 log IFT + 0.576 log CURl
(I 1.9) (38.8)       (1.4)
RSQ= 0.988 DW= 1.74 EST= 1961-80
Imports of consumption goods are determined by total personal con-
sumption (with an imposed unitary elasticity), a relative price term, a time
trend to capture the rising average import propensity and dummy variables
to eliminate the years 1973-1975.
log (MC/CPER) =-2.57 + 0.039 T- 0.607 log (PMG/PQTI)- 0.180 D73M
(20.7) (6.7) (1.5) (3.0)
-0.209 D74M- 0.173 D75
(3.3)      (3.2)
RSQ=0.789 DW= 1.68 RHO=0.617 EST= 1965-80
Imports of agricultural raw materials are determined by agricultural
output (with an imposed unitary elasticity), relative prices and a time trend.
log (MMFPA/QA) =- 3.137 + 0.036 T- 0.488 log (PMMFPA/PQA)
(16.8) (4.3)    (2.0)
RSQ= 0.523 DW= 1.96 EST= 1965-80
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Imports of materials for further production in industry are derived residu-
ally from the output-expenditure identity.
MMFPI = CPER + CG + IH + IFT +IIT + XGS - GDPM
- (MPCG + MC + MMFPA + MS)- STATDIS
MMFPIV = PMG * MMFPI
Total imports of services are determined by total GDP
log MS =- 1.856 + 0.428 log GDPFC + 0.688 log MS I
(1.6) (1.8)          (4.3)
RSQ =0.942 DW= 1.74 EST= 1962-80
MG = MPCG + MC + MMFPA + MMFPI
MGV= PMG* MG
MGS = MG + MS
MGSV = PMG * MG + PMS * MS
PMGS = MGSV ] MGS
TOTRADE = PXGS ] PMGS
YFN = YFNPER- TRDIF
YRFN = YFN ] PMGS
BPTV = XGSV- MGSV
MPV-- BPTV + YFN + FSPFN + TREC + (TRCGF + TRCFG)
BPVR= 100" (BPV/GDPMV)
Labour Supply and Demography
Total population and the population in the three age groupings
mined in terms of a "natural" growth rate and a migration leakage.
ANT + NMA = 0.011 NT.I
(16.5)
RSQ= 0.195 DW= 2.04 EST= 1962-80
are deter-
ANLE14 = 0.009 NLE14- 0.212 NMA
(14.2) (4.9)
RSQ=0.603 DW= 2.64 EST= 1962-80
AN1564 = 0.012 N1564- 0.665 NMA
(14.5)      (6.3)
RSQ=0.734 DW= 1.48 EST= 1962-80
NGE65 = NT- (NLEI4 + N1564)
184 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The participation rate in full time education by the working age popula-
tion is trended and has a policy dummy variable.
log EDPR = 1.108 + 0.114 DUMED + 0.035 T
(9.2) (1.8)        (6.0)
RSQ =0.800 DW=0.97 RHO=0.064 EST= 1961-80
NLFED = EDPR * N1564 [ 100
N1564A = N1564- NLFED
The labour force participation rate is a function of the unemployment
rate.
log LFPR = 4.241 - 0.015 log UR
(518) (3.0)
RSQ=0.349 DW= 1.60 RHO=0.818 EST= 1961-80
LF = LFPR * N1564A ] 100
NLF = N1564- LF
L = LI+LAFF+LS+LPA
LNA = LI + LS + LPA
U=LF- L
UR= 100" (U/LF)
URNAT = (UR + UR.I + UR.2 + UR_3) / 4.0
Net migration abroad is a function of the relative attractiveness of the
UK labour market and the domestic market.
NMA =- 189.5 + (0.166- 0.056 RE1 * RW.1) * (N1564A+N1564A.I) ] 2.0
(2.5) (2.5) (2.3)
RSQ=0.764 DW = 2.58 EST= 1963-80
RE = (1.0- UR]100) [ (1.0- URUK[100)
RW = WIRIR [ WIRUK
THE ABSORPTION BLOCK
Personal consumption is a function of real personal disposable income.
CPER ] NT = 0.130 + 0.418 (YRPERD]NT) + 0.326 (CPER]NT.I) - 0.052 D75
(3.2) (5.9)            (2.9)          (6.6)
RSQ=0.941 DW= 1.78 RHO= 0.767 EST = 1962-80
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CPERV = PCPER * CPER
CGV = OPAV + CGOV
CG = OPA + CGO
CGO = CGOV / PCGO
Private housing investment is a function of real personal disposable in-
come, housing transfers and a real interest rate.
log IHP = - 11.8 + 2.00 log YRPERD + 0.102 log (TRKH/P1H)
(6.5) (l 1.1)          (1.0)
- 0.258 [log(RPL/100) - Iog(P1H/PIH.I )]
(1.4)
RSQ=0.964 DW= 1.56 EST= 1962-80
IHPV = PIH * IHP
IHG = IHGV ] P1H
IH= IHP+IHG
IHV = IHPV + IHGV
IFIV = PIFI * IFI
IFAFFV=PIFAFF* IFAFF
IFSV = PIFS * IFS
IFTNG = IFI + IFAFF + IFSM
IFG = IFGV [ PIFG
IFT= IFI + IFAFF + IFS + IFG
IFTV = IFIV + IFAFFV + IFSV + IFGV
A simple partial adjustment model determines non-agricultural inventory
changes.
IINA = 63.88 + 0.323 O1- 0.529 KINAI
(2.7) (4.2)    (3.9)
RSQ=0.56 DW= 2.30 EST= 1963-.80
IINAV = PIINA * IINA
K1NA = IINA + KINAI
KINAV = PKINA * KINA
liT = IIA + IINA + IIEC
IITV = IIAV + IINAV + IIECV
Three variants of the non-agricultural exports equation are provided: the
first is a pure supply equation and is driven by industrial capacity and pro-
fitability; the second has an added disequilibrium term in real world activity;
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the third is a demand function.
(i) log (XNA/OCI) = - 1.33 + 1.134 log EPRX + 0.037 T
(8.1) (3.9) (10.5)
RSQ= 0.890 DW= 2.08 EST= 1965-80
log (XNA/OCI) = - 1.48 + 0.838 log (YWORLD/EYWORLD)
(10.5) (2.9)
+ 1.183 log EPRX + 0.039 T
(5.0)         (12.1)
RSQ=0.930 DW= 1.77 EST= 1965-80
(iii) log XNA = 4.39 + 1.027 log YWORLD + 1.403 log EPRX + 0.072 T
(43.3) (3.4)           (5.0)         (17.3)
RSQ=0.992 DW= 1.56 EST= 1965-80
XGS=XNA+XA
XGSV-- PXNA * XNA + PXA * XA
GDA = CPER + CG + IFT + IH + lIT- STATDIS
GDAV = CPERV + CGV + IFTV + IHV + I1TV
GDAOI = 0.17216 (CPER-STATDIS) + 0.09500 CG + 0.61746 IH
+ 0.34626 IFT + 0.25260 IINA + 0.19890 IIEC + 0.08091 llA
EGDAOI = w~’ GDAOIq +w~ GDAOI.2 +w~ GDAOI3 + (1 - wI - w2 - ,,v3) *
GDAOI.4
GSOI = 0.17216 (CPER- STATDIS) + 0.09500 CG + 0.61746 IH
+ 0.34626 IFT + 0.25260 IINA + 0.19890 IIEC + 0.08091 IIA
+ 0.31134 XNA + 0.19890 XA
GSOSM = 0.22065 (CPER-STATDIS) + 0.07426 CG + 0.09816 1H
+ 0.10731 IFT + 0.25238 I1NA + 0.09639 IIEC + 0.06764 IIA
+ 0.23223 XNA + 0.09639 XA
EGSOSM = v,,~’ GSOSM.I + v,,~ GSOSM.2 + w~ GSOSM_3 + (1-Wl-W2-W3)*
GSOSM.4
GDE = CPER + CG + IFT + lH + liT- STATDIS + XGS- MGS
GDEV = CPERV + CGV + IFTV + IHV + IITV + XGSV- MGSV
PGDE1 =GDEV/GDE
GFD = CPER + CG + IFT + IH + liT- STATDIS + XGS
GFDV = CPERV + CGV + 1FTV + IHV + IITV + XGSV
EYWORLD = wI * YWORLD -1 + w2 * YWORLD-2 + ws * YWORLD-3
+ (1-WI-W2-w3) * YWORLD.4
APPENDIX 2 187
THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION BLOCK
Three variants of the industrial added-value producer price equation are
provided: the first is a markup model on domestic labour costs; the second
relates industrial prices to world prices with a disequilibrium term in domestic
labour costs; the third determines industrial prices simply as a function of
world prices.
(i) log POI = 0.282 + 0.710 log (WI/EOPRI) + (1- 0.710) log (WI/EOPRI.l)
03.7) (4.2)
RSQ=0.996 DW= 1.63 EST= 1965-80
log POI = 0.064 + 0.368 log PWORLD + (I-0.368) log PWORLD l
(3.6) (2.5)
+ 0.560 Alog (UCLI]EUCLI)
(2.7)
RSQ = 0.994 DW = 1.50 EST : 1965-80
(iii) log PO1 = 0.066 + 0.387 log PWORLD + (1- 0.387) log PWORI~D.I
(3.7) (2.8)
RSQ=0.983 DW= ].82 EST= 1963-80
The gross industrial output price is a function of the added-value com-
ponent, import prices and agricuhural prices.
log PQT1 =
- 0.019 + 0.184 log POI + 0.531 log PMGS + (1 - 0.184 - 0.531) log PQA
(4.8) (4.1)        (11.6)
RSQ:0.999 DW= 1.59 EST= 1961-80
Service sector output prices are a simple markup on domestic labour costs.
log POS = 0.483 + 0.627 log (WS/EOPRS) + (1 - 0.627) log (WS/EOPRS)q
(9.8) (4.5)
RSQ=0.995 DW: 1.75 RI-IO:0.909 EST=1965-80
The price of agricultural inputs are determined by industrial prices and
agricultural output prices.
log PMAT = 0.003 + 0.942 log PQTI + (1- 0.942) log PQAq
(0.4) 03.3)
RSQ= 0.999 DW= 1.49 EST= 1962-80
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POAFF = OAFFV / OAFF
PGDPFC = GDPFCV / GDPFC
PGDPFCDT = 100 * (PGDPFC/PGDPFC l - 1.0)
The common format for the main expenditure deflators is as follows:
log PEX = a0 + aI Iog PGDPFC + (l-aI ) log PMGS
where PEX is a specific expenditure deflator, PGDPFC is the GDP deflator
and PMGS is the deflator of total imports. The export price equation is
included only as a comparison with the others, a different version being used
in the model (see below).
Deflator a0 aI RSQ DW RHO EST
PCPER/(1 + TINC) -0.117 0.704 0.988 1.65 0.979 1962-80
(2.1) (18.6)
PCGO -0.030 0.900 0.958 1.09 1.000 1962-80
(0.1) ( - )
PIFI 0.054 0.534 0.992 1.50 0.799 1962-80
(8.3) (9.5)
P1FS 0.034 0.588 0.999 1.10 -- 1962-80
(7.9) (13.9)
PIFAFF 0.010 0.554 0.976 1.80 0.976 1962-80
(0.12) (9.2)
PlFG
-0.025 0.764 0.998 1.66 -- 1962-80
(3.5) (10.5)
PIH 0.020 0.633    0.904 1.45 1.000 1962-80
(0.002) (5.5)
PXNA 0.051 0.372 0.956 1.91 1.000 1962-80
(0.001) (5.4)
PIF = (IFIV+IFAFFV+IFSV) ] (IFI+IFAFF+IFS)
The export deflator used in the model is determined by world prices.
log PXNA -- 0.093 + 0.66 l log PWORLD + (1-0.661) log PWORLD.I
(4.5) (8.0)
RSQ= 0.987 DW= 1.82 RHO=0.770 EST= 1963-80
PXGS = XGSV ] XGS
EPXNA = wI PXNA_I + w2 PXNA.2 +w3 PXNA.s + (l-wl-w2-w3) PXNA4
EPRX = EPXNA / EUCLI
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The non-agricultural stock change deflator is a function of the deflator
of stock levels and of changes in import prices relative to industrial output
prices.
log PIINA = 1.0 log [(PKINA + PKINA) / 2] + 0.501 log (PMG/PQTI)
(2.2)
RSQ=0.993 "DW= 2.32 EST= 1961-80
log PKINA = 0.076 + 0.366 log PGDPFC + (1 - 0.366) log PMGS
(1.8) (4.8)
RSQ = 0.970 DW= 1.98 RHO= 0.908 EST= 1961-80
The deflators of the adjustment for financial services, of total indirect
taxes and of total subsidies, are related to the overall GDP deflator.
log PYAFS = - 0.062 + 1.0 log PGDPFC
(0.90)
RSQ= 0.864 DW= 1.68 RnO=0.601 EST= 1964-80
log PTET = 0.015 + 1.0 log PGDPFC
(0.40)
RSQ=0.948 DW= 1.46 RHO=0.685 EST = 1964--80
log PSUBT--- 0.155 + 1.0 log PGDPFC
(0.41)
RSQ =0.699 DW= 1.49 RHO= 0.964 EST= 1964-80
Wage Determination
RATWI = Wl * RETRAT ] PCPER
A series of five possible target industrial wage rates are specified in terms
of historical average values.
WIT1 = AVLSHI * POI * OPRI / RETRAT
WIT2 = AVLSH2 * POI * OPRI
WIT3 = AVLSH3 * PCPER * OPRI / RETRAT
WIT4 = AVLSH4 * PCPER * OPRI
WIT5 = AVLSH5 * PCPER*OPRI / RETRAT**0.5
(AVLSHI = 0.614)
(AVLSH2 = 0.725)
(AVLSH3 = 0.582)
(AVLSH4 = 0.688)
(AVLSH5 = 0.633)
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Ten variants of the industrial wage equation are included. The general
form of the wage equation is as follows:
ZXlog WI = alAIog WITi + a2 log (WlTi / Wl.l) + a3 (UR-URNAT.I)
where WITi can takc one of five possible forms and the last term represents
the deviation of the unemployment rate from its trend value.
Target Wage aI a2 a3 RSQ DW EST
1 0.914 0.482 0.678 1.58 1965-80
(20.0) (2.7)
2 0.955 0.579 -0.0218 0.739 1.81 1965-80
(20.9) (3.4) (2.1)
3 1.000 0.247 0.609 1.70 1965-80
(-) (1.1)
4 1.000 0.230 -0.0111 0.608 1.76 1965-80
(-) (1.1) (i.o)
5 0.937 0.523 0.621 1.71 1965-80
(18.6) (2.3)
6 0.982 0.592 -0.0217 0.679 1.65 1965-80
(18.8) (2.8) (1.9)
7 1.000 0.205 0.653 1.87 1965-80
(--) (1.1)
8 1.000 0.156 -0.0126 0.661 1.87 1965-80
(--) (0.9) (1.2)
9 1.003 0.604 0.667 1.69 1965-80
(19.4) (2.3)
10 1.044 0.624 -0.0189 0.709 1.67 1965-80
(19.4) (2.5) (1.7)
WlDOT= 100" (WI/WI.I - 1.0)
The wage rate in marketed services is determined by the industrial wage
rate,
Alog WSM = 0.778 Alog WI + 0.073 log (WI [ WSM.I)
(3.0])       (0.9)
RSQ=0.366 DW=2.07 EST= 1965-80
RATWSM = WSM * RETRAT / PCPER
WSMDOT = 100 * (WSM / WSMI - 1.0)
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WSNM = WPA
WS = YWS / LS
The wage rate in public administration is determined by time industrial
wage rate. Time dummy variables deal with the "bunching" of public sector
pay awards.
Alog WPA = 0.0027 ÷ 1.0 ~log WI + 0.046 WPADU- 0.068 WPADD
(0.5)            (4.3)        (7.3)
RSQ= 0.925 DW= 2,07 EST= 1964-80
WNA = YWNA / LNA
WIRIR = (WNA [ PCPER)
WIRIRDOT= 100" (WIR1R/WIRIRI - 1.0)
COW = UCLW
F, COW = w~ COWa + w~ COW.2 + w~ COW_s + (1-%-w2-ws)* COW4
ECOMP = ECOI ] ECOW
Fiscal Redistribution
A series of four technical equations determine tax revenue from excise
duties, value-added tax, a rcsidual category and motor vehicle duties.
log TED =- 1.122 + 0.768 log TEDR + 0.884 log CPER + 0.332 log PCPER
(2.5) (18.1)        (15.3)        (8.4)
RSQ= 0.999 DW= 1.37 EST= 1961-80
log TAV =-2.560 + 1.086 log TAVR + 1.381 log TAVB
(0.5) (7.7)         (2.3)
+0.993 log (0.75 PCPER + 0.25 PCPER.I )
(8.3)
RSQ= 0.996 DW = 1.26 EST = 1964-80
TAVB= 0.75" CPER+ 0.25 * CPER.I
log T10 = -5.372 + 1.428 log T1OR + 1.078 log CPER + 1.016 log PCPER
(1.7) (3.5)        (2.7)         (5.7)
RSQ=0.984 DW= 1.40 EST=1961-80
log TMVD =-8.695 + 0.928 log TCARR + 1.533 log CPER
(7.3) (12.0)        (9.8)
RSQ=0.936    DW= 1.73 RHO=0.644    EST= 1961-80
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TCD = TCDR * MGSV
TEMVDC = TMVD - TYMVDP
TET = TED + TAV + T10 + TEMVDC + TCD+TRATE + TAGLEV + TMCA
TYPER = TYRA * YPERT
SOC = SOCR * YPERT
SOCE = WKI * SOC
SOCP = SOC - SOCE
TYTOTR = TYRA + SOCR
RETRAT = 1 - TYTOTR
Company tax revenue is simply linked to total profits.
log TYC =- 1.135 + 0.836 log YC.I
(3.9) (16.9)
RSQ= 0.940 DW= 2.18 RHO=0.482 EST= 1962-80
TYMVDP = (1 - WL1) * TMVD
TYT = TYPER + SOC + TYC + TYMVDP + TYA
GREVC = TET + TYT + YGI + TRCGF + TYW
SUBC = SUBCR * CPER
SUBT = SUBC + SUBO + SUBEC
Expenditure on unemployment assistance and benefit is determined by a
rate of benefit and the numbers unemployed.
log TRU =- 2.083 + 1.173 log TRUR + 0.690 log U
(5.3) (28.4)        (5.9)
RSQ=0.998 DW= 1.5"7 EST= 1961-80
TRUYW = K2 * U * WNA.I
TRPT = TRU + TRUYW + TRPO
Interest payments on national loans are determined by an interest rate
and thc change in loans outstanding.
ATRDID = 2.841 + 0.005 RGL * ASECGNL + 0.003 RGL.I * ASECGNL1
(1.8) (8.5) (5.1)
RSQ=0.965 DW=2.77 EST= 1963-80
TRDI = TRDID + TRDIOD + TRDIF
GEXPC = CGV + (SUBT- SUBEC) + TRPT + TRD1 + TRCFG + TMCA
+ ECBUD
GEXPK = IHGV + IFGV + 1FGOV + TRKI + TRKH + GEXPKO
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TINC = (TET- SUBT) / CPERV
GREVR = 100 * (GREVC + GREVK) / GDPMV
GEXPR = 100 * (GEXPC + GEXPK) / GDPMV
GBR = (GREVC- GEXPC) + (GREVK- GEXPK)
GBRR = 100 * (GBR / GDPMV)
GBRCR = 100 * (GREVC- GEXPC) / GDPMV
SECTD = SECGNL + SECOD
LBFGN =-GBR- ASECTD
TRDIFR = 100 * TRDIF / GDPMV
TRDIR = 100 * TRDI / GDPMV
GDGDPR = 100 * (SECTD + SECTF) ] GDPMV
National Income Identities
GDPFC = OI + OAFF + OS + OPA - YRAFS
GDPFCV = OIV + OAFFV + OSV + OPAV- YAFS
YRAFS = YAFS / PYAFS
GDPMV = GDPFCV + (TET- SUBT)
PGDE2 = GDPMV ] GDE
GDPM = GDPFC + (TERT- SUBRT)
TERT = TET / PTET
SUBRT = SUBT [ PSUBT
GNPV = GDPMV + YFN
GNP = GDPM + YRFN
PGNP = GNPV ] GNP
NDPFCV = GDPFCV- (CCAIV + CCAAFFV + CCASV)
Y = NDPFCV + YFN + YASA
YASA=&KINAV- IINAV+YASAEC
YP = Y- YGI + TRD1 + TRPT + FSPFN
YPER = YP- YCU
YPERD = YPER- (TYPER + SOC + TYA + TYW + TYMVDP)
YRPERD = YPERD [ PCPER
YC = NDPFCV- YAFF- YWNA + YASA + YAFS
YC75 = YC ] PIF
Undistributed profits are a simple function of total profits.
YCU = 14.677 + 0.246 YC
(2.4) (28.6)
RSQ =0.977 DW= 1.31 EST= 1961-80
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tYWNA + (YWPA_I - YWPA) + YPO_I - SOCEYPERT = YWNA + YPO.I - SOCE
YPO = YC- YCU + YASA- YGI + TRDI + YFN- YAFS
YWNA = YWI + YWS + YWPA
: pre-1974
: post-1974
Monetary Sector
The demand for money is determined by GDP, the inflation rate and an
interest rate differential term.
log (MON ] PGNP) =- 1.313 + 1.121 log GNP- 0.461 Iog (PGNP]PGNPj)
(2.0) (13.5) (1.5)
+ 0.033 log (RD ] RGL)
(1.0)
~SQ: 0.9G8 DW = ~.30 ~ST = 1961-80
Z~GFX = AMON + Z~ONLB- Z~DC
GFXR= 100 * (GFX/MGSV)
FPN=AGFX- BPV- Z~NFLB- FGN- LBFGN
YAFS =-32.282 + 0.037 GDPMV + 2.344 * (RPL- RD)
(3.0) (19.6)       {1.6)
RSQ=0.953 DW = 1.32 RHO=0.714 EST--- 1961-80
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The purpose of this note is to examine some different approaches to the
treatment of policy indexation. More specifically, we consider two types of
indexation- first, where policy, is indexed relative to some fixed base
period, which we term "fixed base" indexation and second, where policy is
indexed relative to the previous year’s policy, which we call "floating base"
indcxation.
Let us assume tllht our model is of the following simple linear dynamic
form :
Yt = a + t~xt + -rytq
(1)
where Yt is an endogenous variable and xt refers to the single policy variable
available. Over a particular time period, the policy variable will take on
certain specific values {xt, t = O, 1 . . . n}. We call this set of values "actnal"
policy. In carrying out counter-factual analysis such as analysing the effects
of "neutral" fiscal policy, we are reqnired to give hypothetical values to the
policy variable, xt, which corresponds to "neutral" fiscal policy, however
defined.
If {Yt’ t = O, 1 . . . n} represents the solution of Equation (1) with actual
policies and (Y’t, t = O, 1 . . . n) refers to the solution ofyt where actual policies
are replaced by whatever form of indexation is chosen, then {Yt - Y’ , t = O,
t
l . . . n } represents the extent to which y is affected by policy activism in
the period in question.
One method of determining "neutral" or indexed policy is by using the
following simple policy rule,
x’ =as Xo, S=O, 1 ...n. (2)
where a refers to a constant parameter which might represent a constant
growth rate. This method of policy indexation implies that from a given
base period value x0, the policy variable is indexed by increasing x0 in
successive periods by (et- 1)xO. In other words, policy is always changed by
some proportion of the value of xt in period O, i.e., we use a fixed base
method of policy indexation. This implies that if the authorities controlling
the policy variable wish to follow a path of indexation by the above policy
rule, then the), must increase the policy variable by (~t-1) times its value in
some base period.
An alternative method of determining a "neutral" policy rule is to use the
following:
fF
x = ~ ×,-t (3)
t96
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This method of policy indexation implies that, if the policy variable is to
be indexed in any given period s, the authorities should increase it by (~- 1)
times the value of x in the previous period, s- 1. Therefore, the authorities
need not refer back to some previous base period on which to base neutral
policies, but only need the policies of the previous year.
Let us now distinguish two methods of analysing fiscal policy over a
number of time periods. One manner is to consider the aggregate effects of
fiscal policy, implemented in previous years, on a given year. We call this
approach "integral" fiscaI policy analysis and it amounts to comparing
actual xt against neutral xt defined from a base period for each time period
regardless of actual policies in the intervening period. This rather vague
description is clarified in Figure A3.1 below.
In time period s, actual policy is given by xs and neutral policy by x’s.
Therefore, the extent to which policy was over-indexed, i.e., the extent to
Figure A3.1: lnte~ral fiscal policy indexation with a fixed base
0
Xs÷I
s+l
tL,xt
s+l                  t
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which actual policy exceeded neutral policy, is given by/Xxs. l’n period s + 1,
policy activism under an integral fiscal measure is given by ~Xs+1 , regardless
of the fact that policy is over-indexed to a lesser extent than in the previous
period, i.e., the position that it inherited from period s. In other words, no
reference is made to thc extent of policy non-indexation in previous periods.
It has become more realistic in reccnt times to take account of the position
which has been inherited by an administration in period s, i.e., the value of
xt in period s- 1. This mcthod of policy indexation supposes that government
has less discretion than is assumed by the integral approach. This approach
implies that all policies which have been previously implemcntcd must be
seen as permancnt and indexation mnst be considered relative to the position
inherited in the previous pcriod. By such a mechanism we can isolate the
effect of individual p~nod s policy throughout the entire sample period. We
term this approach "incremental" fiscal policy anaysis. Again wc refer to
graphical presentation in Figure A3.2.
Assume, for simplicity, that s is the first period.so that there is no previous
position inherited. Therefore, policy activism is given by Axs. Becausc this
Figure A3.2: Incremental fiscal policy indexation with a fixed base
(X’s+l Ixs)
x
l~X’s+1
X$+l
I
×t
xPt
s S+I t
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change is considered as permanent its effects must now be considered until
the etad of tile sample. Therefore, the effects of this single period’s policy
can be detcrnained by simulating the model with this value of policy activism,
&Xs, removed from all time periods from s tmtil the end of the time period.
In this way we can examine the effect of the policies of period s for all future
time periods. Turning now to analysing the effects of policy in period s + 1,
we must now take account of the level of policy in the previous period, xs.
Let us first assume that indexation has been determined from a fixed base.
Therefore, the policy indcxation is ol)tained by increasing the policy variable
at period s by (c~- l)x0. This is given by the point (x’s+lxs) which means
indexed policy for period s + I using a fixed basegiven historical policies of
time period s. (This contrasts with the previous integral policy analysis
where no reference was made to the level of the policy variable in any
previous periods except the base pcriod). Therefore, policy activism for
period s + 1 is given by-&Xs+l.This value is again subtracted from actual
policy (i.e., Axs+I is added) and the modcl simulated from periods s + 1
onwards in order to exanaine the effect of policy of year s + 1.
By carrying out this procedure for all time periods we can isolate the
effects of the policics of all time periods for each subsequent period. An
intercsting question to ask is whether the effects of the individual period’s
policics can be meaningfully summed in order to obtain the aggregate effect
of fill policy changes from the base period to a given end period, and, if so,
will it give identical results to the integral approach which does a similar
calculation I)ut more directly? It can be shown algebraically that results
obtained from tile "integral" approach are identical to those from the
fixed base "incremental" approach for the simple model described by
Equation (1). This result depends on the assumptions that the model is
linear find that a is exogenous to the model, but not necessarily constant.
More generally, we can say that under the assumptions of linearity and
exogeneity of a, the "integral" effect and the sum of the incremental effects
will be identical for our model if the cumulative sum of &x’i, policy activism
under incremental policy for period i, for all periods previous to i, is equal
to &xi under the integral approach. This is the case in Figure A3.2 where Axs -
&x’s+1 is equivalent to the extent to which policy is over-indexed under an
integral approach, &xs÷I .
Let us now consider the case where the base is allowed to "float" from
one period to the next, where indexatlon is determined by the value of the
policy variable in the immediately previous period. In this case, indexation
implies increasing xt by (~- l)xt.I rathcr than by (a-l)X01 This situation is
illustrated in Fignre A3.3.
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Figure A3.3: Incremental fiscal policy indexation with a floating base
(X"s+l/xs)
s S+I t
As before, incremental policy analysis is implemented by stxbstituting
neutral policy for actual fiscal policy in each of the periods of the sample
in order to examine the effect of individual period’s policies. In tiffs case,
in order to index x in period s + 1 we increase the policy variable by (~e- l)xs
rather than (a-l)x0, bringing indexed policy to the point (X"s+1/Xs) which
denotes indexed policy in period s + 1 using a floating base and given historical
policy in year s. The reason why this exceeds the fixed base equivalent is
that the constant growth rate a- 1 is now being applied to a larger base under
the floating base approach (xs) than trader the fixed base approach (x0 ).
To put this last distinction into more concrete terms, this implies that,
say, government expenditure can increase by 5 per cent of last year’s value
of government expenditure rather than by 5 per cent (i.e., similar a) of
government expenditure in some remote base period. Therefore, this method
of indexation only has relevance given that historical policy v;cas set at
previous years’ levels unlike the incremental approach with a fixed base
or the integral approach where the extent to which the policy variable
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increased depended only upon a and tile base value of the policy variable,
x0. As a resuh, it is imphiusiblc to add thc impact effect of "indexed"
policy in period s to tile delayed cffect of "indcxcd" policy of period s- 1
oil period s since indcxation with a floating base in periods implies historical
policy of period s- 1. To put this in the same context as in the fixed base
case, the ctmlulativc sum of incremental policy with a floating base will not,
in gencral, bc equal to the measure of policy activism by an integral measure.
We are not comparing like with like and additivity will not hold cxccpt in
restrictive cases. The only case where tile incremental approach with a float-
ing base will be cquivalent to the incremental approacb is wbere policy has
been fully indexed for all time periods, i.e., xs = x’s = (x’s/Xs.l) = (x"s/
xs_l ). This rcfers to the case where actual policy followed a path of indexation
for all periods, clearly a redundant case for policy analysis.
Let us now consider the relative merits and demerits of each of the above
two forms of incremental policy analysis. The advantage of tile fixed base
case lies in the fact that it can be compared to the integral approach to
provide a test of model lincarity, given an exogenous a. The disadwmtage
of a fixed base approach is that it assumes that indexation involves the
addition of a constant amount (~ex0) to tile policy w~riable regardless of its
level in tile intervening period. Consider the implication of such a mechanism
for tile h’ish economy over tile last twenty years. The size of the public
sector has increased considerably over that time period so that adding a
constant fraction, of say, the size of tile public sector in 1960 will represent
a considerably smaller proportion of the size of the public sector in 1980
than it did in 1960. This can be seen as one advantage of tile floating base
approach to incremental fiscal policy since it can take account of the grow-
ing size of the policy variable over time, thus indexing by a constant pro-
portion of the increasing policy variable. In this way we can introduce a
naechanisnl which ensures that tbe ratio of government expenditure to GDP
can be maintained rougbly constant, i.e., by setting a equal to 1 plus the
rate of growth of GDP. "Ellis is not possible tinder the fixed base case except
in higbly restrictive cases. Another advantage of this definition of neutrality
is that it is mucb simpler for authorities to implement -- tbey need refer only
to the previous year’s Icvcl of x rather than determine a base year from
which indexation should occur. The main drawback of this approach is that
it no longer allows aggregation of each year’s fiscal policy for a given year
since each calculation only has relevance if the policy variable was set at
historical levels for all previous years.
Another reason why tests of additivity has not been performed in Chapter 5
is that we have violated one of tile assurnptions mentioned above which
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are necessary for additivity to occur -- namely, the exogeneity of e. In our
model ct is related to the rate of growth of GNP and, where the policy vari-
able concerned is in nominal terms, the price deflator of GNP. Botb these
variables are cndogenonsly determined and depend in part upon previous
years’ fiscal policy. When implementing incremental fiscal policy we assume
that all previous fiscal policy was set at "actual" levels so that "actual"
prices and rates of growth of GNP arc used to determine indexed values of
the policy variable for the year of implementation. However, under an
integral fiscal policy measure, because fiscal policies for periods previous to
that being examined differ from "actual" policies, thc endogenously dcter-
mined prices and growth rate of GNP may differ from those cxperienccd
under "actual" policy. Therefore, fiscal indexation under an incremental
and integral measure will involve different prices and growth rates so that,
in this case different e’s will result in alternativc valucs of policy activism.
As a result, a situation will arise where the cumulative effects of incremental
fiscal policy, even under a fixed base assumption, will differ in general from
an incremental approach.
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 205
Books:
Economic Growth in Ireland: The Experience Since 1947
Kieran A. Kennedy and Brendan Dowling
Irish Economic Policy: A Review of Major Issues
Staff Members of ESRI (eds. B. R. Dowling and J. Durkan)
The Irish Economy and Society in the 1980s (Papers presented at ESRI
Twenty-first Anniversary Conference) Staff Members of ESR1
The Economic and Social State of the Nation
J. F. Meenan, M. P. Fogarty,J. Kavanagh and L. Ryan
The Irish Economy: Policy and Performance 1972-1981
P. Bacon,J. Durkan andJ. O’Leary
Employment and Unemployment Policy for Ireland
Staff Members of ESR1 (eds. Denis Conniffe and Kieran A. Kennedy).
Policy Research Series:
1. Regional Policy and the Full-Employment Target
M. Ross and B. Walsh
2. Energy Demand in Ireland, Projections and Policy Issues S. Scott
3. Some Issues in the Methodology of Attitude Research
E. E. Davis et al.
4. Land Drainage Policy in Ireland Richard Bruton and Frank J. Convery
J.J. Sexton5. Recent Trends in Youth Unemployment
Broadsheet Series:
1. Dental Services in Ireland
2. We Can Stop Rising Prices
3. Pharmaceutical Services in Ireland
P. R. Kaim-Caudle
M. P. Fogarty
P. R. Kalm-Caudle
assisted by Annette O’Toole and Kathleen O’Donoghue
4. Ophthalmic Services in Ireland P.R. Kaim-Caudle
assisted by Kathleen O’Donoghue and Annette O’Toole
5. Irish Pensions Schemes, 1969 P.R. Kaim-Caudle andJ. G. Byrne
assisted by Annette O’Toole
6. The Social Science Percentage Nuisance R.C. Geary
7. Poverty in Ireland: Research Priorities Brendan M. Walsh
8. Irish Entrepreneurs Speak for Themselves M.P. Fogarty
9. Marital Desertion in Dublin: an exploratory study Kathleen O’Higglns
10. Equalization of Opportunity in lreland: Statistical Aspects
R. C. Geary and F. S. O Muircheartaigh
11. Public Social Expenditure in Ireland Finola Kennedy
12. Problems in Economic Planning and Policy Formation in Ireland,
1958-1974 Desmond Norton
13. Crisis in the Cattle Industry R. O’Connor and P. Keogh
14. A Stud), of Schemes for the Relief of Unemployment in Ireland
R. C. Geary and M. Dempsey
with Appendix                                                E, Costa
204 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
15. Dublin Simon Community, 1971-1976: an Exploration lan Hart
16. Aspects of the Swedish Economy and their relevance to Ireland
Robert O’Connor, Eoin O’Malley and Andlony Foley
17. The Irish Housing System: A Critical Overview
T.J. Baker and L. M. O’Brien
18. The Irish Itinerants: Some Demographic, Economic and Educational
Aspects M. Dempsey and R. C. Geary
19. A study of lndustrial Workers’ Co-operatives
Robert O’Connor and Philip Kelly
20. Drinking in Ireland: A Review of Trends in Alcohol Consumption,
Alcohol Related Problems and Policies towards Alcohol
Brendan M. Walsh
21. A Review of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Implications of
Modified Systems for Ireland
R. O’Connor, C. Guiomard andJ. Devereux
22. Policy Aspects of Land-Use Planning h~ lreland
Frank j. Convery and A. Allan Schmid
23. Issues in Adoption in Ireland                      HaroldJ. Abramson
Geary Lecture Series:
1. A Shnple Approach to Macro-economic Dynamics (1967)
R. G. D. Allen
2. Computers, Statistics and Planning-Systems or Chaos? (1968)
F. G. Foster
3. The Dual Career Family (1970) Rhona and Robert Rapoport
4. The Psychosonomics of Rising Prices (1971) H.A. Turner
5. An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Measurement of Utility or Welfare
( 1972) J. Tin bergen
6. Econometric Forecasting from Lagged Relationships (1973)
M. G. Kendall
7. Towards a New Objectivity (1974) Alvin W. Gouldner
8. Structural Analysis in Sociology (1975) Robert K. Merton
9. British Economic Growth 1951-1973: Success or Failure? (1976)
R. C. O. Matthews
10. Official Statisticians and Econometricians in the Present Day World
(1977) E. Malinvaud
11. PoliticalandInstitutionalEconomics(1978) Gunnar Myrdal
12. The Dilemmas of a Socialist Economy: The Hungarian Experience
(1979) J ~in os Kornai
13. The Story of a Social Experiment and Some Reflections (1980)
Robert M. Solow
14. Modernisation and Religion (1981) P.L. Berger
15. Poor, Relatively Speaking (1983) Amartya K. Sen
16. Towards More Rational Decisions on Criminals (1984) Daniel Glaser
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 205
General Research Series:
1. The Ownership of Personal Property in Ireland Edward Nevin
2. Short-Term Economic Forecasting and its Application in Ireland
Alfred Kuehn
3. The Irish Tariff and The E.E.C.: A Factual Survey Edward Nevin
4. Demand Relationships for Ireland C.E.V. Leser
5. Local Government Finance in Ireland: A Preliminary Survey
David Walker
6. Prospects of the Irish Economy in 1962 Alfred Kuehn
7. The Irish Woollen and Worsted Industry, 1946-59: A Study in Statis-
tical Method R.C. Geary
8. The Allocation of Public Funds for Social Development David Walker
9.. The Irish Price Level: A Comparative Study Edward Nevin
10. Inland Transport in Ireland: A Factual Study D.J. Reynolds
11. Public Debt and Economic Development. Edward Nevin
12. Wages in Ireland, 1946-62 Edward Nevin
13. Road Transport: The Problems and Prospects in Ireland
D.J. Reynolds
14. Imports and Economic Growth in Ireland, 1947-61 C.E.V. Leser
15. The Irish Economy in 1962 and 1963 C.E.V. Leser
16. Irish County Incomes hz 1960 E.A. Attwood and R. C. Geary
17. The Capital Stock of Irish Industry
18. Local Government Finance and County Incomes
19. lndustr~d Relations in Ireland: The Background
20. Social Security in Ireland and IVestern Europe
2 I. The Irish Econonzy in 1963 and 1964
22. The Cost Structure of Irish Industry 1950-60
23. A Further Analysis of Irish Household Budget Data, 1951-52
C. E. V. Lescr
24. Economic Aspects of h~dustrial Relations David O’Mahony
25. Psychological Barriers to Economic Achievement P. Pentony
26. Seasonality in Irish Economic Statistics C.E.V. Leser
27. The Irish Economy hz 1964 and 1965 C.E.V. Lescr
28. Housing in Ireland: Some Economic Aspects P.R. K~dm-Caudle
29. A Statistical Study of Wages, Prices and Employment in the Irish
Manufacturing Sector C. St. J. O’Herlihy
30. Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part L Energy Consumption in 1970
J. L. Booth
l’:dward Ncvin
David Walker
1)avid O’Mahony
P. R. Kaim-Caudlc
C. E. V. Lcscr
Edward Nevin
31. Determinants of Wage Inflation in Ireland Keith Cowling
32. Regional Employment Patterns in the Republic of Ireland T.J. Baker
33. The Irish Economy in 1966
The Staff of The Economic Research Institute
34. Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part H. Electricity and Turf J.L. Booth
35. Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part 111. International and Temporal Aspects
of Energy Consumption J.L. Booth
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
36. lnstitutional Aspects of Commercial and Central Banking in Ireland
John Hein
37, Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part IV. Sources and Uses of Energ’y
J. L. Booth
38, A Study of Imports C.E.V. Leser
39. The Irish Economy in 1967
The Staff of The Economic and Soci’,d Research Institute
40. Some Aspects of Price Inflation in lreland
R. C. Gear3’ andJ. L, Pratschke
41. A Medium Term Planning Model for Ireland David Simpson
if2, Some Irish Population Problems Reconsidered Brendan M. Walsh
43. The Irish Brain Drain Richard Lynn
64. A Method of Estimating the Stock of Capital in Northern Ireland
Manufacturing Industry: Limitations and Applications C.W. Jefferson
45. An Input-Output Analysis of the Agricultural Sector of the Irish
Economy in 1964 R. O’Connor with M. Breslin
46. The Implications for Cattle Producers of Seasonal Price Fluctuations
R. O’Connor
47. Transport in the Developing Economy of Ireland John Blackwcll
48. Social Status and Inter-Generatlonal Social Mobility in Dublin
Bertram Hutchinson
49. Personal lncomes by County, 1965 Miceal Ross
50. Income.Expenditure Relations in Ireland, 1965-1966
John L. Pratschke
.51. Costs and Prices in Transportable Goods Industries
W. Black,j. V. Simpson, D. G. Slattery
59. Certain Aspects of Non.Agricultural Unemployment in Ireland
R. C. Gear), and.]. G. Hughes
53. A Study of Demand Elasticities for Irish Imports Dermot McAleesc
54. lntemtal Migration in Ireland R.C. Geary and J. G. Hughes
with Appendix C.J. Gillman
55. Relig4on and Demographic Behaviour in Ireland B.M. Walsh
with Appendix R.C. Geary and J. G. Hughes
56. Views on Pay Increases, Fringe Benefits and’ Low Pay
H. Behrend, A. Knowles andJ. Davies
57. Views on Income Differentials and the Economic Situation
H. Behrend, A. Knowles andJ. Davies
58. Computers in Ireland F.G. Foster
59. National Differences in Anxiety Richard Lynn
60. Capital Statistics for Irish Manufacturing Industry C.W. Jefferson
61. Rural Household Budget - Feasibility Study
Sile Sheehy and R. O’Connor
62. Effective Tariffs and the Structure of Industrial Protection in Ireland
Dermot McAleese
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 207
63. Methodology of Personal Income Estimation by County Miceal Ross
64. Further Data on Count), Incomes in the Sixties Miceal Ross
65. The Functional Distribution of lneome in Ireland, 1938-70
J. G. Hughes
66. IHsh Input-Output Structures, 1964 and 1968 E.W. Henry
67. Social Status in Dublin: Marriage, Mobility and First Employment
Bertram Hutchinson
68. An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing, 1: The Visiting Anglers
R. O’Connor and B. J. Whelan
69. Women and Employment in Ireland: Results of a National Survey
Brendan M. Walsh assisted by Annette O’Toole
70. Irish Manufactured Imports from the UK in the Sixties: The Effects of
AIFTA                              Dermot McAleese and John Martin
71. Alphabetical Voting: A Study of the 1973 General Election in the
Republic of Ireland Christopher Robson and Brendan M. Walsh
72. A Study of the IHsh Cattle and Beef Industries
Terence J. Baker, Robert O’Connor and Rory Dunne
73. Regional Employment Patterns in Northern Ireland
William Black and Clifford W. Jefferson
74. IriSh Full Employment Structures, 1968 and 1975 E.W. Henry
75. An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing H: The IHsh Anglers
R. O’Connor, B. J. Whelan, and A. McCashin
76. Factors Relating to Reconviction among Young Dublin Probationers
lan Hart
77. The Structure of Unemployment in Ireland, 1954-1972
Brendan M. Walsh
78. An Economic Evaluation of lrish Salmon Fishing, IH: The Commercial
Fishermen B.J. Whclan, R. O’Connor, and A. McCashin
79. Wage Inflation and [.gage Leadership
W. E. J. McCarthy, J. F. O’Brien and V. G. Dowd
80. An Econometric Study of the lHsh Postal Service Peter Neary
81. Employment Relationships in Irish Counties
Terence J. Baker and Miceal Ross
82. Irish Input-Output Income Multipliers 1964 and 1968
J. R. Copeland and E. W. Henry
83. A Study of the Structure and Determinants of the Behavioural Com-
ponent of Social Attitudes in Ireland E.E. Davis
84. Economic Aspects of Local Authority Expenditure and Finance
J. R. Copeland and Brendan M. Walsh
85. Population Growth and other Statistics of Middle-sized Irish Towns
D. Curtin, R. C. Geary, T. A. Grimes and B. Menton
86. The Income Sensitivity of the Personal Income Tax Base in Ireland,
1947-1972                                            Brendan R. Dowling
208 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
87. Traditional Families? From Culturally Prescribed to Negotiated Roles
in Farm Families             Damien F. Hannah and Lonise Katsiaouni
88. An Irish Personality Differential: A Technique for Measuring Affective
and Cognitive Dimensions of Attitudes Towards Persons
E. E. Davis and Mar), O’Neill
89. Redundancy and Re-Employment in Ireland
Brendan J. Whelan and Brendan M. Walsh
90. A National Model for Fuel Allocation -- A Prototype
E. W. Henry and S. Scott
91. A Linear Programming Model for Irish Agriculture
Robert O’Connor, Miceal Ross and Michael Behan
92. lrish Educational Expenditures -- Past, Present and Future
A. Dale Tussing
93. The Working and Living Conditions of Civil Service Typists
N6irln O’Broin and GilIian Farren
94. Irish Public Debt Richard Bruton
95. Output and Employment in the Irish Food Industry to 1990
A. D. O’Rourkc and T. P. McStay
96. Displacement and Development: Class, Kinship and Social Change in
Irish Rural Communities Damian F. Hannan
97. Attitudes in the Republic of Ireland relevant to the Northern Problem:
Vol. 1: Descriptive Analysis and Some Comparisons with Attitudes in
Northern lreland and Great Britain E. E, Davis and R. Sinnot
98. Internal Migration Flows in lreland and their Determinants
J. G. Hughes and B. M. Walsh
99. Irish Input-Output Structures, 1976 E.W. Henry
100. Development of Irish Sea Fishing Industry and its Regional Implications
R. O’Connor, J. A. Crutchfield, B.J. Whelan and K. E. Mellon
101. Employment Conditions and Job Satisfaction: The Distribution,
Perception and Evaluation of Job Rewards       Christopher T. Whelan
102. Crime in the Republic of Ireland: Statistical Trends and their
Interpretation                                       David B. Rottman
103. Measure of the Capital Stock in the Irish Manufacturing Sector, 1945-
1973 R.N. Vaughan
104. A Study of National Wage Agreements in Ireland James F. O’Brien
105. Soeio-Economic Impact of the Construction of the ESB Power Station
at Moneypoint, Co. Clare
R. O’Connor, J. A. Crutchfield and B. J. Whelan
106. The Financing of Third-level Education A.C. Barlow
107. An Input-Output Analysis of New Industry in Ireland in 1976
E. W. Henry
108. Social Insurance and Absence from Work in Ireland Gerard Hughes
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 209
109. The Distribution of Income in the Republic of Ireland: A Stud), in
Social Class and Family-Cycle Inequalities
David B. Rottman, Damian F. Hannan, Niamh Hardiman and
Miriam M. Wiley
110. The Economic and Social Circumstances of the Elderly in Ireland
B.j. Whelan and R. N. Vaughan
111. [’forker Priorities, Trust in Management and Prospects for [.forkers"
ParticipatioN Christopher T. Whelan
112. The Impact of Energy Prices on the Irish Economy during 1973-1981
E. W. l-lenry
113. Schooling arid Sex Roles: Sex Differences in Subject Provision arid
Student Choice in Irish Post-Primary Schools
D. Hannah, R. Breen and B. Murray, D. Watson, N. Hardiman,
K. O’Higgins
114. Energy, Crops, Forestry arid Regional Development in Ireland
Frank J. Convery and Kathleen Dripchak
115. Aggregate Supply, Aggregate DemaNd and Income Distribution in
lreland:A Macrosectoral,’lnalysis John Bradleyand Conncll Fanning
116. Social Mobility in the Republic of Ireland: A Comparative Perspective
Christopher T. Whelan and Brendan J. Whclan
117. Attitudes towards Poverty and Related Social Issues in Ireland
E. E. Davis, Joel W. Grube and Mark Morgan
118. A study of New House Prices in Ireland in the Seventies
fan J. lrvine
119. Education and the Labour Market: Work and Unemployment Among
Recent Cohorts of Irish School Leovers Richard Breen
120. Payroll Tax INcidence, the Direct Tax Burden and the Rate of Return
on State Pension Contributions in Ireland              Gerard Hughes
12 I. Crime Victimisation in the Republic of lreland
Richard Breen and David B. Rottman
122. Medium-term Analysis of Fiscal Policy in Ireland: A Macroeconometric
Study of the Period 1967-1980
John Bradley, Connell Fanning, Canice Prenderg~st and Mark Wynne
ORIGINATION BY
DUBLIN
Printed in the Republic of Ireland by
Criterion Press Limited, Dublin.
Printed in the Republic of Ireland by
Criterion Press Limit(~k Dublin.
